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Introduction 
 
In recent years an intensified interest in the technical and historical details of Carnap’s 
philosophy of mathematics and logic could be witnessed. In my dissertation I take up this 
debate and focus on his early formative contributions to a theory of formal semantics. 
According to a dominating view regarding Carnap’s work, a ‘semantic turn’ - eventually 
culminating in his three volume book project Series in Semantics (Carnap (1942), Carnap 
(1943), Carnap (1947)) - took place only after his confrontation with Tarski’s program of 
“scientific semantics” and the acceptance of serious limitations of the syntactical method in 
Logical Syntax of Language (1934). This has recently been put into proper perspective in a 
number of contributions (Awodey and Carus (2001), Awodey and Reck (2001), Bonk and 
Mosterin (2000), Reck (2007), and Goldfarb (2005)). It is noted that there had been a short 
phase of theoretical engagement with semantic issues in Carnap’s work well before his work 
on logical syntax. These considerations were closely linked to a larger project on the 
methodology and formal reconstruction of modern axiomatics. Carnap’s contributions to the 
topic include two published articles, (Carnap (1930) and Carnap and Bachmann (1936)), as 
well as the recently published typescript Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Axiomatik of 1928 
(Carnap 2000). These works include early formal definitions of the notions of ‘model’, 
‘model extension’, and ‘logical consequence’ as well as a number of theorems concerning the 
metatheory of axiomatic theories. Whereas Carnap’s metatheoretic results have been 
examined in the literature (see above), no closer attention has so far been dedicated to 
Carnap’s conception of the basic semantic notions in his theory of axiomatics. In my 
dissertation, I provide a detailed conceptual analysis of the technical details of Carnap’s early 
semantics and contextualize his results in their historic and intellectual environment. By 
drawing to unpublished material from Carnap’s Nachlass, in particular his notes on the 
second projected part of Untersuchungen, I also discuss certain interpretative issues related to 
his heterodox conception of formal models and the tacit semantics for his type-theoretic logic.   
 
The dissertation comprises three chapters that are intended for separate publication. Chapter 1 
critically surveys Carnap’s attempt to provide a logical reconstruction of formal axiomatics in 
a type-theoretic setting. The chapter has two aims. First, to analyze the kind of mathematical 
structuralism and the specific semantics implicit in Carnap’s account. Second, to show that 
Carnap’s attempt to capture one of the central semantic innovations of formal axiomatics, i.e. 
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the definition of classes of structures, with his notion of “Explizitbegriffe” is severely limited 
due to these semantic assumptions. 
Chapter 2 examines Carnap’s theory of extremal axioms with a view to the auxiliary concepts 
of models and model extensions introduced in Carnap (2000). The motivating question here 
is: “Does Carnap’s early conception of models allow domain variation?” My discussion 
focuses on these aspects and responds to a commentary in Hintikka (1991) which states that, 
for several reasons, Carnap’s version of extremal axioms is seriously flawed. I present an 
alternative interpretation of Carnap’s theory and show that Hintikka’s claims cannot be 
upheld once a more balanced account of Carnap’s early conception of models is provided. I 
describe in detail two conventions used by Carnap to allow domain variation for his formal 
models. Finally I show that the notion of model extension underlying his theory of extremal 
axioms, if properly understood, clearly captures the informal use of model extension in the 
axiomatic tradition. 
Chapter 3 also discusses Carnap’s theory of extremal axioms, but this time from a more 
historical perspective. The aim in this chapter is to provide a historically sensitive 
reconstruction of the evolution of Carnap’s theory between 1928 and 1936. The main focus is 
thereby set on the unpublished documents of Part Two of Untersuchungen from his Nachlass. 
Carnap’s theory is surveyed with an eye to clarifying two points: the first concerns the main 
mathematical influences, most importantly by the set theorist Abraham Fraenkel, on Carnap’s 
specific formalization of minimal axioms. The second point regards Carnap’s specific 
understanding of the connection between extremal axioms and other metatheoretic notions of 
completeness, most notably the categoricity of an axiom system. 
 
Each chapter of the dissertation is concerned with a specific aspect or a specific interpretive 
issue of Carnap’s early formal semantics. As such, each is self-contained and readable as an 
independent paper. There is, however, a broader perspective shared in all chapters that can 
also be considered a more general motivation of this dissertation. It concerns a certain 
reservation against the universal validity of a still dominant interpretive scheme in the history 
of logic, viz. van Heijenoort’s (and Hintikka’s) classic distinction between the ‘universalist’ 
and the ‘model-theoretic’ tradition (e.g. van Heijenoort (1967), Hintikka (1988)). Briefly, 
their claim is that there exist two essentially incompatible traditions in the history of logic and 
that each of the major proponents of modern logic – from Frege, Russell, Carnap to Quine – 
can be neatly placed either within the one or the other camp. As I show in the dissertation, 
Carnap’s work in Untersuchungen from the late 1920s clearly does not fit within this dualist 
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picture. To be clear, there are on the one hand (as will be shown in Chapter 1) strong 
‘universalist’ leanings in Carnap’s work, particularly due to the logicist background in his 
treatment of axiomatics. Nonetheless, this does not prevent him on the other hand from 
developing an account of formal models for axiomatic theories that anticipates constitutive 
features of modern formal semantics (see Chapter 2). Thus, at least in this case, the van 
Heijenoort-Hintikka interpretive framework, if conceived in a strong dichotomic sense, does 
not help to clarify but rather conceals the real conceptual transformations in the evolution of 
modern logic present in his work on axiomatics. As I hope to show in the following, only a 
more balanced account of Carnap’s early semantics between the lines of the two grand logical 
traditions will allow specifying his particular contribution to the “semantic revolution” in 
logic in the first third of the last century. 
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Chapter 1: Carnap’s Explizitbegriffe: axiomatics, structuralism, and 
logicism  
 
1.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses Carnap’s attempt in the late 1920s to provide a formal reconstruction 
of modern axiomatics.1 One interpretive theme commonly addressed in the recent scholarly 
literature concerns Carnap’s underlying logicism in his philosophy of mathematics in the 
1920s, more specifically, his genuine attempt to “reconcile” the logicist approach of reducing 
mathematics to logic with the mathematical method of formal axiomatics.2 It was by Reck 
and others that the central idea in Carnap’s manuscript Untersuchungen was to balance a 
Fregean (or Russellian) foundational stance with the modern model-theoretic viewpoint 
introduced in Hilbert’s Grundlagen der Geometrie (Hilbert 1899).3 It was also shown that 
Carnap’s attempt to provide a logicist reconstruction of axiomatics is limited in several ways. 
No closer attention, however, has so far been dedicated to some of the details of his attempted 
reconciliation. 
Our principle aim in this chapter is to undertake a closer analysis of Carnap’s theory of 
axiomatics from Untersuchungen and the related works, specifically of the impact of an 
implicit logicist assumption underlying his early semantics for axiom systems. In this respect 
the concept of an “Explizitbegriff” (“explicit concept”) will stand in the center of attention. 
Carnap’s notion of “Explizitbegriffe” is particularly insightful in the evaluation of his 
reconciliatory approach between formal axiomatics and logicism. On the one hand it closely 
mirrors Frege’s own reconstruction of Hilbert’s method in Hilbert (1899). On the other hand, 
the concept is clearly introduced to capture formally one a central semantic innovation for 
formal axiomatics, namely the idea that an axiom system defines its class of structures. 
Moreover, the concept implies a structuralist account of mathematical theories that has 
leanings to both traditions.  
The subsequent discussion of these points is guided by several interpretive questions: First, in 
what sense is Carnap’s version of a mathematical structuralism expressed here effectively 
                                                 
 
1
 Carnap’s early contributions to axiomatics comprise two published articles, Carnap (1930) and Carnap and 
Bachmann (1936), as well as Carnap (1929) and the posthumously published typescript Untersuchungen zur 
allgemeinen Axiomatik (Carnap 2000) written around 1928. 
2
 Compare in particular Awodey and Carus (2001), Reck (2004), Reck (2007), and Bonk and Mosterin (2000).  
3
 For instance, Awodey and Carus (2007) characterize Untersuchungen as a “large-scale project to reconcile 
axiomatic definitions with logicism, and transform implicit into explicit definitions.” (ibid, 29) 
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comparable to the structuralism implicit in the modern axiomatic tradition, in particular in 
(Hilbert 1899)? Second, what are the semantic assumptions attached to this structuralist 
approach? Here, in particular, a closer look at the specifics of Carnap’s attempt to provide a 
formal semantics for axiomatic theories, viz. a theory of formal models, is insightful. Finally, 
given his logicist background, does his reconstruction meet the methodological and semantic 
desiderata of the modern axiomatic tradition?  
 
The chapter will be structured in this way: Following a brief presentation of the crucial 
semantic innovations in formal axiomatics (Section 1.2.1) and of Frege’s early attempt of a 
logicist presentation of formal axiomatics (Section 1.2.2), Carnap’s account of axiomatics will 
be outlined in Section 1.3. Section 1.3.1 introduces his notion of “Explizitbegriffe” of an 
axiom system. In Section 1.3.2 the kind of mathematical structuralism involved in this theory 
will be discussed. Carnap’s early notion of a formal model as defined in Untersuchungen is 
presented in Section 1.3.3. Given this rather expository part, we will show in Section 1.4.1 
that Carnap’s attempt to reconstruct the semantics of axiomatic theories is based on a specific 
logicistic premise, namely a logical definability condition for formal models. Carnap’s 
definability assumption is compared with similar accounts suggested by Tarski (Section 1.4.2) 
and Bachmann (1.4.3). We will argue in Section 1.5 that this premise has strong limiting 
effects for Carnap’s overall attempt to express the model-theoretic semantics of formal 
axiomatics. This will be shown for cases where Carnap employs quantification over the 
models of a theory is necessary (Section 1.5.1). It also effectively restrains the tacit semantics 
of his underlying type-theoretic background language (Section 1.5.2). In Section 1.6, it will 
finally be shown that, as a consequence of this, Carnap’s “Explizitbegriffe” fail to capture 
adequately the semantic innovations introduced by Hilbert and others in modern axiomatics.  
 
1.2 “Methodological turn(s)” of formal axiomatics   
It is not intended here to provide an all-encompassing picture of the conceptual 
transformations implied by the rise of formal axiomatics at the turn of the last century. Such a 
task would have to discuss the epistemological and methodological innovations in the works 
of Dedekind, Peano and the Italian ‘Peanists’, Pasch, and, most importantly Hilbert in contrast 
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to the traditional axiomatic method.4 Crucial points in this transformation include the change 
of the “epistemic status” of axioms, the new methodology for axiom choice and justification, 
the logical rigorization of proofs, as well as the strict “separation of the mathematical and 
logical [spheres] from the spatial-intuitive [sphere]” (Bernays 1922, 192), e.g. the complete 
abstraction from intuition in mathematical concept formation.  
 
1.2.1 Three semantic innovations 
What is relevant for our discussion is the fact that these “new methodological turn(s)” in 
formal axiomatics also led to a second revolution, namely a fundamental transformation of the 
semantics of a mathematical theory. With the abstraction from the intuitive sources of a 
theory, modern model-theoretic semantics could emerge. This is probably most explicit in 
Hilbert’s Grundlagen der Geometrie (Hilbert 1899).5 For the present purposes, it will be 
instructive to pin down three distinct but closely interrelated semantic innovations.   
A first important difference to the classical axiomatics lies in the disinterpreted character of 
the primitive terms of a mathematical theory. Given this schematic treatment, the primitive 
concepts (like, in Hilbert’s work, ‘point’, ‘line’, ‘between’ etc.) can then be reinterpreted in 
different ways.  
A second innovation resulting directly from this new, formal treatment of the mathematical 
terminology is the implementation of a theory of models, in Hilbert’s words “systems of 
things” that to allow the reinterpretation of implicitly defined mathematical primitive terms. 
In Hilbert’s Grundlagen, the use of models (and the idea of model variation) plays a 
methodologically fruitful role in his theory, more precisely in the metatheory for his axiom 
system: different analytic models ranging over a set of algebraic numbers and over the 
complete ordered field of real numbers are devised in order to prove the consistency of the 
axiom system and different independence results for his axioms.6   
                                                 
 
4
 See de Jong and Betti (2010) for a detailed account of the “classical model of science” preceding the modern 
axiomatic method. For a discussion of the historical evolution of modern axiomatics see e.g. Grattan-Guinness 
(2000). 
5
 For a more general account of the emergence of modern semantics in the axiomatic tradition see Hintikka 
(forthcoming). For a recent survey on the semantic innovations in Hilbert’s book and, more generally, on 
Hilbert’s new conceptualization of the relations of intuitive, analytic and axiomatic geometry compare Hallett 
(2008).  
6
 See Hilbert (1899, §2). Compare Hallett (2008) on the connection between the two innovations: “The basic 
technique which Hilbert adopted for this investigation is that of modelling, more strictly, of translating the theory 
to be investigated into another mathematical theory. For this, it is essential (…) that the primitive concepts are 
not tied to their usual fixed meanings; they must be free for reinterpretation.” (ibid, 211) 
  8 
A third innovation less explicit in Hilbert (1899) shows the algebraic background of his 
approach. It consists in the fact that an axiom system defines its class of models.7  This idea is 
best visible in Hilbert’s presentation of his axiom of completeness as a continuity axiom in 
later editions of Grundlagen. The axiom implicitly involves the quantification over the 
possible models of his theory.8 In modern terms, this more or less corresponds to the model-
theoretic notion of the “class of structures” defined by an axiom system. Briefly, the class 
defined is the one consisting of all models that satisfy the axiom system.9  
One can schematically present the three semantic innovations of formal axiomatics in this 
way:  
 
(1) The schematic conception of the primitive terms of a theory, and thus their 
reinterpretability. 
(2)  The use of formal models for the interpretation of a theory (as well as the related notions 
of truth or satisfaction in a model). This includes the systematic use of model construction and 
variation for establishing metatheoretic results.  
(3)  The notion of a definition of a class of models of an axiomatic theory. 
 
The reason for pinpointing (1)-(3) is to refer to them in the following as adequacy conditions 
for a logical reconstruction of the modern axiomatic method. Thus, any attempt to provide a 
formal presentation of axiomatics can only be considered successful if it manages to capture 
in an adequate manner each of these three semantic desiderata. 
As mentioned in Introduction, the specific case to be tested in terms of (1)-(3) will be 
Carnap’s explication of (Hilbertian) axiomatics. Before turning to his approach, however, a 
closer look at his immediate predecessor Frege and the latter’s attempt to come to terms with 
Hilbert’s new conception of axiomatics is instructive.  
 
                                                 
 
7
 Compare Hintikka on this point: “The basic idea of the [GS: axiomatic] method is the capture of a class of 
structures as the models of an axiomatic system.“ (Hintikka forthcoming) He further underlines the general 
relevance of this semantic approach in modern axiomatic thinking:  “The very purpose of the axiomatic method 
is to study some class of structures by constructing an axiom system whose models they are.” (ibid.)  
8
 See Hilbert (1900, 25). Compare Section 3.2 for a fuller discussion of Hilbert’s axiom.  
9
 Compare Hodges (1997, 30-37) for a technical presentation of the concept. 
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1.2.2 Frege on Hilbert (1899): a shared assumption? 
The appropriate starting point for our discussion of the adequacy of Carnap’s logicist 
reconstruction of formal axiomatics is the notorious controversy between Hilbert and Frege at 
the turn of the last century.10 Their widely discussed correspondence is illustrative since it 
provides a historical document that highlights some of the main conceptual differences 
between two opposing logical camps: Frege, on the one side, as the founder of logicism and 
proponent of a “universalist” conception of logic; Hilbert as an early proponent of the 
“model-theoretic tradition” on the other side.11 I will not go here into the details of Frege’s 
objections to Hilbert’s conception of axioms as implicit definitions, nor of Frege’s own 
conception of axioms and primitive terms in geometry and of his heterodox views on 
axiomatic metatheory (in particular concerning Hilbert’s indirect consistency proofs). It 
suffices to note that due these differences, their conceptions were sometimes characterized as 
simply irreconcilable.    
Nevertheless, as was recently stressed by various commentators, the conceptual differences 
between them are far smaller than often stated. In particular, in view of the semantic 
innovations of the modern axiomatic approach, it was pointed out that Frege’s approach to 
axiomatics is not, in principle, incompatible with the model-theoretic approach.12    
Concerning condition (1), one can find in Frege a convention to by-pass the schematic 
conception of logic necessary for Hilbert’s treatment of axiomatics primitives as formal 
terms. This is simply to treat primitives as free (higher-order) variables of the logical 
language in use, thus allowing a similar kind of generality constitutive for Hilbert’s approach. 
In Carnap’s notes on Frege’s lecture “Logic in Mathematics” from 1914 Frege’s intuition 
underlying this presentation is made clear. In a remark on Hilbert’s axioms Frege states that:   
 
Later Hilbert not only uses the word “between” with a different meaning, he also often uses “point,” 
“line,” “plane,” (…) differently from Euclid. What is unclear, then, is this: he never says so explicitly 
and he never makes clear how else he understands them. Often he uses expressions as indicating 
indefinitely, just as we use letters.” (Reck and Awodey 2004, 166, my emphasis) 
 
                                                 
 
10
 See Frege (1980) for the original correspondence between the two mathematicians. Compare Blanchette 
(2009) and the references given there for recent commentary on the debate.   
11
 As is well known, this distinction between two logical traditions goes back to van Heijenoort (1967). For more 
recent discussions see Goldfarb (1979) and Hintikka (1988). 
12
 Compare, e.g., Blanchette (2009) and Tappenden (1997). 
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“Letters” are understood here as free variables of the underlying formal language. It should be 
noted that this way of symbolizing the primitives of an axiomatic theory was common 
practice at that time. A similar treatment of schematic terms as variables can be found in the 
works of Russell, the American postulate theorists, and - as we will see - also Carnap. In fact, 
the same convention was also suggested by Hilbert himself three decades after his 
controversy with Frege. In Hilbert and Bernays (1934), a partial formalization of the axiom 
system of Hilbert (1899) is developed. Here, they state: “Speaking properly, the primitive 
relations have for formal axiomatics the role of variable predicates.” (ibid, 7)13 
Frege says less on condition (2), i.e. the systematic use of models for studying the 
(metatheoretic) properties of an axiomatic theory. In fact, it seems as though the very idea of a 
model as introduced in Hilbert’s Grundlagen was foreign to Frege’s understanding of 
axiomatics. For instance, in a letter dated January 6, 1900, he discussed a possible 
modification of Hilbert’s notion of implicit definitions. In comparing Hilbert’s version to that 
of Stolz, he critically adds:  
 
And to repair the damage that I believe to find in your definitions one will have to proceed in a similar 
way; except that it will be much more difficult because what is in question is not just a single system 
but three systems (of points, lines and planes) with their manifold relations. Incidentally, what are you 
calling a system here? I believe it is the same thing which is elsewhere called a set or a class and 
which is best called the extension of a concept. (Frege 1980, 47)    
 
This clearly suggests that Hilbert’s informal notion of a model as a “system of things” that 
satisfies the axioms was (to put it mildly) not fully acknowledged by Frege.   
Despite this obvious disinterest in Hilbert’s strategic use of models, Frege does make an 
interesting contribution to a formal presentation of (3). To understand his approach, it should 
be noted first that the modern version of (3) in terms of a “class of models” can be given an 
alternative formulation that more adequately catches the historical accounts of the idea. In this 
version, an axiom system defines not a class of models but an abstract structure (or a higher-
order property) that is shared by (or applies to) all possible models of the theory. Thus, in the 
case of Hilbert’s theory of Euclidian plane geometry, (3) can be understood as the 
specification of a general (relational) structure instantiated by all possible Euclidian planes. 
More generally, one can rephrase (3) by the equivalent version: 
                                                 
 
13
 “In Wahrheit aber haben für die formale Axiomatik die Grundbeziehungen die Rolle von variablen 
Prädikaten.” (Hilbert and Bernays 1934, 7) Compare Bonk and Mosterin (2000, 16). 
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(3*) An axiom system defines an abstract structure shared by all models satisfying the 
axioms.14 
 
It was argued recently that there is no deep conceptual difference between Frege and Hilbert 
on condition (3) since the former in fact proposes a logical reconstruction of (3*).15 The 
crucial convention used by him is the ascent to higher-order concepts. Frege holds that while 
the single axioms, as assertive statements, cannot be understood as (implicit) definitions in 
Hilbert’s sense, the axiom system nevertheless provides an explicit definition of a “second-
level concept” that holds for all first-order concepts defined in the theory. In the letter cited 
above, Frege explicitly discusses this point:   
 
The characteristic marks you give in your axioms are apparently all higher than first-level (…). It 
seems to me that you really want to define second-level concepts but do not clearly distinguish them 
from first-level ones. (ibid, 46)  
 
In a letter to Liebmann, his view of Hilbert’s (1899) alleged confusion of the hierarchy of 
concepts is stated in closer detail: 
 
It seems to me that Prof. Hilbert first had the idea in mind of defining second-level concepts; but he 
does not distinguish them from first-level concepts. And this explains what Hilbert’s explanations 
always leave unclear: how the same concept seems to be defined twice. It is just not the same concept. 
At first it is a second-level concept, afterwards a first-level concept falling into it. It is a mistake to 
mix up the two and to use the same word (e.g. ‘point’) in both connections. (ibid, 93-94)  
 
                                                 
 
14
 (3*) is closely captured by Corcoran’s insightful remark on the historical notion of a structure (of a domain) as 
opposed to its modern understanding of structure as a model: “From a philosophical and historical point of view 
it is unfortunate to that the term ‘mathematical structure’ [GS: as the class of mathematical objects and functions 
and sets over them] is coming to be used as a synonym for ‚mathematical system’. In the earlier usage (…) two 
mathematical systems having totally distinct elements can have the same structure. This in this sense a structure 
is not a mathematical system, rather a structure is a “property” that can be shared by individual mathematical 
systems. At any rate a structure is a higher order entity. (…) For mathematical purposes it would be possible to 
‘identify’ a structure with the class of mathematical systems having that structure, but such ‘identification’ may 
tend to distort one’s conceptual grasp of the ideas involved.” (Corcoran 1980, 188) For a detailed history of the 
notion of ‘structure’ in modern mathematics and logic compare also Mancosu (2006, 210). 
15
 See e.g. Blanchette (2009) and Tappenden (1997). Blanchette paraphrases (3*) in terms of a higher-order 
relation: “A set AX of sentences containing n geometric terms defines an n-place relation RAX holding of those n-
tuples which, when taken respectively as the interpretations of AX’s geometric terms, render the members of AX 
true.” (Blanchette 2009 (SEP)) 
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The idea outlined here is that axiomatic primitives like ’point’ effectively refer to two 
concepts. In Frege’s first sense, ‘point’ expresses a first-order concept that applies to a fixed 
class of elements. In addition, it also refers to a second-order concept, i.e. a concept “in” 
which all first-level concepts ‘point’ (with a fixed extension) that meet the conditions 
specified by the axioms fall. The second-level concepts, say ‘point2’, does not denote a 
specific system of points, but a class of systems of points, i.e. it holds for (extensionally) 
different concepts ‘point1’.16 Thus, Hilbert’s axiom system is reconstructed as providing an 
explicit definition of the second-order concept of “Euclidian Space” under which all 
geometric systems satisfying the axioms fall.17 
 
Now, despite Frege’s clear reservations against the Hilbert’s use of “systems of objects” with 
their “manifold relations”, it seems only a small step from this idea of higher-order concepts 
defined by the axioms to a properly semantic notion like (3*). As is suggested by Blanchette 
and others, there is thus no deep disagreement between Frege and Hilbert on this point. The 
actual differences between their accounts result only from two different ways to express 
essentially the same semantic idea.18 In particular, in Frege’s case, the main tool to express 
the second- or higher-order concepts explicitly defined by an axiom system is that of 
quantification in a higher-order pure logic (henceforth HOL). Quantification over individuals 
in sentences like “For all x, x is point and …” specifies a specific class of elements designated 
by ‘point1’. Second-order quantification in sentences like “For all classes of points, ….”  then 
expresses the second-level concept which holds for all concepts ‘point1’. Now, Frege is 
nowhere explicit on how the higher-order concept defined by an axiom system is to be 
formalized. Nonetheless, the idea can easily be recast in HOL. A possible tentative 
formulation of Frege’s idea is this: an axiom system AS specifies a concept P2 such that all 
concepts satisfying AS fall under this concept, i.e. formally, P2(X1) ↔ (∀X1)(AS(X1)).   
I will return to this specific interpretation of Frege’s view in Section 5. For the moment, it 
suffices to say that prima facie, there seems to be no deep conceptual difference between the 
informal model-theoretic version of (3) in Hilbert’s Grundlagen and the one outlined by 
                                                 
 
16
 Essentially the same idea can be found in the latter’s notes on Frege’s 1914 lecture (Awodey and Reck (2004, 
163-166).  
17
 Compare Reck (2004, 159-160) on this point.  
18
 This affinity was already pointed out in Stein (1988). Stein discusses a variant of (3*) in Hilbert (1899): “(…) 
hence the axioms taken together constitute a definition. Of what? Of a species of structure.” Then, he remarks on 
Frege’s “undervalued insight” concerning nature of this definition: “(…) a Fregean “second-level concept” 
simply is the concept of a species of structure.” (ibid, 254) 
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Frege. More generally, one could be inclined to argue that - despite the underlying, deeper 
divergences between the mathematicians on the nature of axioms, the role of intuition in 
geometry, the correct conception of logic, etc. - Frege’s account does in fact present a valid 
reconstruction of Hilbert’s semantics for his theory of geometry. At least two of the crucial 
semantic desiderata of formal axiomatics, namely (1) the reinterpretability of mathematical 
terms as well as (3*) the classification of an abstract structure by the axiom system are 
captured in the former’s reconstruction.  
With this background we will turn to Carnap’s formal presentation of axiomatics. Our aim 
will be to see whether this claim concerning the adequacy of a Frege-style logical 
reconstruction can be upheld once the technical details left implicit in Frege’s account are 
fully specified.    
 
1.3 Carnap’s axiomatics as “applied logistic” 
We know from Carnap’s lecture notes of Frege’s 1914 lecture that he was well acquainted 
with Frege’s understanding of (Hilbertian) axiomatics. Moreover, the continuity with Frege’s 
conception is also more than evident in Carnap’s own work on the axiomatic method, from 
the informal account in “Eigentliche und Uneigentliche Begriffe” (Carnap 1927) to more 
formal presentations in Abriss (Carnap 1929) and Untersuchungen (Carnap 2000).19 In 
particular, it is not difficult to identify several points of contact with Frege’s reconstruction of 
the semantic innovations made by Hilbert. Generally, it can be safely said that the main 
rationale for Carnap’s work was to provide a formal explication of Frege’s intuitions and, in a 
way, to reconcile the axiomatic method with the latter’s logicist approach to mathematics.  
 
1.3.1 “Explizitbegriffe“ for axiom systems  
Carnap’s understanding of modern axiomatics is informally outlined in the Section 2 of 
Untersuchungen (See Carnap, 2000, 87-90).20 The basic idea is that a formal axiom system is 
symbolized in a “basic discipline” (“Grunddisziplin”), viz. a fully interpreted type-theoretic 
language (henceforth STT for simply theory of types). The “primitive symbols” 
(“Grundzeichen”) do not have a fixed interpretation but can be freely interpreted. In the 
                                                 
 
19
 See in particular Awodey and Carus (2001) and Reck (2004) for a closer discussion.  
20
 Compare again Awodey and Carus (2001) for a similar discussion of Carnap (2000). 
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following passage the difference to “contentual axiomatics” (“inhaltliche Axiomatik”) is 
explicitly addressed:  
 
One can also understand the primitive concepts as unspecified elements and relations of an unspecified 
domain where it is only stipulated how they relate to each other as specified in the axioms. If in 
different domains elements and relations are found that satisfy these formal specifications, then the 
axiom system can be applied to each one of these domains; in each one of these domains also the 
consequences of the axiom system hold given the respective interpretation. (ibid, 88)21  
  
Carnap continues to remark that this version is the “method commonly used by the 
mathematician,” most notably Hilbert’s conception in Hilbert (1899). 
As mentioned above, his logical presentation of formal axiom systems in STT is closely 
inspired by Frege’s approach. Just as was indicated by Frege, the primitive symbols 
(expressing the primitive concepts) of a system are symbolized by free predicate variables (of 
a specified type). Axioms are conceived as propositional functions that range over the 
primitive symbols. The axiom system is also presented as a propositional function that 
expresses the conjunction of its axioms and contains a “model variable” (“Modellvariable”) of 
a specified type, e.g.:22 
                                                         f(Rn, Sn, Tn)  ∼  f(Mn+1)   
Given this formalization, we can see how Carnap intends to meet the semantic desiderate 
described above. It is clear from the passage just cited that condition (1), i.e. the 
reinterpretability of the primitive terms is clearly met here. Formally, this is done (as by Frege 
before) by the symbolization of the primitive terms in terms of free variables of STT. 
We will postpone the discussion of Carnap’s attempt to tackle condition (2) to Section 2.3. 
There, it will be shown that he, unlike Frege, had a distinct idea of how Hilbert’s “systems of 
things” can be recast in formal terms.  
                                                 
 
21
 “Oder aber man faßt die Grundbegriffe auf als unbestimmte Gegenstände und Beziehungen eines 
unbestimmten Gebietes, von denen nur festgelegt wird, daß sie sich so zueinander verhalten, wie es in den 
Axiomen bestimmt wird. Finden sich auf verschiedenen Gebieten Gegenstände und Beziehungen, die diese 
formalen Bestimmungen erfüllen, so kann das Axiomensystem auf jedes dieser Gebiete bezogen werden; auf 
jedem dieser Gebiete gelten dann auch in entsprechender Deutung die Folgerungen des Axiomensystems.“ (ibid, 
88) 
22
 This conception of axiomatic systems as propositional functions was first introduced in published form in 
Carnap (1929, 70-72). It is important to note here, however, that this convention to treat axiomatic theory as 
propositions functions was quite common at the time Carnap was working on the topic. Carnap is referring to 
Huntington (1913) for the first explication of this position. Compare Jané (2006, 18-27) on a similar conception 
in the works by the ‘Peanists’ Padua and Pieri. See Mancosu (2006, 212-216) for a broader historical survey of 
this “widespread conception”. Finally, see Section 3.4.1 for a similar account in Fraenkel (1928). 
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Concerning condition (3) (or (3*)), Carnap’s attempt was to provide a logical reconstruction 
of Frege’s original idea that an axiom system explicitly defines a higher-order concept. His 
formal version of this is most explicitly discussed in his logic manual Abriss der Logistik 
(Carnap 1929). In the second part of the book, titled “Applied Logicist,” Carnap describes – 
in line with the Untersuchungen – two ways of understanding an axiom system: (1) as an 
interpreted theory and (2) as a formal system in Hilbert’s sense. Accordingly, two formal 
presentations in STT can be provided for the theory in question: the primitive terms in (1) are 
to be expressed via non-logical constants, in the case (2), as we have seen, via free variables 
(Carnap 1929, 71).23 Given this, Carnap is quick to point out that an axiom system in question 
not only provides implicit definitions of its primitive terms, but also an explicit definition of 
something comparable to Frege’s second-level concepts, namely an “Explizitbegriff”. I quote 
the central passage on this point in Carnap (1929) in full length since it will provide the basis 
for our further discussion:      
 
In every AS (…) one or more primitive concepts are implicitly defined as “improper concepts”. In 
addition, a specific, namely a logical concept is defined explicitly by any AS of n primitive concepts: 
the “explicit concept” (“Explizitbegriff“) for the AS; this concept is a class for n = 1, otherwise an  
n-ary relation. If x, y, … α, β, … P,  Q,… are the primitive variables of the AS and if we name the 
conjunction of axioms (that is a propositional function) AS(x, y, … α, β, … P,  Q,…), then the 
definition of the explicit concept for this AS is: 
                                        
( )}{ ,...,,...,,,...,,,...ˆ,ˆ,...,ˆ,ˆ,...,ˆ,ˆ QPyxASQPyx βαβα
 
The explicit concept of Peano’s AS of the numbers e.g. is the class of number sequences that satisfy 
the AS; this is the logical concept prog (class of the progressions (...)). (ibid, 71-72)24 
 
                                                 
 
23
 Compare the following passage: “Jedes AS (…) ist zunächste ein System von Zeichenkombinationen, für 
dessen Deutung dir folgenden Möglichkeiten vorliegen: 1. Die Zeichen der Grundbegriffe („Grundzeichen“) 
bezeichnen bestimmte nichtlogische Begriffe; es sind also nichtlogische Konstanten; die Axiome und die 
deduzierten Lehrsätze sind Aussagen über diese Begriffe. 2. Die Grundzeichen haben an sich noch keine 
Bedeutung, sondern bekommen sie erst durch das AS: sie sollen das bezeichnen, was die durch das AS 
angebebenen Eigenschaften und Beziehungen hat („implizite Definition“); exakter ausgedrückt: die 
Grundzeichen sind Variable, die Axiome und Lehrsätze (…) Aussagefunktionen.” (Carnap 1929, 71).  
24
 “In jedem AS werden (...) ein oder mehrere Grundbegriffe als „uneigentliche Begriffe“ implizit definiert. Es 
wird aber außerdem durch jedes AS, wenn es n Grundbegriffe hat, ein bestimmter, und zwar ein logischer 
Begriff, explizit definiert, der “Explizitbegriff“ des AS, dieser Begriff ist für n = 1 eine Klasse, sonst eine n-
stellige Relation. Sind etwa x, y, … α, β, … P,  Q,… die Grundvariablen des AS, und bezeichenen wir die 
Konjunktion der Axiome (also eine Aussagefunktion) mit AS(x, y, … α, β, … P,  Q,…), so lautet die Definition 
des Explizitbegriffs dieses AS: ( )}{ ,...,,...,,,...,,,...ˆ,ˆ,...,ˆ,ˆ,...,ˆ,ˆ QPyxASQPyx βαβα . Der Explizitbegriff des 
Peanoschen AS der Zahlen ist z.B. die Klasse der Zahlfolgen, die das AS erfüllen, das ist der logische Begriff 
prog (Klasse der Progressionen (…)).“ (ibid, 71-72) 
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It is important to have a precise understanding of what is stated here. According to Carnap, 
setting up an axiom system implies the definition of a (logical) “Explizitbegriff” as a class or 
relation whose members are the interpretations of the theory. For instance, an axiom system 
with one primitive binary relation R (as in his example of basic “Peano arithmetic”) explicitly 
defines the class of higher-level relations R1, R2, etc., i.e. the “class of progressions” that 
satisfy the axiom system.25 For an axiom system with n primitive terms (e.g. Hilbert’s system 
in Hilbert (1899), the respective “Explizitbegriff” denotes a higher-level n-ary relation (in 
modern terms, a class of n-tuples).   
Now, Carnap’s notion of “Explizitbegriffe” clearly mirrors Frege’s informal talk of higher-
level concepts. It has to be understood as a Frege-style attempt to formally model or capture 
the semantic innovation (3), i.e. the concept that an axiom system specifies its own model 
class. Note that Carnap seems closer to the modern model-theoretic understating of (3) than 
Frege originally was. The former explicitly speaks of a “class” determined by the 
‘Explizitbegriff’ consisting of those interpretations that “satisfy the AS”. Moreover, he uses 
set comprehension to present his concept formally.  
 
1.3.2 A structuralist account 
Carnap’s account of ‘Explizitbegriffe’ in Abriss can also be considered as a formal 
representation of the structuralist variant (3*). In his example of Peano arithmetic, he 
mentions the “class of number sequences”. In the same sentence he holds that the axiom 
systems also defines “the logical concept prog” (ibid, 72). Thus, the ‘Explizitbegriff’ is 
viewed here as a (logically defined) concept or property that applies to all interpretations of 
the theory. This seems to mirror closely the “structuralist methodology” (Reck and Price 
2000) underlying the modern axiomatic method. Briefly, structuralism holds that mathematics 
is the study of structures or of structural properties of the objects that leaves unspecified the 
particular nature of objects.26 This idea is at least implicit in Hilbert axiomatic approach. 
Here, a theory does not study the specific intuitive nature of particular geometrical objects or 
collections of objects but their ‘logical relations’, i.e. an abstract structure. In a second, 
independent step the models as the instances in such a relational structure are studied.27 
                                                 
 
25
 For a detailed presentation of Carnap’s theory of basic arithmetic see 2.5.1 as well as 3.4.3.  
26
 See Shapiro (2000, 257-260). 
27
 See again Bernays (1922, 192-193). Compare also Hintikka on the implicit structuralism in modern 
axiomatics: ”The structuralist orientation of modern mathematics naturally leads to the use of axiomatization. To 
understand a kind of structure, for instance the structure of a group, is to have an overview over all its 
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Carnap’s own structuralist account of axiomatics becomes visible at several places in his 
work from the late 1920s. In Carnap (1929), in discussing different examples of 
‘Explizitbegriffe’ of mathematical axiom systems, he explicitly mentions of the structures of a 
theory. Beside Peano arithmetic, he mentions different systems of projective geometry and 
topology, stating that:  
 
(...) the explicit concept of a geometrical AS, e.g. of an AS of projective geometry (...) presents the 
logical concept of the respective type of space (e.g. the concept “projective space“). In this way, 
geometry can (like arithmetic (...)) also be presented as a branch of logistic instead of an applied case 
of logistic to a non-logical field. (ibid, 72)28 
 
Here, as in the case of Peano arithmetic, the respective axiom systems in geometry define an 
abstract “logical concept” of a particular (Euclidian, projective or topological) space that is 
instantiated by different (Euclidian, projective or topological) models. Moreover, the 
specification of this concept can be effected in purely logical terms, thus geometry itself can 
be reconstructed as a “branch of logistic”. (I will return to this latter point in Section 1.4.) 
This structuralist account of geometry is further specified in an interesting exchange between 
Scholz and Carnap in 1932 on the latter’s conception of ‘Explizitbegriffe’ for axiomatic 
geometry in Abriss. Scholz, in a letter dated April 19, 1932, remarks on the “interpretation of 
Euclidian space”:  
 
I have thought about a lot (...) whether it makes sense to call every sextuple of argument values that 
satisfy the Hilbert axioms of an Euclidian space (...). If this makes sense, then the Euclidian space (of 
course in the sense of the class of Euclidian spaces) would be the explicit concept (“Explizit-Begriff“) 
defined by the Hilbert system. Do you otherwise know an interpretation that gives us the One 
Euclidian space? (RC 102-72-07)29  
  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
instantiations. In an axiomatic system, this is accomplished by capturing all those structures as the models of the 
system.” And: ”For this method is the natural one for a structuralist. The axioms determine a class of structures 
as models of the axiom system.“ (Hintikka (forthcoming)) 
28
 “(…) der Explizitbegriff eines geometrischen AS, z.B. eines AS der projektiven Geometrie (…) stellt den 
logischen Begriff der betreffenden Raumart dar (z.B. Begriff “projektiver Raum“). Auf diese Weise kann auch 
die Geometrie, anstatt als Anwendungsfall der Logistik auf ein nichtlogisches Gebiet, dargestellt werden als 
Zweig der Logistik selbst (wie die Arithmetik (…)).“ (ibid, 72) 
29
 “Ich habe (...) viel darüber nachgedacht, ob es sinnvoll ist, jedes Sextupel von Argumentwerten, die die 
Hilbert-Axiome befriedigen, einen Euklidischen Raum zu nennen (…). Wenn die Sache sinnvoll ist, so wäre der 
Euklidische Raum (natürlich im Sinn der Klasse der Euklidischen Räume) der durch das Hilbert-System 
definierte Explizit-Begriff. Oder kennen Sie eine Interpretation, die uns den Einen Euklidischen Raum liefert?“ 
(RC 102-72-07) 
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Carnap’s reply in a letter (dated May 3, 1932) is particularly insightful:  
 
To me, it does not seem to be a question of truth but of convenience what one names “Euclidian 
space“. In case one prefers to speak not of various Euclidian spaces but of the Euclidian space, it 
seems convenient to name as “Euclidian space” the structure shared by the Hilbertian sextuples. (RC 
102-72-04)30  
 
This clearly shows Carnap’s structuralist conception of geometrical theories. (Euclidian) 
space is defined here as the abstract structure shared by all models of Hilbert’s 
axiomatization.31 Finally, Carnap’s structuralism is also evident in his more general account 
in Untersuchungen. Here, the formal reconstruction of axiom systems and the model theory 
for them that makes essential use of the notion of structures. Briefly, a theory can express a 
number of ‘structures’ where each structure defines an isomorphism class of models (Carnap 
2000, 121-123). If the axiom system defines only one structure (as in the case of Peano 
arithmetic and Hilbert’s Euclidian geometry), it is categorical (“monomorph”). It is non-
categorical (“polymorph”) in case it defines more than one structure (ibid, 128-129).32  
 
Given these remarks it is obvious that Carnap shares with the axiomatic tradition a 
structuralist understanding of mathematics. Nonetheless, our initial concern was to see how 
exactly his account of axiomatics can be positioned between Hilbert’s model-theoretic 
viewpoint and a Frege’s ‘universalist’ approach. With this in mind, a more refined view of 
what Carnap’s version effectively amounts to will prove to be necessary.  
For this task a comparison with two variants of mathematical structuralism in the 
contemporary discussion will be insightful. In the current debate, two (among other) different 
conceptions are frequently discussed, namely (a) “relative structuralism” and (b) “unversalist” 
or “eliminative structuralism”.33 Both accounts hold that the genuine subject field of a formal 
mathematical theory are abstract structures and not (as for instance in synthetic geometry, 
                                                 
 
30
 “Es scheint mir keine Wahrheitsfrage, sondern nur eine Zweckmässigkeitsfrage zu sein, was man als 
“euklidischen Raum“ bezeichnen will. Möchte man lieber nicht von mehreren euklidischen Räumen, sondern 
von dem euklidischen Raum sprechen, so dürfte es zeckmässig sein, als „euklidischen Raum“ die den 
Hilbertschen Sextupeln (…) gemeinsame Struktur zu bezeichnen. (…).” (RC 102-72-04) 
31
 For a related account of formal geometry compare Carnap’s dissertation (Carnap 1922), in particular of 
chapter 1 on “formal space”. 
32
 An example of a noncategorical theory discussed by Carnap is the axiom system of topology presented in 
Abriss §33 (Carnap 1929, 75-78). See 2.2 for a more detailed discussion of Carnap’s conception of axiomatics. 
33
 For an overview of the current debate see Shapiro (2000). For a detailed comparison of (a) and (b) see Reck 
and Price (2000, 348-354 and 354-361 respectively). For a further discussion of (a) compare Parsons (1990). 
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facts about the intuitive nature of the field of investigation). The central difference between 
them concerns alternative assumptions on the additional “semantic implications” of the 
structuralist doctrine (see Reck and Price 2000, 347). In (b), the abstract structures studied by 
a theory can be instantiated by models or set-theoretical structures. Hence, talk about abstract 
structures can thus be replaced by talk about a specific interpretation of a theory once the 
structure has been interpreted model-theoretically. The denotation of the primitives and the 
truth of a theory are specified relative to a given model.   Moreover, the consequence relation 
between a sentence and the theory can be expressed via the notion of model-theoretic 
consequence (see ibid, 349-350). Thus, a relative structuralist position can be characterized as 
the combination of two assumptions: mathematical structuralism and standard model theory.  
In contrast to this, position (b) does not turn to model theory for a semantic theory in support. 
Instead of interpreting the primitives of a theory and its domain of discourse in a particular 
model, the eliminative structuralist uses higher-order logic to circumvent talk about relative 
truth and specific model construction. Here, consequence is not defined model-theoretically 
but via the introduction of a universally closed conditional of the form 
                                          (∀R)(∀S)(∀T)[AS(R, S, T) → ϕ(R, S, T)] 
where R, S, T are higher-order variables for the primitive terms of an axiomatic theory AS and 
ϕ(R, S, T) is a specific sentence of the theory. The closed formula then essentially states that 
for any tuple of assignments to the primitives, ϕ follows logically from AS. In short, the 
sentence expresses a true sentence in HOL. Note that this too marks a specific semantics 
assumption, just like the adoption of model-theory in the case of (a). The respective difference 
in the semantic assumptions between the two versions is specified in Reck and Price (2000): 
the crucial characteristic of (a) is that - instead of a model-theoretic interpretation of a 
structure – use of higher-order quantification is made that allows generalization over all 
possible interpretations of the variables R, S, T of an axiom system. For the case of Peano 
arithmetic this has the following effect: 
 
(…) note that we again “abstract away” – now by generalizing – from what is peculiar about any 
particular model of PA2. (…) In fact, (…) any reference to specific models of PA2, or to particular 
objects and functions in them, has disappeared completely (even in a relative or model-theoretic 
sense). Instead, what we assert with an arithmetical statement p is now something about all objects, all 
one-place functions, and all one-place predicates and sets; since the main logical operators in q [GS: a 
universally closed sentence like the one above] are unrestricted universal quantifiers. (ibid, 356)  
 
In comparison to (a), this difference is further specified in this way:  
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In relativist structuralism the basic idea is to pick a particular model of the relevant theory and to 
explain the reference of mathematical terms with respect to it; in universalist structuralism the appeal 
to particular objects and the use of referring terms is simply quantified away. (ibid, 361) 
 
Given this, does Carnap’s structuralist account of axiomatics (and in particular his 
reconstruction of ‘Explizitbegriffe’) side with one of these two variants and its respective 
“semantic implication”? As we will see, it is difficult to provide a clear-cut answer to this 
question. Consider again Carnap’s two main intellectual influences on this theory of 
axiomatics: Hilbert’s position in Grundlagen and Frege’s logical reconstruction. It is clear 
that the semantic innovations in Hilbert (1899), in particular his introduction and systematic 
use of formal models (viz. (2)) make Hilbert an early proponent of relative structuralism. In 
contrast, Frege’s suggested formulation of innovation (3*) via the use of higher-order 
concepts in 1900 and again in 1914 can be viewed as a kind of eliminative structuralism.34 
The difficulty in positioning Carnap’s account within one of the two camps of mathematical 
structuralism results from the fact that it deliberately was formulated as a reconciliation 
between Hilbert’s and Frege’s viewpoints. We emphasized the strong continuity between 
Carnap’s notion of ‘Explizitbegriffe’ and Frege’s reconstruction of (3*). In fact, one can 
easily reformulate Carnap’s use of set comprehension in the explication of this notion  
                                    ( )}{ ,...,,...,,,...,,,...ˆ,ˆ,...,ˆ,ˆ,...,ˆ,ˆ QPyxASQPyx βαβα  
by a universally quantified sentence in his “applied logistic” of the form  
   (∀x)(∀y) ..(∀α)(∀β)..(∀P)(∀Q)..(AS(x, y,..α,β,.. P, Q,..) → ExAS(x,y, .. α, β,..P, Q,..)) 
Here, ExAS stands for the ‘Explizitbegriff’ of the axiom system in question. This clearly looks 
like an instance of the more general scheme of eliminative structuralism discussed above. In 
fact, given his examples of ‘Explizitbegriffe’ in Carnap (1929), one could view the quantifiers 
in the sentence as introduced in order to “abstract away” from the reference to particular 
models of the class of interpretations specified by the axiom system. (I will return to this 
interpretation in Section 5.)  
Can one infer from this that Carnap was an eliminative structuralist? To a certain point, as far 
as the Fregean background of his reconstruction goes, we would argue that one can. 
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to hold that he was an eliminative structuralist throughout. 
                                                 
 
34
 More generally, it is sometimes argued that eliminative structuralism and in particular the convention to treat 
mathematical primitives not as schematic terms but as variables, has close ties to the logicist accounts. Compare 
Parsons (1990, 311-315). 
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In particular, closer attention to his explication of several semantic notions in the context of 
his work on axiomatics shows that the situation is more intricate in his case. Where Carnap 
differs from Frege is in the fact that he, unlike the latter, makes a serious attempt to come to 
terms logically with Hilbert’s semantic innovation (2), viz. the introduction and use of models 
of an axiom system. 
 
1.3.3 Formal models in Untersuchungen 
No closer account of what Carnap understands by an interpretation of an axiomatic theory is 
provided in Carnap (1929). Fortunately, in his Untersuchungen written around the same time 
as Abriss, a detailed formulation of the notion of a “formal model” of an axiom system can be 
found.35 In §2.3 of the manuscript, the following definition is given: 
 
If we write for f(R, S, T), in short f(M), and if R1, S1, T1 are specific, e.g. arithmetic relations that are 
admissible values of the variables R, S, T, then we can also introduce an abbreviatory notation for the 
ordered system of relations R1, S1, T1, say M1. The model M1 is then a value of the model variable M. 
Each of the relation variables R, S, T of the axiom system has a specific type (…); the sentential 
function for f(R, S, T) only yields a true or false sentence if the values of these types are inserted. If the 
three relations R1, S1, T1 are admissible values of the variables R, S, T, i.e. if they can adopt the type of 
the three variables R, S, T (by declaring a specific domain of discourse in them to be the domain of 
individuals), we name the system of relations (R1, S1, T1), or short M1 an “admissible model” of fM, 
irrespective of whether M1 satisfies fM or not; fM1 is then in any case meaningful, i.e. either a true or a 
false sentence. An admissible model M1 of fM is only then also a model of fM if fM1 is not only 
meaningful, but also true. (Carnap 2000, 95, notation slightly changed)36 
 
                                                 
 
35
 Compare also Chapter 2 for a detailed survey of Carnap’s conception of models.  
36
 “Schreiben wir für f(R, S, T), kurz f(M), und sind R1, S1, T1 bestimmte, etwa arithmetische Relationen, die 
zulässige Werte der Variablen R, S, T sind, so können wir auch für das geordnete Relationensystem R1, S1, T1 ein 
abkürzende Bezeichnung einführen, etwa M
 1. Das Modell M1 ist dann ein Wert der Modellvariablen M. Jede der 
Relationsvariablen R, S, T des Axiomensystems hat einen bestimmten Typus (…); nur dann, wenn Werte dieser 
Typen eingesetzt werden, ergibt die Aussagefunktion für f(R, S, T) eine wahre oder falsche Aussage. Wenn die 
drei Relationen R1, S1, T1 zulässige Werte der Variablen R, S, T  sind, d.h. wenn sie (dadurch, dass ein 
bestimmter Gegenstandsbereich in Ihnen zum Individuenbereich erklärt wird) den Typus der drei Variablen R, S, 
T annehmen können, so nennen wir das Relationensystem (R1, S1, T1), oder abgekürtzt M1, ein „zulässiges 
Modell“ von fM, gleichgültig, ob M1 fM befriedigt oder nicht; fM1 ist dann jedenfalls sinnvoll, nämlich entweder 
eine wahre oder eine falsche Aussage. Ein zulässiges Modell M1 von fM ist nur dann auch Modell von fM1, wenn 
fM1 nicht nur sinnvoll, sondern wahr ist.“ (Carnap 2000, 95, notation slightly changed) 
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We have seen above that axiom systems were conceived by Carnap as “theory-schemata” 
logically presentable as systems of sentential functions that range over several predicate (or 
relation) variables. Systems with more than one predicate variable of the form f(R, S, T) are 
abbreviated by a “model variable” M of a specified type. The resulting axiom system f(M) 
allows different empirical and formal interpretations. The term “formal model” is reserved for 
the second type of interpretations. The variable M thus ranges over the set of adequate models 
(“zulässige Modelle”) of f (ibid, 95).  
Carnap’s account has to be considered as an early attempt to provide a logically precise 
definition of models, viz. of condition (2) in the axiomatic context. Whereas different 
informal version of the notion had been used in the 1920s and before, it is mainly in Carnap’s 
Untersuchungen as well as in Tarski’s work at the same period that first attempts of a formal 
explication were given.37 This said it is obvious that Carnap’s definition of a model is - in 
several ways - heterodox compared to modern account of models. In recent work Carnap’s 
Untersuchungen, it was characterized as “something like model theory” (Awodey and Carus 
(2001, 145) or as an “early heuristic form of the modern concept” of models (Bonk and 
Mosterin (2000, 38). However, so far no further qualification of Carnap’s account has been 
given. Nonetheless, I believe that for reasons shown below, it is worth the effort to look more 
closely at where precisely Carnap’s conception of models differs from the modern account. 
Some aspects are clearly anachronistic: first, note that in contrast to standard model theory 
models are devised for theories formulated not in first-order but in higher-order logic, 
particularly in type-theoretical setting.38,39 Moreover, Carnap is operating in Untersuchungen 
with a pure logical language with an empty signature, whereas, in the modern account, 
models are usually constructed for theories in languages with a non-empty signature. This 
difference in the kind of the formal language is directly reflected in the Carnap’s conceptual 
architecture of models. Briefly, a model (for a formal language) is conceived now as a tuple 
〈D, I〉 where D designates the (non-empty) universe and I the interpretation function that 
                                                 
 
37
 See Badesa (2004) for an account of early model theory in the work of Löwenheim and Skolem. Compare 
Mancosu (2006) on Tarski’s early notion of a model. See Sieg and Schlimm (2005) for a detailed discussion of 
the notion of a system in Dedekind’s work on arithmetic, in particular Dedekind (1888). See Jané (2006) for a 
more general discussion of the semantic notions ‘system of things’, ‘application’, and ‘representation’ (among 
others) in the work of the Italian ‘Peanists’ as well as the American postulate theorists Veblen, Young and 
Huntington.  
38
 In fact, Carnap gives an explicit specification of the type-theoretic setting in which his theory of models is 
conceptualized. One of his contributions to a systematic theory of models is the above distinction between the 
‘structural adequacy’ as a type-theoretic condition for ‘admissible models’ and the ‘truth’ in a model. This two-
step approach to models clearly mirrors Carnap’s strong background in Principia Mathematica, particularly the 
theory of relations presented there. For more on this see Chapter 2. 
39
 Compare, however, Shapiro (1991), where a model theory of SOL is outlined. 
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assigns to the non-logical symbols of the language elements of D (sets of elements of D, 
relations on D, and functions from Dn to D, respectively).40 In Carnap’s notion, there exists no 
interpretation function I, but only valuations to the variables R, S, T, viz. the primitive terms 
of the theory. A model M1 is thus simply conceived as an n-tuple of relations (or more 
precisely, as we will see, as a sequence of relational constants) of a specified type that are 
assigned to the ‘primitive symbols’ and that “satisfy” the axiom system f.41  
Finally, returning to our discussion above, it follows from Carnap’s heterodox understanding 
of formal models and its subsequent use in his discussion of axiomatic theories and their 
metatheory that his account cannot be classified as an eliminative structuralism tout court. 
Just like the relative structuralist Hilbert, Carnap uses the notions of “truth”, “satisfaction” of 
an axiom system relative to a given model and does not “abstract away” from particular 
interpretations of the theory. One can thus conclude that he held a hybrid structuralist position 
that combines both elements from (a) with elements from (b). We saw above that he seems to 
favour the semantics involved in unversalist structuralism in discussing the ‘Explizitbegriffe’ 
of an axiom system. This does not retain him from formulating an early theory of models and 
of using particular models in his study of axiomatic systems. We will return to the 
implications of Carnap’s hybrid structuralist account in Section 1.5. 
Given Carnap’s presentation of formal models (and thus his version of (2)), we are now 
halfway to turn to the main question of this chapter, namely ‘Does Carnap’s formal 
reconstruction adequately capture the semantic innovation (3) of modern axiomatics?’ Before 
addressing the question, however, a specific logicist assumptions implicit in his early 
semantics has to be specified. As we will see in Section 1.6, it is here, that Carnap’s theory of 
axiomatics runs into problems. 
 
1.4 A logicist reconstruction of axiomatics 
We mentioned in the Introduction that Carnap’s theory can be considered as a ‘logicistic’ 
reconstruction of Hilbertian axiomatics. This has to be refined. More than Frege, Carnap was 
aware of key methodological innovations (1) and (2) of modern axiomatics. His use of 
‘applied logicist’ in the formalization of schematic primitives and models of a theory was 
clearly supposed to meet these desiderata. Moreover, Carnap also provided a reconstruction of 
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 See, e.g., Enderton (2001, 80-82) 
41
 For a more detailed survey on these differences to the modern notion, particularly with respect to the concept 
of domain variation for models see Section 2.4.  
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the model-theoretic idea expressed in (3). Given this, on could infer that his theory clearly 
meets the adequacy conditions of formal axiomatics.  
Such a diagnosis would miss to take into account, however, that Carnap’s heterodox version 
of (2) was still closely tied to the traditional logicist program in the foundations of 
mathematics.42 Interestingly, in Carnap’s Untersuchungen and later on, this point is nowhere 
explicitly addressed. In fact, at one point in Carnap (2000), when introducing his “basic 
discipline” for his study of axiomatics Russell’s project of the logical reduction of 
mathematics is mentioned in a sentence only to stress that his work on axiomatics is 
“independent of this conception” (ibid, 62). (Compare also Section 1.4.5 below.) This 
suggests that there was no closer conceptual connection between Carnap’s work on 
axiomatics and his more general logicist leanings in the philosophy of mathematics at that 
time. However, as we will see, the situation is much more intricate than this.  
As is well known, the logicist reduction of mathematics to logic depends crucially on the 
formal notion of interpretation. A mathematical theory T1 (expressed in language L1) is 
interpreted in a second logical theory T2 (expressed in the logical language L2 in the following 
way:  (i) the mathematical terms of T1 are defined in L2, i.e. for every primitive or defined 
concept P of T1 in language L1 a formula ϕ is given in L2 that defines the concept; (ii) the 
range of the quantifiers in L2 is restricted to the range of the quantifiers of L1 via quantifier 
relativization. Given (i) and (ii) all axioms and theorems of T1 can be expressed as sentences 
of L2 and can be deduced from the axioms of T2. In the case of the classical logicist reduction, 
T2 is logical axiomatic system like Russell’s theory of types and L2 a pure (type-theoretical) 
logical language.43  
How does this classical logicist program relate to Carnap’s logical reconstruction of formal 
axiomatics?44 Evidently, in both cases the notion of an interpretation in terms of a translation 
plays a central role. In Carnap’s axiomatics, it is, as we have seen, the translation of a formal, 
uninterpreted axiomatic theory into a fully interpreted logical system, his “basic discipline”. 
The first step in this translation was outlined above: primitive terms are expressed as 
variables, the axioms and sentences of the theory as propositional functions of STT. In 
addition, there is a second step in the translation that has not been considered so far. What has 
to be added to the above picture is that also the semantics, in particular his formal models are 
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 For Frege’s and Russell’s logicist programs see Burgess (2005). For a broader account of Carnap’s own 
evolving conceptions of logicism over his intellectual career see Bohnert (1975). 
43
 For a more detailed definition see e.g. Burgess (2005, 50-51). 
44
 Compare in particular Reck (2004, 172-175) on this point.  
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subject to interpretation in pure logic. Thus, a full logical reconstruction of an axiom system 
also concerns the interpretations of the system.   
Carnap does not mention this additional condition concerning the interpretations of an axiom 
system, neither in Untersuchungen nor in Abriss. The most explicit account of it can be found 
in his contribution to the Königsberg discussion on the foundations of mathematics in 1930. 
Here, in aiming to provide a bridging account of the three foundational schools, he makes the 
following well-known remark on the “logical analysis of the formalistic system”:   
 
1. For every mathematical sign one or more interpretations are found, and in fact purely logical 
interpretations. 
2. If the axiom system is consistent, then upon replacing each mathematical sign by its logical 
interpretation (or one of its various interpretations), every mathematical formula becomes a tautology.  
3. If the axiom system is complete (…), then the interpretation is unique; every sign has exactly one 
interpretation, and with that the formalist construction is transformed into a logicist one. (Hahn and al. 
(1931, 143-144) quoted from: Awodey and Carus (2001, 153))   
 
Carnap’s understanding of a ‘logicist’ reconstruction of the formalistic method, i.e. formal 
axiomatics as the interpretation in pure logic is outlined most distinctively here. Point 1 
highlights the above assumption, viz. the logical interpretability of the mathematical 
primitives of the axiom system. If the system is understood as formal then this condition 
effectively amounts to the logical interpretability of the formal models of an axiom system. 
Given this, we can refine our above question in the following way: what does Carnap 
understand by “purely logical interpretations” of an axiom system? And: applied to his theory 
of models, how does he conceive the logical definability of a model? 
 
1.4.1 The definability of models 
One of the earliest commentators of Carnap’s Untersuchungen, the mathematician Hasso 
Härlen, already took notice of such a logicist assumption concerning the models of an axiom 
system. In commenting on a draft of the manuscript in a letter dated January 1, 1928, he 
remarked that:   
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The existence of cases of application [is here] equivalent to the existences of models. This claim is 
hypothetical; I would like to name it the hypothesis of logicism: that no structure can be described 
axiomatically if it is not already describable in logic. (RC 081-01-34)45 
   
And then, in emphasizing the difference between Carnap’s account and Hilbert’s use of 
analytic models in Hilbert (1899) he adds:  
 
Hilbert mapped geometry to a mathematical model, not to a formal one in your sense. Basically, this 
amounts to the same, but Hilbert’s mapping differs not principally from those of Lobatschefsky, Klein, 
and Beltrami. (RC 081-01-34)46 
 
The conceptual difference mentioned here between the “mathematical models” used by 
Hilbert and Carnap’s “formal models” is important.47 For Härlen, using the latter as 
presentations of the former implies an additional assumption, a “hypothesis of logicism,” 
namely that every mathematical axiomatic structure can be “captured logically”.  
Now, it is important to note that the definability of models of an axiom system can be 
understood in two ways. In the first and weaker sense, the definability assumption simply 
requires that for every consistent mathematical axiom system, (at least) one purely logical 
model can be constructed. In the second, stronger sense, the definability assumption requires 
that all models of a formalized theory can be presented in logical form, i.e. as logical models. 
Both versions of the definability assumption have been discussed in the recent literature on 
Carnap’s axiomatics, sometimes without sufficiently stressing their difference.48 For instance, 
Reck (2007), in discussing Untersuchungen, explicitly argues for the stronger assumption: 
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 “Vorhandensein von Anwendungsfällen [is here] gleichbedeutend mit Vorhandensein von Modellen. Diese 
Behauptung ist hypothetisch; ich möchte sie die Hypothese des Logizismus nennen: dass keine Struktur 
axiomatisch erfassbar ist, die nicht schon logisch erfassbar ist.“ (RC 081-01-34) 
46
 “Hilbert hat die Geometrie auf ein mathematisches Modell abgebildet, nicht auf ein formales in ihrem Sinn. Im 
Endeffekt ist das ja das gleiche, aber dem Sinn nach ist Hilberts Abbildg. nicht prinzipiell von denen 
Lobatschefskys, Kleins, Beltramis verschieden.“ (RC 081-01-34) 
47
 Härlen’s claim concerning the continuity between the ‘intuitive models’ introduced by Beltrami and Klein for 
non-Euclidian geometries and Hilbert’s analytic models in Hilbert (1899) cannot be discussed here. See, 
however, Webb (1995).  
48
 In recent commentary on the metatheoretic results in Carnap’s 1928 manuscript, most notably Awodey and 
Carus (2001) and Reck (2007), this logicist definability assumption underlying his model theory is also 
mentioned, specifically in the discussion of Carnap’s ‘Gabelbarkeitssatz’. The theorem states the equivalence of 
the three notions of completeness discussed by Carnap, i.e. categoricity (‘monomorphism’), syntactic 
completeness (‘deducibility’) and semantic completeness (‘non-forkability’) (Carnap 2000, 133-139). Carnap’s 
theorem is generally flawed for several reasons (see Awodey and Carus (2001) and Goldfarb (2004)). 
Nonetheless, it was argued that – given Carnap’s definability assumption for models – the equivalence between 
semantic completeness and categoricity does in fact hold. Compare Awodey and Carus (2001) and Reck (2007). 
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“Carnap assumed that every model of a higher-order theory is definable.” (ibid, 195) In 
discussing Carnap proof of the ‘Gabelbarkeitssatz’, he notes in Reck (2004) that: 
 
Carnap implicitly assumes that, for any model M, “being isomorphic to M” is expressible in the simple 
theory of types. This assumes that any model M is definable in simple type theory, which is not true as 
became clear after Carnap’s work. (ibid, 170, my emphasis) 
 
In contrast, in discussing the same proof, Awodey and Reck (2002) describe Carnap’s tacit 
assumption in this way: “In particular, he in effect assumed that any consistent theory has a 
model that is definable within simple type theory, which is false.” (ibid, 35)  
 We will return to the limiting effects of these definability constraints on models in Sections 
1.5 and 1.6. For the moment, our interest lies in the question which of the two versions 
Carnap actually assumed. Not surprisingly, it is difficult to give a clear-cut response to this 
question based on Carnap’s writings in the 1920s, given the fact that the logicist assumptions 
were (mostly) left implicit in his project. Nonetheless, one can get a clearer picture of his 
account when comparing it with two similar accounts of ‘logicized’ axiomatics of two of 
Carnap’s contemporaries, Alfred Tarski and Friedrich Bachmann. 
 
1.4.2 Tarski’s “effective interpretation”  
Carnap’s “Gabelbarkeitssatz” from 1928 is usually discussed in reference with Tarski and 
Lindenbaum (1935) where the theorem was stated correctly for the first time. Here, in contrast 
to Untersuchungen, the additional assumption concerning the logical definability of models 
was made explicit.49 The main result of the paper is the formulation of a theorem that 
connects the logical definability of concepts to an invariance condition under permutations of 
the logical “universal domain” V of a type-theoretic language. The theorem states that all 
notions definable in STT are invariant under all permutations of V and vice versa. The central 
point is that this invariance condition holds for “every relation between objects (individuals, 
classes, relations, etc.) which can be expressed by purely logical means”, viz. in terms of STT 
(ibid, 385).50 
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 See fn.48. Compare in particular Bonk and Mosterin (2000, 41-43), Coffa (1991, 282), and Awodey and Carus 
(2001, 160). For an independent treatment of the paper compare Goméz-Torrente (2002). 
50
 It should be noted here that a kind of invariance based approach to logically definable notions close to Tarski’s 
account is already discussed in Carnap’s conception of axiomatics. Compare a a passage on “structural 
properties” of relations in Carnap (2000) where this is made explicit: “The structural properties are in a way the 
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Applied to axiomatic theories this invariance theorem translates into a second theorem 
concerning the logical definability of mathematical relations. Tarski and Lindenbaum 
paraphrase it in this way:  
 
Intuitively speaking, every relation between objects (…) which can be expressed in terms of logic and 
geometry is invariant with respect to every one-one mapping of space onto itself in which the relation 
a is preserved, i.e. with respect to every similarity transformation (and not only with respect to every 
isometrical transformation)” (ibid, 388)  
 
Note that with the move to specific mathematic ‘deductive theories’ there is also a shift here 
from definability within a pure logical language (like STT) to definability within a formal 
language with a non-empty signature, i.e. with non-logical terminology (say STT*). For their 
example of an axiom system of Euclidian geometry, they explicitly stress the limits of logical 
definability compared to geometric definability (in this extended logical language): briefly, 
there are geometrical relations that are definable in STT*, but not in STT (ibid, 389).51       
The consequence of this for Tarski’s treatment of his version of the ‘Gabelbarkeitssatz’ is 
this: the equivalence of semantic completeness (in Tarski’s terms “non-ramificability”) and 
categoricity is conceived as a direct “application of [Theorem] 1,” i.e. the first invariance 
theorem stated above. For this reason, an additional condition concerning the logical 
definability of the primitive terms of the axiomatic theory is explicitly mentioned (ibid, 390). 
Their crucial Theorem 10 states: “Every non-ramifiable axiom system which is effectively 
interpretable in logic is categorical.” (ibid, 391) The “effective interpretability in logic’ of a 
theory mentioned here is specified in this way: 
 
[Theorem 10] (…) proves to hold under a supplementary assumption. We define an axiom system 
‘α(a, b, c, …)’ to be effectively interpretable in logic if there is in logic a sentential function  
‘τ(x, y, z, …)’ such that the following three logical formulas are logically provable:  
                                    (x, y, z, …) : τ(x, y, z, …). ⊃ . α(x, y, z, …); 
                                                  (∃x, y, z, …) . τ(x, y, z, …); 
( zzyyxx ′′′′′′′′′ ,,,,, ): τ( zyx ′′′ ,, ,…). τ( ,...,, zyx ′′′′′ ).  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
properties invariant under isomorphic transformations. They are of particular importance for axiomatics.” 
(Carnap 2000, 74) 
51
 Tarski and Lindenbaum note for the case of geometry: “The distinction between logic and geometry comes to 
light, however, in the discussion of three termed relations; for, as is well known, there are infinitely many three- 
(and many-termed) relations which are definable in Euclidian geometry.” (ibid, 389) 
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                                              ⊃ . x′ = x ′′ . y′ = y ′′ . z′ = z ′′ ….. (ibid, 390-391) 
 
Several points should be mentioned here. Note that Tarski’s convention to formalize axiom 
systems in STT closely mirrors Carnap’s own approach outlined above. A sentential function 
is logically expressed via the scheme ‘α(a, b, c, …; x, y, z, …)’where a, b, c, …. stand for 
“extralogical” constants and x, y, z, …. for free variables of a given type. An interpreted 
axiom system can be expressed by the closed formula ‘α(a, b, c, …)’ where a, b, c, … express 
the primitive terms of the theory. A formal, disinterpreted system is then symbolized as  ‘τ(x, 
y, z, …)’ i.e. a sentential (or propositional) function in pure STT.  
This said, Tarski’s additional condition concerning the “effective interpretability” of 
axiomatic theories is best understood as a translation of an interpreted theory of the form ‘σ(a, 
b, c, …)’ expressed in STT* (i.e. here STT with the signature {a, b, c, …}) into a theory of 
the form ‘τ(x, y, z, …)’ expressed in pure STT. This method bears strong similarities with the 
method of logicist reduction outlined above. In Tarski’s case, the interpretation can be 
effected in two ways: in the above passage the three conditions fix (i) that there is an 
universally quantified implication from the sentential function τ (expressing the logical axiom 
system) to the sentential function α (expressing the disinterpreted axiom system); (ii) that 
there exists an interpretation of for τ and (iii) that τ holds for a unique sequence of values for 
x, y, z, …. The second way outlined in Tarski and Lindenbaum (1935) to characterize the 
“effective interpretation” has an interesting implication on level of models of an axiomatic 
theory.52 There is an insightful reformulation of the conditions (i) to (iii) of the above passage:  
 
(…) the axiom system ‘α(a, b, c, …)’ is effectively interpretable in logic if and only if there are 
logical constants ‘ a′ ’, ‘b′ ’, ‘ c′ ’, … (undefined or defined) such that the sentence ‘α( cba ′′′ ,, , …)’ 
obtained by substituting these logical constants for the primitive terms in the axiom system discussed 
is logically provable.” (ibid, 391)  
 
In this kind of translation, the primitives of an interpreted theory expressed by the non-logical 
constants a, b, c, … are substituted by logical constants cba ′′′ ,, , ..., i.e. primitive or defined 
terms of STT. The axiom system is thus effectively interpretable in STT if the transformed 
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 For a closer comparison of Tarski’s and Carnap’s conception of formal models see 2.4.2. 
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system ‘α( cba ′′′ ,, , ...,)’ can be deduced in Tarski’s logical system (i.e. a theory of types plus 
the axiom of infinity).53 
Tarski conception of models in the early 1930s is similar to that of Carnap. Models are in both 
cases understood as tuples of relations that are substituted for the variables in the formalized 
axiom system ‘α(x, y, z, …)’. Given this, the sequence of logical relations 〈 cba ′′′ ,, , ...〉 has to 
be understood as a logical model of the theory. Thus, “effective interpretability” means the 
construction of a particular model for an axiom system that consists of logical constants. This 
is in effect the translation of a theory in a mathematical language into a theory in pure HOL 
where variables expressing primitive notions are substituted by logical notions. Conceived in 
this way, the “effective interpretability” of an axiom system then simply states that there is (at 
least) one model of the theory that is definable in pure STT.  
 
1.4.3 Bachmann’s “logical constitution of a model” 
The notion of an “effective interpretation” outlined in Tarski and Lindenbaum (1935) is not 
the only specification of a logical definability assumption comparable to the “hypothesis of 
logicism” in Carnap’s formal models. A similar account can be found in a relatively unknown 
work of the mathematician Bachmann, a later collaborator of Carnap (Bachmann 1934).54 
Bachmann’s subject of his inaugural dissertation, the formal presentation of different axiom 
systems of arithmetic and the study of their logical relations shares various points of contact 
with both accounts. As in Tarski’s notion here too the aim is explicitly to provide a logicist 
presentation of axiomatic theories.55  In the introduction, Bachmann presents this task in this 
way:   
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 Tarski and Lindenbaum mention a possible limit to the effective interpretability of a theory in a given type 
level of the background language. They add: “It sometimes happens that an effective interpretation of an axiom 
system in logic can be found only at a higher type (this applies, for example to the axiom system of the 
arithmetic of real numbers).” (ibid, 391) Compare 2.4.3 for a similar account of type ascent in Carnap’s logical 
presentation of models for axiom systems.    
54
 Compare the discussion of Bachmann (1934) in 2.4.2. 
55
 In his introduction, he explicitly speaks of an “allgemeine Untersuchungen zur Axiomatik der Arithmetik” 
(ibid, Introduction). There is no indication, despite the strong similarity to Carnap’s Untersuchungen that 
Bachmann knew Carnap’s 1928 typescript when working on his dissertation. Nonetheless, in Bachmann’s 
bibliography, explicit reference is made to Carnap (1929). Moreover, there exists an extensive discussion of the 
treatment of extremal axioms in Carnap (1930, 46-47). This topic was the subject of the later collaboration 
between the two. Compare also Chapter 2. 
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The subject of this work is the problem of the deducibility of arithmetic from logic or – to be more 
precise – the problem of the deducibility of an interpretation of arithmetic from logic. (ibid, 
Introduction)56  
 
Bachmann mentions two “subtasks” for the “solution of the problem“:  
 
1) The logical characterization of the models of arithmetic (the presentation of an axiom system of 
arithmetic) 
2) The logical constitution of a model of arithmetic (the presentation of a system of constants and the 
proof that this system of constants holds in an axiom system of arithmetic. (ibid, Introduction)57 
 
This is clearly not the typical approach of reducing arithmetic to logic according to classical 
logicism. Nevertheless, Bachmann’s close ties to this program are evident, however, in the 
specifics of these two tasks. He discusses (1) for different axiomatizations of arithmetic, 
including Peano arithmetic, Dedekind’s version of arithmetic via chains, and an axiom system 
of elementary arithmetic (ibid, 27-52).58  As in Tarski’s and Carnap’s versions, axiom systems 
are treated here as “sentential forms” (“Aussageformen”) and the un-interpreted primitive 
terms as variables.59 Models are also conceived in essentially the same way as in Carnap 
(2000). In Bachmann’s terms, a model for the system of elementary arithmetic f(x R α) is 
specified in this way: “Every triple of values that if substituted for x R α transforms the 
axioms in true sentences is called a model of arithmetic.” (ibid, 1)   
Given these striking similarities, two subtle differences to Carnap’s account are worth to be 
mentioned. The first concerns Bachmann’s discussion of his first subtask of the “logical 
constitution of a model” for axiomatic arithmetic, i.e. the “presentation of a system of 
constants” as a model for the system. Whereas Carnap’s account is, as we will see, restricted 
to a presentation of different sequences of “constants of the basic system” without any further 
specification of these constants, Bachmann is clear about the admissible range of constants to 
be allowed here. He states that the constants constituting a model have to name concepts that 
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 “Der Gegenstand dieser Arbeit ist das Problem der Ableitbarkeit der Arithmetik aus der Logik oder – wie ich 
mich genauer ausdrücken möchte – das Problem der Ableitbarkeit einer Interpretation der Arithmetik aus der 
Logik.“ (ibid, Introduction) 
57
 “1) einer logischen Charakterisierung der Modelle der Arithmetik (Angabe eines Axiomensystems der 
Arithmetik); 2) der logischen Konstituierung eines Modells der Arithmetik (Angabe eines Konstantensystems 
und Beweis, dass dieses Konstantensystem einem Axiomsystem der Arithmetik genügt).“ (ibid, Introduction) 
58
 Compare Chapter 3 for a closer discussion of these systems. 
59
 For a given theory of arithmetic, he states that: “Our axiom system consists of four sentential functions in 
which apart from the constants of logic and bound variables also three free variables x R α appear.“ (ibid, 1)  
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are definable in sense of Frege’s reductive definitions. This is spelled out explicitly as a 
condition for his task of showing the “deducibility of an interpretation” of arithmetic. What is 
missing - and probably deliberatively left out in Carnap’s treatment due to his shift of 
attention from logicist reduction to axiomatics – is the specific method of the “presentation” 
(“Aufweis”) of “a logically constituted Modell” (“ein logisch konstitutiertes Modell”) (ibid, 
9). In Bachmann (1934), for the case of elementary arithmetic, such a task consists in the 
presentation of a sequence 〈0, Succ, NN〉, where each concept is given an explicit reductive 
definition. Here, unlike in Carnap, the assumption concerning the logical definability of 
models is made explicit. So, the first task of step (2) of a logicized reconstruction of axiomatic 
arithmetic is to present at least one purely logical model just as in Tarski and Lindenbaum 
(1935). 
A second difference to Carnap’s account concerns Bachmann’s second task of step (2), the 
“proof that this system of constants holds in an axiom system of arithmetic” (ibid, 
Introduction). Following the presentation of a logical model (as a sequence of logically 
defined constants) for the axiom system in question, Bachmann holds that, in a second step, 
one has to “then show of its definientia that they form a model of arithmetic” (ibid, 9). This is 
the proof that the logically defined notions ‘0’, ‘Succ’, and ‘NN’ “satisfy” the conditions 
specified in the axiom system (see ibid, 18-26). Note that in Carnap’s account, the relevant 
notions used for this like ‘truth in a model’ or ‘satisfaction’ are left informal, at least in 
1928.60 Nevertheless, it is clear that they are - at least in principle - considered to be semantic 
in nature. In Bachmann’s case, the proof that the models “hold” in an axiom system is 
understood in purely syntactic terms. We have seen that for him models are a set of logically 
defined relational expressions. An interpretation then holds in an axiom system if the sentence 
resulting form the substitution of the variables in f(x R α) by such constants is provable in the 
logical background system. This “deducibility of an interpretation of arithmetic” from logic is 
not understood model-theoretically. The proof that a model of the form 〈0, Succ, NN〉 
“satisfies” the axiom system is given “by exclusive use of the means of proof of logic” (ibid, 
8). Note that also in Tarski and Lindenbaum (1935), the adequacy of a effective interpretation 
of an axiom system is not expressed via a semantic notions of truth but syntactically, via the 
“logical provability” in STT (see Coffa 1991, 282-283) This clearly underlines his logicist 
motivation of both accounts.  
                                                 
 
60
 Compare 2.4.1 for a more detailed discussion.  
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Given Bachmann’s two-step approach, it is important to note that the “logical constitution” of 
a model of arithmetic means for him, just as in Tarski’s case, the construction of a single 
logical model. Here again, definability seems to be understood in the weak form.  
Nevertheless, there exists a crucial difference between Tarski and Bachmann concerning the 
general motivation of the formal reconstruction of axiomatics. In Tarski and Lindenbaum 
(1935), the “effective interpretation” is conceived as one among alternative ways to present 
logically mathematical theories and their models. Given the convention that axiom systems 
are expressed via propositional functions with several variables, models can here either be 
presented as sequences of genuinely mathematical and thus non-logical relations of a 
language STT*. They can also be presented as sequences of logical expressions, “defined or 
undefined” in pure STT.61 
In contrast, in Bachmann (1934) the exclusive aim of the study is to devise a logic 
reconstruction of axiomatics close to classical Fregean reduction. It is in this understanding of 
logical formalization that the stronger definability assumption concerning models can be 
identified. Consider again Bachmann’s second task for his intended “deducibility of an 
interpretation of arithmetic from logic:” to present a single “logically constituted model“ that 
holds in the theory. Given his logicist account, any model of elementary arithmetic that can be 
subject to this second task has to be logical in the sense specified by him. In contrast to 
Tarski’s account, there are thus no alternative ways to formalize axiom systems and their 
models. The resulting stronger version of the definability assumption is explicitly mentioned 
in Bachmann (1934). In his discussion of the “proof that the system of constants holds for an 
axiom system,” he gives an explanation why the models must consist only of logical constants 
in this context:   
 
For the second task to succeed it is necessary that the three constants are constructed from the 
primitive signs of logic and bound variables, in short: that they are logical constants. A sentence with 
nonlogical constants is only deducible from logic if it is transformed into a universally valid sentential 
form in case the constants are substituted by variables. Since the sentential form A-AS I(x, R, α) is not 
universally valid, this approach is not possible. (ibid, 9)62  
                                                 
 
61
 See Goméz-Torrente (2009) for a broader survey of Tarski’s “logical pluralism”, i.e. the different uses of 
logical language for the formalization of mathematical theories in the 1930s.  
62
 “Damit die Lösung der zweiten Aufgabe gelingt, ist es notwendig, dass die drei Konstanten aus den 
Grundzeichen der Logik und gebundenen Variablen aufgebaut, kurz: dass sie logische Konstanten sind. Eine 
Aussage über ausserlogische Konstanten ist nämlich nur dann aus der Logik ableitbar, wenn sie bei Ersetzung 
der Konstanten durch Variable in eine allgemeingültige Aussageform übergeht. Da nun die Aussageform A-AS 
I(x, R, α) nicht allgemeingültig ist, ist dieser Weg nicht gangbar.“ (ibid, 9) 
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This passage is central for Bachmann’s understanding of the logicist reconstruction of 
axiomatics. The theory A-AS I(x, R, α) is not universally valid since one can, as Bachmann 
points out, construct “non-models” that fail to satisfy the theory (ibid, 5-6). It follows from 
this that any model constructed for the theory has to consist exclusively of logical constants in 
order to allow this proof of the validity the interpreted system. Thus, in Bachmann’s specific 
presentation of axiomatics, any model for an axiom system has to be logical for exactly this 
reason. All models relevant for consideration are thus “logically constituted” in this sense.  
  
1.4.4 Carnap’s substitutional conception of models  
How do Tarski’s “effective interpretation” of an axiomatic theory and Bachmann’s “logical 
constitution of a model” relate to Carnap’s tacit definability assumption? Recall again the 
latter’s remarks on the “logical analysis of the formalistic system” in Königsberg. Here his 
intention was obviously to provide a logicized version of formal axiomatics close in spirit to 
both Tarski’s and Bachmann’s accounts. Moreover, his talk of “one or more (…) in fact 
purely logical interpretations” of the mathematical primitives suggests that he too proposed 
the weak version of logical definability in 1930.63 
However, we saw from Bachmann (1934) that this type of reconstruction if considered the 
exclusive formal method to treat axiomatic theories effectively implies the stronger version, 
namely that all relevant models are logically definable. Turning to Untersuchungen, we noted 
that Carnap’s primary aim here was not to provide logicist reconstruction in Bachmann’s 
sense. Carnap stresses at the outset of his manuscript that the principle objective is to provide 
formal explications, i.e. “precise definitions for the concepts” used in axiomatics in a formal 
framework and not a Fregean reduction (Carnap (2000, 59)). In this sense, Carnap’s account 
in 1928 is closer in motivation to Tarski’s discussion of deductive theories in 1935. 
Nonetheless, Carnap’s theory differs from the latter’s more pluralist account with respect to 
the specific formal framework. In particular, Tarski conceived of formal languages with non-
logical terminology. One of his conventions of a formal reconstruction of the semantics of a 
theory was the introduction of (a sequence of) non-logical mathematical constants 〈a, b, c, …〉 
that are assigned to the variables of an axiom system ‘α(x, y, z, …)’. This is ruled out in 
                                                 
 
63
 Note that a similar account of a “logical interpretation” (in contrast to a “descriptive interpretation”) of an 
axiomatic theory in a type-theoretic theory can still be found in Carnap (1939). The idea expressed here is 
essentially identical to Tarski’s method of an “effective interpretation” (compare ibid, 22).  
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Carnap’s framework with the deliberate limitation to a pure type-theoretic logic. In 
consequence, all formal models for an axiom system have to be expressed in pure STT. So, 
whereas his general approach in 1928 is closer to Tarski’s formal reconstruction, he 
effectively assumed logicist premises similar to those highlighted in Bachmann (1934). The 
main tacit import of this is that he in fact assumed the stronger version of the logical 
definability of models. The fundamental difference to Tarski’s account of formal 
reconstruction of axiomatics is that the latter does not impose – as does Carnap – that all 
possible interpretations of an axiom system are logical. For the latter, the “effective 
interpretability” of an axiom system is a special case of model construction. For Carnap, a 
similar interpretability is conceived as a general condition for providing an interpretation. 
Here, the underlying assumption is that all models are in fact expressible in his “basic 
discipline”.64  
 
This tacit condition of the interpretability in STT is evident in Carnap’s substitutional 
conception of models. We have seen that models were treated as n-tuples of relations, more 
specifically as relational constants in Untersuchungen, i.e. as relational terms with a fixed 
meaning of the interpreted background language. The assignments to the “primitive variables” 
are not understood extensionally in terms of objects, sets, or relations but substitutionally, in 
terms of constants of STT. Provided that STT is understood here as a pure logical language 
without non-logical terminology, these constant expressions are all logical (as in Bachmann’s 
theory).  
There is strong evidence that Carnap understood his formal models in this way, in 1928 and 
also in later works. Compare a passage in Untersuchungen where he further specifies his 
account of models:  
 
                                                 
 
64
 It is important to clearly distinguish between the two assumptions – weak and strong definability – here. The 
versions are sometimes mingled in the recent debate. Compare a passage in Reck (2007) on the relation between 
Carnap’s tacit assumption and Tarski’s “effective interpretation”: “Carnap assumed that every model of a higher-
order theory is definable. This is made explicit in the correct, but restricted, version of the result published, a few 
years later, in Lindenbaum and Tarski (1935).” (ibid, 195) What Tarski effectively imposes here, is, as we have 
seen, the weaker constraint on model definability. Note, however, that the stronger version clearly implies the 
weaker one. In a perceptive footnote in Awodey and Reck (2001), this point is stressed: “Note that this 
restriction, that the axiom system be “effectively interpretable” (…), is in effect imposed by Carnap in the 
Axiomatics as well, where all sentences are interpretable in the basic system.” (ibid, 169) 
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(…) in short, we speak of “models” of an axiom system und thereby mean logical constants, i.e. 
“systems of concepts of the basic discipline (these are mostly systems of numbers). (ibid, 94)65 
 
This is further highlighted in his distinction between “formal models” and “realizations”, i.e. 
empirical interpretations of an axiom system:  
 
As the values of the primitive relations of an axiom system both logical as well as non-logical 
constants can occur; the axiom system can either be applied to concepts of the basic discipline or also 
to real concepts (“Realbegriffe”) (concepts of a nonlogical, empirical state of affairs). (ibid, 93)66  
 
In this conception, mathematical or formal models are exclusively composed of the logical 
terms of the “basic discipline”. The same account can also be identified in a later paper, 
Carnap and Bachmann (1936). In specifying the notion of an isomorphism correlation 
between “n-place models (i.e., sequences with n members)” the authors hold here that such a 
correlation is defined “(…) over the field of this relation, i.e., over the totality of constants of 
the basic, assumed language which can appear as elements of models (...)“ (Carnap and 
Bachmann (1981, 74). Here again, the underlying language is a pure and higher-order. This 
substitutional conception of models is still present in the first English edition of Logical 
Syntax of Language from 1937. A small section not yet included in the original German 
version is devoted to the “axiomatic method“ (ibid, §71e). Here, one can find a definition of 
models and model domains that is comparable to the one in Carnap and Bachmann (1936) and 
Carnap (2000):  
 
In the first method, the domain of the interpretations of a certain primitive symbol is the domain of the 
substitution-values of the variable. If, as is usual, it is a case of primitive variable within a system of 
types, then the same relations of types must hold between the symbols of the model as hold between 
the corresponding primitive variables. (Carnap 2002, §71e) 
 
According to this method, a model for the AS is to be understood as a series of k substitution-values 
U1,…Uk for the primitive variables. (ibid, §71e)   
 
                                                 
 
65
 “(…) wir sprechen kurz von “Modellen” eines Axiomensystems und meinen damit logische Konstanten, also 
„Systeme von Begriffen der Grunddisziplin“ (und zwar sind dies meist Systeme von Zahlen).“ (ibid, 94) 
66
 “Als Werte einer Grundrelation eines Axiomensystems können sowohl logische als auch nicht-logische 
Konstanten auftreten; das Axiomensystem kann angewendet werden auf Begriffe der Grunddisziplin und auch 
auf Realbegriffe (Begriffe eines nichtlogischen, empirischen Sachverhalts.)“ (ibid, 93) 
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Each of these passages cited here describes the same picture: formal models as conceived as 
sequences of constants of a fully interpreted type-theoretic language with an empty signature. 
These constants are assigned to the “primitive variables” of a theory also expressed in that 
language. Since there is no non-logical terminology in languages like STT, all relevant 
constants used for this kind of model construction have to be logical or logically definable in 
STT. 
 
1.4.5 The “scope of logic” in Untersuchungen 
Carnap’s substitutional conception of models imposes strong conditions on the scope of 
logical expressions of his “basic discipline”. The expressibility condition effectively 
presupposes that there is a range of logical constants in the language sufficient to express all 
classes, relations, etc. that are referred to in models. Several questions arise from this: First, 
what exactly does Carnap understand by logical constants in Untersuchungen? Second, what 
is the “scope of logic” (“Gebiet der Logik”) in his “basic discipline”? Finally, what does 
logical definability mean in context of his theory? Before turning to a discussion of the 
limiting effects of this logicist assumption for his overall theory of axiomatics, these points 
have to be clarified.  
 
Typically, constant expressions can be added in two ways to a formal language. They can be 
stipulated at the outset with the specification of the primitive symbols of the language. They 
can also be introduced via definitions from the given vocabulary. For example, if a certain 
formula of the language specifies a certain class of (or relation on) the language’s 
interpretation, a new constant can be added to the language to name this set (or relation).  
A similar approach can be found in Carnap’s specification of his interpreted “basic discipline” 
in Untersuchungen. The main difference to a modern conception lies in the fact that here the 
constant expressions are all logical. Thus, the language does not contain non-logical 
expressions (i.e. “external signs” (“Fremdzeichen”) denoting possible “external concepts” of 
an axiom system) (see Carnap (2000, 89-90).67 In setting up his background logical theory, 
Carnap gives the following classification of the possible logical terms:  
(1) proper logical constants (∀, ∃, →, ¬, …);  
                                                 
 
67
 “The present investigation discusses, as is usual in mathematics, only axiom systems without external 
concepts.” (ibid, 90) 
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(2) constants of absolute arithmetic (successor, number, 0, 1, 2, …); 
(3) constants of absolute set theory (class, ∈); 
(4) constants of relation theory (Carnap 2000, 59-70). 
The relevant distinction made here is between the logical constants in (1) and those logical 
constants in a broader sense (2) to (4).68 Combined, they constitute the syntactic resources of 
his ”basic discipline” in which the models for a theory are constructed. Two points should be 
noted here. First, the notion of logical concepts is obviously conceived here in a much more 
general way compared to the modern account. STT does not only include the proper logical 
terminology of (1) but in addition terms from arithmetic, set theory, and most importantly, 
relation theory. Compare Carnap’s following remark on this generalized account of logic:  
     
The schools diverging in the question of providing a foundation to mathematics will come to agree 
that in the basic discipline the usual arithmetic, set-theoretical and also logical concepts have to be 
present; we want to designate the concepts of these fields (…) with the unifying expression “logical 
concepts”. (ibid, 62)69 
 
Thus, any formalization of an axiomatic theory in terms of the theory of types does in fact 
draw to resources not included in a modern account of HOL. These are in particular terms of 
mathematics and constant expressions of relation theory.  
Given Carnap’s generalized “scope of logic”, the question arises how the expressions in 
classes (2) to (4) are related to the proper logic in (1).70 Carnap in Untersuchungen is more or 
less silent on how the terms of (2) to (4) are supposed to enter into the “basic discipline”. He 
mentions that these concepts can be logically constructed from proper logical concepts by 
reductive definitions as in the work of Frege and Russell (see ibid, 61-62). Nonetheless, he 
leaves undecided whether they should be conceived with such a “logistic meaning”. In fact, in 
a side remark, Carnap is quite explicit that he is not interested in the logicist project in 
Untersuchungen: 
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 Compare Carnap: “By “logical constants“ we understand all signs of the basic discipline, i.e. the signs of logic 
in the closer sense (...) as well as the arithmetical signs (e.g.: 1, 2, + etc.).“ (ibid, 89) At other places of 
Untersuchungen, also the signs of set theory and relation theory are mentioned. 
69
 “Die in der Frage der Begründung der Mathematik auseinandergehenden Richtungen werden darüber einig 
sein, dass in der Grunddiziplin die üblichen arithmetischen, die üblichen mengentheoretischen und außerdem 
noch logische Begriffe vorkommen müssen; die Begriffe dieser Gebiete wollen wir (…) mit der 
zusammenfassenden Bezeichnung “logische Begriffe“ nennen.“ (ibid, 62) 
70
 Note again that all notions of the “basic discipline” are (in contrast to their disinterpreted ‘axiomatic’ 
correlates) understood as “absolute”, i.e. as fully interpreted (“inhaltlich”) (ibid, 60). 
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For the following investigation of axiomatic problems it is irrelevant whether the set- theoretical and 
arithmetical concepts are presented as independent primitive concepts or if they are deduced from 
those [concepts] of logic. The results are independent of the mentioned (Russellian) conception. (ibid, 
62)71     
 
Thus, he deliberately leaves open the question whether the primitive mathematical notions 
like ‘0’, ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘+’, ‘<’, ‘>’, ‘∈’, etc. should be conceived as undefined primitive logical 
constants or as logical constants defined from the core logical vocabulary in (1). This marks a 
crucial difference to the decidedly logicistic account in Bachmann (1934). For Bachmann, the 
relevant logical constants used in a model of axiomatic arithmetic are particularly those 
mathematical terms that can be given a logicist definition in pure logic (compare Bachmann 
(1934, 8-9). In Untersuchungen, these constituents of the formal models are simply treated as 
logical primitives. It is deliberately left open whether they are defined or undefined notions.  
However, this alleged indifference towards this question in Carnap (2000) is doubtful at 
closer inspection. The generalized account of logical concepts is almost per definition 
conceptually tied to a logicist and thus reductive approach. The whole idea of classifying 
genuinely mathematical terms like ‘number’, ‘successor’, ‘point’, ‘betweenness’ etc. as 
logical notions as Carnap is grounded on the idea that they can be defined in proper logic. 
That the genuine mathematical concepts in the scope of logic are to be definable in terms of 
pure logic is explicitly stated in a later work by Carnap (Carnap 1948). Here the generalized 
scope of logic from 1928 is still upheld. He gives the following explication of the expanded 
class of logical signs:      
     
Further, all those signs are regarded as logical which are definable by those mentioned [GS: those of 
the above class (1)]; (…), all signs of the system of [Principia Mathematica] by Whitehead and 
Russell and of nearly all other systems of symbolic logic, all signs of mathematics (including 
arithmetic, analysis of real numbers, infinitesimal calculus, but not geometry) with the meaning they 
have when applied in science (…). A defined sign is descriptive if its definiens contains a descriptive 
sign, otherwise logical. (ibid, 57-58) 
 
                                                 
 
71
 “Für die folgenden Untersuchungen axiomatischer Probleme ist es indessen nicht von Belang, ob die 
mengentheoretischen und die arithmetischen Begriffe als selbstständige Grundbegriffe aufgestellt sind oder aus 
denen der Logik abgeleitet werden. Die Ergebnisse sind also unabhängig von der genannten (Russellschen) 
Auffassung.“ (ibid, 62) 
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It is precisely this condition of logical concepts that also seems to underlie Carnap’s 
conception of the “basic discipline” in Untersuchungen: according to it, a sign is logical if it 
is primitively (or genuinely) logically or can be defined in terms of genuinely logical 
expressions.72 Given this conception, it is highly likely that Carnap - irrespective of the 
remark cited above - understood the mathematical terms in (2) to (4) of his ‘basic discipline’ 
not as primitives but as logically defined terms in the sense of Russell’s and Frege’s reductive 
definitions in the part (1) of his logic.73  
This point concerning the definitional structure of the “basic discipline” can be further 
strengthened by looking at how the non-elementary, mathematical constants are actually used 
in the specification of models. We have noted in Section 1.3 that in contrast to Frege, Carnap 
fully embraced the idea of model variation in the theory of axiomatics. Thus, for a given 
axiomatic system like Peano arithmetic or Hilbert’s Euclidian geometry he accepted the idea 
that different models can be constructed for each theory. Given his formal presentation of 
models, this implies that tuples of extensionally different relations (more precisely, relational 
constants) can be presented in which the system is interpreted. Therefore, there exist – at least 
in the case of non-categorical theories - not only one sequence of logical concepts but several 
sequences of extensionally different concepts that satisfies the theory. Carnap’s “basic 
discipline” has to include different logical signs of, say ‘successor’ in the case of arithmetic or 
‘between’ in the case of Euclidian geometry that denote extensionally different relations of 
individual elements. Together, they form the substitution class of the “primitive variables” of 
an axioms system discussed in Section 1.3.3. Now, it is in principle possible in this “relation-
theoretic” presentation of models that these different expressions are introduced as undefined 
terms into the language. It is far more plausible that they are introduced as constants denoting 
sets or relations that are explicitly defined in terms of (1) of STT.   
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 A comparable conception of the scope of logic can be identified in the work from the 1930s of Carnap’s 
contemporary Tarski. Compare Goméz-Torrente (1996) on his conception of logical notions: “(…) Tarski 
reserves his most inclusive use of the word ‘logic’ for a system of logic based on the theory of types (…), such a 
“logic” is a system, therefore, in which arithmetical constants can be defined in terms of logical constants, and 
arithmetic developed as logic.” (ibid, 134) 
73
 Goméz-Torrente (2002) gives as more general presentation of this practice in Tarski and Lindenbaum (1935) 
that is also shared by Carnap:  “(…) all primitive symbols denoting notions in that language (…) are (logical 
constants)T; also, if the definition were applicable to defined symbols, all these symbols would be (logical 
constants)T. Such results agree well with (…) traditional practice (for example the practice of the logicists, but 
others as well) according to which the constants of the language of the theory of types are logical constants.“ 
(ibid, 16)  
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Irrespective of this question, - given Carnap’s substitutional conception of models and his 
generalized scope of logic - we are now in a position to give a more refined definition of his 
tacit definability assumption (henceforth DA) in Untersuchungen:  
 
(DA) All models of a given axiom system are expressible in the ‘basic discipline” in the sense that all 
constitutive parts (sets, relations, and individual constants) of a model are named by constant 
expressions of STT. These constants are (i) either conventionally fixed to be part of the basic 
vocabulary or are (ii) introduced via explicative definitions in pure STT.   
 
1.5 Carnap’s tacit semantics for STT  
Carnap’s implicit logicist assumption (DA) has strong, limiting consequences for his overall 
theory of axiomatics. It effectively restricts the class of possible models of a theory to those 
expressible in his background logic. This is not necessarily restricting in the case of individual 
model construction. In this case, (DA) calls for the presentation of a particular logical model 
in the sense of Tarski’s “effective interpretation” or Bachmann’s “presentation of a logically 
constituted model.”74 Here, the condition of logical definability causes no deeper problems for 
Carnap’s theory, at least for the axiomatic systems discussed in Untersuchungen. For 
instance, as it was shown by Bachmann (1934) for the case of Peano arithmetic that different 
models can be presented via explicit ‘logicist’ definitions of the three primitive terms ‘0’, 
‘Succ’ and ‘NN’.75 
Where (DA) imposes constraints on Carnap’s theory of models is in cases where he refers to 
all models of a theory. Here, the condition effectively implies the expressibility of all models 
in STT, either in terms of primitive expressions of the language or in terms of defined notions. 
The real impact of (DA) is thus not on the level of concrete model construction 
(“Modellaufweis”) but on the more general level when the class of models of an axiom system 
is discussed. These instances are formally expressed by Carnap via the quantification over 
higher-order relations in STT. It is here that talk about the totality of models also implies 
                                                 
 
74
 Note that a similar account of a “logical interpretation” of an axiomatic theory in a type-theoretic theory can 
still be found in Carnap (1939). The idea expressed here is essentially identical to Tarski’s method of an 
“effective interpretation” (compare ibid, 22).  
75
 One possible limitation to the logical presentation of models in a logical system was mentioned in Tarski and 
Lindenbaum (1935), namely that the definability depends on the specific richness of the assumed background 
language. They mention the following example: ”It sometimes happens that an effective interpretation of an 
axiom system in logic can be found only at a higher type (this applies, for example to the axiom system of the 
arithmetic of real numbers).” (ibid, 391) A similar point was also stressed in Carnap and Bachmann (1936). 
Compare also 2.4.3.  
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effective constraints on the tacit semantics of his type-theoretic language, particularly of its 
higher-order segments. 
 
1.5.1 Quantification over models 
Quantification over the models of a theory is usually expressed in the metatheory today, e.g. 
in an interpreted set theory like ZFC. In Carnap’s early formal account, in contrast, talk of “all 
models” was cast in his ‘universalist’ and also fully interpreted type-theoretic language STT. 
Recall that models were conceived in Carnap (2000) and later on as n-tuples of relational 
constants of a given type of the form M1 = 〈R1, S1, T1, …〉. Given this conception, the 
generalization over models is then simply expressed as the higher-order quantification over 
relations (of the type-level of M1). So, e.g., in the case of Peano arithmetic with an individual 
term and two first-level primitive terms, the quantifiers binding the “model variable” would 
range over second-level tertiary relations of STT. 
This use of higher-order quantification is frequently used in Carnap’s work on axiomatics. 
Four particular cases should be mentioned here:  
 
(1) The first example concerns his treatment of the notion of logical consequence. In 
Untersuchungen (and already in Carnap (1927)) a “Lehrsatz” is expressed by (R)(fR → gR), 
where R is an unspecified predicate (or relation) variable, fR a propositional function 
expressing the axiom system, and gR a propositional function expressing a sentence “implied” 
by fR. “Lehrsätze“ are defined as follows: „gR is called a consequence of fR, if (R)(fR → gR) 
is valid“ (Carnap 2000, 92) Carnap gives this further specification: “If f → g is valid, that is, 
if all models of f are also models of g, we can also say: the extension (“Umfang”) of f is a 
“part” of the extension of g” (ibid, 95). Clearly, R is understood here as a model variable that 
ranges over all possible models of the system f.76 
(2) A second example where Carnap generalizes over models can be identified in his 
treatment of “extremal axioms” in the projected second, unpublished part of Untersuchungen 
(and later in Carnap and Bachmann (1936)). “Extremal axioms” are introduced to a theory in 
order to impose minimal or maximal conditions on the possible interpretations of the theory. 
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 Compare Reck (2007) for an extensive discussion on Carnap’s understanding of the consequence-schema 
(∀R)(fR→gR). Reck points out that there is “an ambiguity in his definition of the notion of deducibility, or of 
logical consequence more generally” that concerns Carnap’s assumed conditions under which a “Lehrsatz” is 
valid (see ibid, 188-189). 
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His main example of a mathematical maximal axiom is Hilbert’s axiom of completeness in 
geometry (see Hilbert 1900).77 Carnap’s formal reconstruction of this maximal axiom has the 
following form:  
                                       Max(F; M) =df ∼(∃N) (M ⊂ N . M ≠ N . F(N)). 
Informally, the axiom states that for a given theory F and a model M of F, there exists no 
proper extension of M that also satisfies F (Carnap and Bachmann 1981, 77).   
(3) A further example of quantification over models, again of a clearly metatheoretic 
character from a modern perspective, is Carnap’s treatment of categoricity (in his terms 
“monomorphism”) in Untersuchungen. Based on a formal presentation of the notion of 
“model isomorphism” between models of a given type structure (Carnap 2000, 104-122), a 
theory f is categorical if  (∃)f & (P, Q) [(fP & fQ) → Ismq(P, Q)] holds in STT. The formula 
expresses that the theory f is satisfied and that for any two models P and Q of f there exists an 
“isomorphism correlation” of type-level q between P and Q (ibid, 128-129). 
(4) Finally, we have already seen that an implicit generalization over the possible models of a 
theory can be identified in Carnap’s notion of the “Explizitbegriff” (compare Section 1.3.1). 
Recall that, for Carnap, an axiom system AS defines in an explicit fashion the class of all 
models of AS in terms of this higher-order explicit concept EB. We noted that his formal 
presentation of this via class comprehension, i.e.  
                                                   EBAS = ( )}{ TSRASTSR ;,,, )))  
can be reformulated as an universally quantified sentence of STT of the form 
                                         (∀R)(∀S)(∀T)(AS (R, S, T) → EBAS(R, S, T)) 
Thus, Carnap’s specification of the class of models of a theory in an “Explizitbegriffe” can 
also be recast in terms of higher-order quantification over relations.  
 
Given these examples, two brief remarks should be made. First, note that all cases can be 
viewed as additional cues for Carnap’s universal structuralism underlying in his theory of 
axiomatics (in the sense specified in Section 1.3.2). Quantification over models can in a sense 
be considered as the abstraction from specific instances of his logical model construction 
described above. Thus, in results that would today run under the label of metatheory - viz. the 
formulation of categoricity, model maximality, logical consequence, and the definition of 
                                                 
 
77
 See Sections 2.2 and 3.2 for further details. 
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classes of structures - Carnap seems to have held a universal structuralist position. The next 
section will show, however, that this is not the full picture.  
Second, in (1) to (4) the specific class of models of an axiom system expressed here via 
higher-order quantification is directly linked to Carnap’s tacit semantics for the type levels, 
i.e. the ranges of the bound variables of STT. In the context of his formal reconstruction of 
axiomatics there is thus a direct connection between the formal semantics of a theory, 
specifically its class of possible models and the interpretation of the higher-order segments of 
the background language STT. The class of models referred to in each of the above cases is 
identical to the range of the higher-order quantifier of STT.  It follows from this that Carnap’s 
(DA) concerning the formal models has to be directly reflected in his tacit semantics of his 
formal language. We mentioned above that (DA) effectively restricts the class of models to 
those expressible in STT. Consequently, it must have a similar effect on the (fixed) ranges of 
the higher-order segments of Carnap’s underlying theory of types. 
  
1.5.2 Higher-order quantification 
We have pointed out before that the “basic system” for Carnap’s theory of axiomatics was 
understood as fully interpreted. Compare the following remark on this point in 
Untersuchungen:  
 
Every treatment and investigation of an axiom system therefore presupposes a logic, specifically a 
contentual logic, i.e. a system of sentences that are not merely combinations of signs but that have a 
particular meaning. (Carnap 2000, 60)78    
 
Thus, the constant expressions as well as the quantifiers of STT come equipped with a fixed 
semantic interpretation. It follows also that all formulas in the examples discussed above that 
generalize over the models of a theory are conceived as interpreted statements of STT. 
Unfortunately, Carnap did not get any more specific about his intended interpretation of this 
“contentful logic” that forms the “basis for axiomatics” (ibid, 60). In particular, no explicit 
remark can be found in Untersuchungen concerning the intended interpretation of the higher-
order quantifiers of the “basic discipline”. In the following discussion, we will restrict our 
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 “Jede Behandlung und Prüfung eines Axiomensystems setzt also eine Logik voraus, und zwar eine inhaltliche 
Logik, d.h. ein System von Sätzen, die nicht bloße Zeichenzusammenstellungen sind, sondern eine bestimmte 
Bedeutung haben.“ (Carnap 2000, 60) Compare Chapter 2 for a more detailed study of Carnap’s conception of 
type-theoretic languages. 
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attention for reasons of simplicity to a segment of Carnap’s (finite) type-theoretic logic, 
namely SOL.79 The pressing interpretive question then is: What is Carnap’s assumed 
semantics for his “applied logicistic”, in particular for the second-order domains of relations 
(of a given arity)? 
 
In order to reconstruct his case, a modern presentation of the spectrum of the possible 
semantics for SOL will prove to be helpful. Koellner (2010) shows that for a second-order 
language L, a specific class of L-structures can be defined by a formula Φ(x, y). An instance 
of Φ is a structure 〈M, S〉 where M stands for the first-order domain and S for the second-order 
domain of the structure respectively (ibid, 1-2). The interesting point is to determine “what 
constraints” different Φs can place on the possible structures of L. Given this convention, the 
difference between what is usually classified as “standard” and “nonstandard semantics” 
relates to two limiting instances of Φ: in the minimal case, Φ restricts the class of models for 
L to models whose second-order domains S are restricted to the definable subsets of M. In 
other words, in the resulting “Definable SOL”, S = Def(M), viz. “the set of subsets of M that 
are definable over M with parameters.” (ibid, 31) The other, maximal case is that of “Full 
SOL.” Here, the second-order domains of the models are S = ℘(M), i.e. the second-order 
domain ranges over the full power set of a given M (see ibid, 33-36).80  
Generally speaking, type-theoretic languages (and thus SOL) as used in the foundational 
programs up to 1930s were usually conceived to range over all appropriately segmented 
objects of a type-theoretic universe.81 For instance, Shapiro argues for the adequacy of this 
“standard semantics” in the characterization of the historical use of type-theory in the works 
of Frege, Russell and others: “(...) standard higher-order logic is a good model of the logicist 
systems, and it would be a major distortion to think of them as if they were first-order (for 
example, to impose a non-standard semantics)” (Shapiro 1991, 179). In modern terms, this is 
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 Most of the axioms system Carnap discusses in Carnap (2000) and Carnap (1929) as well as their 
interpretations can be recast formally in SOL. For example, we saw that quantification over the first-level 
relations conceived as the interpretations for Peano arithmetic PA2 can be expressed in SOL. Also, his discussion 
of “elementary arithmetic” based on the concept of “progressions” as binary first-level relations can be expressed 
in SOL. 
80
 Compare Shapiro (1991, 80-96) for a similar discussion of standard and non-standard semantics for SOL.  
81
 See e.g. Ferreirós (2007) and Grattan-Guinness (2000) for two broader historical studies of the evolution of 
logic during that time. 
  46 
to say that the bound first-level predicate and function variables of a language were intended 
to range over the power set of the respective individual domain of the language.82 
 
Nevertheless, turning to Carnap’s use of “applied logicistic” for formalizing axiomatics, there 
is direct evidence that he must have conceived the higher-order domains of his interpreted 
language in a nonstandard sense. In the cases of quantification over models mentioned above, 
this nonstandard treatment follows directly from his substitutional conception of models 
outlined in Section 1.4.4. Given the fact that Carnap conceived his models as sequences of 
relational constants, it is obvious that – in sentences like (∀R)(fR→gR) – the range of (∀R) is 
clearly restricted to the class of relational expressions of STT. Note that this understanding of 
higher-order quantification is not limited to Carnap’s work on axiomatics. In fact, it can safely 
be said that prior to the Logical Syntax of Language (Carnap 1934), he upheld a substitutional 
understanding of higher-order domains (as well as of the first order domain) of a formal 
language.83 This conception of models and of higher-order quantification necessarily implies 
a nonstandard semantic close to the above specified sense. The reason for this is that, 
particularly in mathematical contexts, substitutional quantification is restricted compared to 
standard extensional quantification. This holds particularly for mathematical domains with 
indenumerable cardinalities given the usual assumption that a substitution class of expressions 
of a given type is at most (infinitely) denumerable. Carnap himself was quite explicit on this 
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 Against Shapiro’s view, these historical logics are sometimes also characterized in terms of a “non-standard 
semantics.” It is argued for instance in Hintikka (1995) that Russell’s ramified type theory in Principia 
Mathematica (Whitehead and Russell (1962)) effectively implies as non-standard interpretation. Due to Russell’s 
predicativity constraints on the comprehension principles, the higher-order quantifiers effectively range only 
over a subset of the power set of the model’s universe. The sets of admissible values for the higher-level 
quantifiers are thus effectively restricted to those elements (concepts, relations, sets,…) that are predicatively 
definable in type theory. Thus, due to this additional definability condition for higher-order entities, Hintikka 
follows, Russell and Whitehead “in effect assume a nonstandard interpretation” of the higher-order quantifiers of 
their logical language (Hintikka 1995, 38) 
83
 This becomes obvious in Carnap’s correspondence with Gödel from 1932 on several issues concerning drafts 
of Logical Syntax, most importantly, the valid understanding of the notion of ‘analyticity’ for formulas in a type-
theoretic language. Here, in an early version of analyticity for formulas involving a second-order quantifier 
presented to Gödel, Carnap apparently suggested that a sentence (X)X(0) is analytic iff  F(0) is analytic for all 
predicate constants F of the language. Gödel objections to this use of substitutional quantification eventually led 
Carnap to a change in mind concerning his conception of higher-order quantification and his subsequent move to 
an extensional treatment in Logical Syntax and later on. Compare Carnap (2002) on this point: “It may happen 
that, though all these sentences are true, ‘M(F)’ is nevertheless false – in so far as M does not hold for a certain 
property for which no predicate can be defined in II (…) we will follow Gödel’s suggestion and define ‘analytic’ 
in such a way the ‘M(F)’ is only called analytic if M holds for every numerical property irrespective of the 
limited domain of definitions which are possible in II.” (Carnap 2002, 106-107) Compare Awodey and Carus 
(2007, 37-38) and Coffa (1991, 290-293) for detailed discussions of this correspondence and its effects on 
Carnap (1934).   
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premise concerning the vocabulary of a formal language at several places in his work.84 Given 
these inherent limits of this conception of (first- and higher-order) quantifiers in comparison 
to the extensional interpretation, it is clear that Carnap’s conception of STT was nonstandard 
in a crucial way.  
 
One might object here that Carnap’s early substitutional approach was - in the absence of a 
sharply drawn syntax/semantics-distinction - in fact unintended or merely the result of a 
(generally shared) confusion between the expressions of a language and their semantic 
correlates. In this more charitable reading, he was not deliberately proposing a substitutional 
theory of models and quantifiers in a strong sense, but rather a quasi-extensional conception 
cast - for lack of better knowledge - in syntactic terms.85 In the context of his work on 
axiomatics, there are in fact a number of passages in Untersuchungen that indicate a certain 
ambiguity in his understanding of the “domains” (“Gebiete”) of a theory that can be 
mentioned in support of this view. For instance, at one place when Carnap is discussing 
Hilbert’s consistency proofs for axiomatic geometry he mentions its domains of “individuals 
of real numbers (or ordered set of those)” (Carnap 2000, 94). More specifically, he states:  
 
As a model of an axiom system of Euclidian geometry e.g. different triples of real numbers and certain 
relations between them can be used (…). (ibid, 94)86, 87  
 
There is not talk here of linguistic representations as the elements of the respective domain, 
but simply of relations between (triples of) real numbers, classes, and individuals. Hence, one 
might be tempted to infer that when Carnap speaks of logical constants (of STT) as the 
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 Compare, e.g., Carnap (2002): “(…) obviously the number of aggregate-designations is denumerable in every 
system. The richness is only assumed by means of axioms, and it is not demonstrable by designations. (names or 
descriptions).“ (ibid, 270) 
85
 A similar account can be identified in Principia Mathematica where it is not always clear whether Russell and 
Whitehead are discussing the syntactic expressions or their semantic relata when speaking of propositional 
functions.  
86
 “Als Modell eines Axiomensystems der euklidischen Geometrie können z.B. die Tripel reeller Zahlen und 
gewisse Beziehungen zwischen Ihnen genommen werden (…).“ (ibid, 94) 
87
 In a second example he discusses the fact that for every non-formal, e.g. an empirical interpretation S of an 
axiom system, an isomorphic formal model S’ can be presented. Here again the elements of a system seem to be 
understood extensionally: “For every system S consisting of such individual elements (including classes or 
relations of such individual elements or classes (or relations) of classes (or relations) of such individual elements 
etc.) there is a structure-identical system S’ whose individuals are real numbers (or ordered sets of such) (…).” 
(ibid, 94) “Zu jedem System S, das aus solchen Einzelheiten besteht (einschließlich der Klassen oder Relationen 
solcher Einzelheiten, oder der Klassen oder Relationen von Klassen oder Relationen solcher Einzelheiten usf.), 
gibt es daher ein strukturgleiches System S’, dessen Individuen reelle Zahlen (oder geordnete Mengen von 
solchen) sind (…).“ (ibid, 94) 
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constituents of the models or the instances of (higher-order) quantification, what he actually 
means to speak about are the extensional objects denoted by them.  
     
Even if a certain ambiguity concerning the proper nature of the semantic relata is granted for 
Carnap’s case, one should not overlook the fact that his substitutional account is directly 
motivated by his logicist background. More specifically, it is a natural consequence of his 
definability assumption for mathematical concepts. Thus, there is also a deliberate reason for 
him to restrict higher-order quantification to a nonstandard semantics. This is most explicitly 
expressed in Carnap (1931) in the context of his discussion of Ramsey’s approval of full 
impredicative comprehension in the theory of types (in contrast to Russell’s ramified version 
in Principia Mathematica). In arguing against Ramsey’s “concept absolutism“ in the 
quantification over all properties, Carnap states:  
 
(…) I think we should not let ourselves be seduced by it into accepting Ramsey’s basic premise; viz., 
that the totality of properties already exists before their characterization by definition. (…) I think we 
ought to hold fast to Frege’s dictum that, in mathematics, only that may be taken to exist whose 
existence has been proved (and he meant proved in finitely many steps). I agree with the intuitionists 
that the finiteness of every logical-mathematical operation, proof, and definition (…) is required by the 
very nature of the subject. (Carnap 1931, 102 quoted from: Benaceraff and Putnam 1983, 50) 
 
In a draft of his Königsberg talk on which the article was based in Carnap’s Nachlass, he gets 
more explicit about the kind of definability assumed here:  
 
We in contrast: not theological as Ramsey, but constructivistically: “all properties” means: “all 
expressions with 1 variable constructed from the basic properties according to given principles of 
construction.” (RC 090-16-09)88 
 
Two points should be stressed here. First, Carnap is fully explicit here about his motivation 
for a deliberate restriction of the higher-order domains: Ramsey’s “concept absolutism” has to 
be rejected from a Fregean constructivist point of view. Carnap’s explicit constructivism 
mentioned here essentially coincides with what we described as (DA) for formal models, i.e. 
the assumption that all mathematical higher-level entities (such as models) have to be 
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 “Wie dagegen: nicht theologisch, wie Ramsely, sondern konstruktivistisch: “alle Eigenschaften“ bedeutet: 
“alle Ausdrücke mit 1 Variablen, die aus Grundeigenschaften nach gegebenen Konstruktionsprinzipien 
konstruiert sind.“ (RC 090-16-09) 
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expressible in the “basic discipline”. In Carnap (1931) the condition for the existence of (and 
thus quantification over) higher-level concepts is that they have to be (logically) constructible 
or definable.89 
Second, note that here again a certain ambiguity concerning the effective elements in the 
range of quantification can be identified: they can either be considered as extensionally 
understood “properties” or as “expressions” and thus substitutionally. Nonetheless, in either 
way (and in contrast to Ramsey’s suggested full quantification), the higher-order domains are 
clearly supposed to be restricted to logically definable entities. Hence, Carnap tacit semantics 
for higher-order quantifiers is significantly nonstandard irrespective of the intrinsic 
constraints of the substitutional account, due to this logicist constructivism in concept 
formation and in quantification over properties.  
Given this Fregean doctrine in Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics we can specify his tacit 
semantics for the higher-order regions of STT in this way: in the case of second-order 
domains, the assumption implies something comparable to “Definable SOL” specified above. 
In Carnap’s account, the second-order domain S of the intended model 〈M, S〉 consists of the 
relations on and sets of M that are definable in the language. Given the fact that the class of 
defining formulae (and thus the introduced constants denoting them) have to be denumerable, 
it is clear that this semantics for SOL, i.e. the range over relations, is strongly restricted 
compared to full second-order quantification over the power set of M. Thus, Carnap’s logical 
constructivist doctrine effectively restricts the usual full higher-order semantics for his formal 
language STT.90   
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 In fact, this Fregean constructivism can be considered as a philosophical invariant in Carnap’s work from that 
time. Compare also his remarks in (Carnap 1930/31) on the “logicistic definitions“ of Frege and 
Whitehead/Russell: “The concepts of mathematics can be deduced from the logical concepts (…)” (ibid, 298). 
A few lines later, he talks of a “formally developed system of basic concepts: starting from some basic concepts 
all concepts of the mentioned fields [GS: i.e., arithmetic, analysis, and set theory] can be constituted by Stepp-
wise explicit definitions.“ (ibid, 300) For a closer analysis of Carnap’s logicism in the 1920s see again Reck 
(2004, 172-175) as well as Bonk and Mosterin (2000, 28-29). 
90
 This fact is eventually noted in Logical Syntax where Carnap - under the influence of Gödel’s suggestions 
from 1932 - purposes an extensional treatment of the fully interpreted higher-order quantifiers of his languages 
LII. Compare the following passage in §55 on “improper operators“ of LII: “The universal and existential 
operators of higher levels – that is to say, with p (or f) – are apparently improper in the majority of languages. 
(...) Let the 2prl, pr2, of ΙΙl [GS: the logical sub-language of ΙΙ] designate (in material speech) a property which 
belongs to all the number properties which are definable in ΙΙl but, on the other hand, not to all the number 
properties which are indefinable in ΙΙl (...). Then (p1)(pr2(p1)) is contradictory; the class of all closed variants of 
the operand is, however, analytic: and hence this contradictory sentence can not be a consequence of it. Further, 
on the same hypothesis (∃p1)(∼pr2(p1)) is analytic; hence all closed variants of the operand are contradictory; the 
content of the existential sentence is null and the product of the contents of the variants is the total content; 
therefore the former is a proper sub-class of the latter.” (Carnap 2002, 197) 
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With this in mind, we are now finally in a position to address the question what implications 
Carnap’s logicist assumption (and the resulting nonstandard semantics for his logical system) 
have for his attempt to capture formally the model-theoretic condition (3) of modern 
axiomatics via “Explizitbegriffe”. 
 
1.6 A restricted “Explizitbegriff”?  
Previous Sections 1.2.2 and 1.3.2 showed that (3) could be recast in structuralist terms as (3*). 
We mentioned that a proper understanding of (3*) depends on one’s additional semantic 
assumptions concerning the interpretation of the structures referred to here. In a “relative 
structuralism,” this concerns the specifics of one’s conception of models. In case of “universal 
structuralism,” the intended interpretation of the higher-order quantifiers in formulas like 
(∀R)(∀S)(∀T) [AS(R, S, T) → ϕ(R, S, T)] turns out to be decisive. 
As was pointed out, Carnap’s own semantic assumptions underlying his structuralist account 
of axiomatics combine elements from both strands. Here, a heterodox notion of formal 
models is used vis-à-vis a universal approach in cases where models are quantified out in 
higher-order quantification. Moreover, we saw that this generalization over the interpretations 
of a theory is not eliminative in a strong sense of the term since it does not fully abstract from 
the particular instances. Quantification in Carnap’s case remains effectively constrained by 
the logical definability conditions imposed on the level of individual model construction (i.e. 
his “Modellaufweis”). The implications of this for his reconstruction of (3) (or (3*)) are not 
difficult to see: the range of the quantifiers in the reformulation of Carnap’s “Explizitbegriff” 
                                    (∀R)(∀S)(∀T) (AS(R, S, T) → EBAS (R, S, T)) 
is clearly restricted to those instances of R, S, T that are explicitly definable in his “basic 
system”. Hence, Carnap’s talk the classes of models defined by an EBAS effectively means the 
class of logically definable models of the AS. 
So much for Carnap’s side. What have not been specified so far are the actual semantic 
assumptions underlying modern axiomatics, e.g. in Hilbert’s own work. In particular, for (3), 
this concerns the intended class of models specified by his axiomatic theories for geometry or 
analysis. In order to get a definitive answer to whether Carnap’s notion of “Explizitbegriffe” 
provides a valid reconstruction, we have to get a closer picture on the implicit semantics 
underlying (3) in the modern axiomatic practice. 
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1.6.1 Frege vs. Hilbert: which shared assumption? 
In addressing this, a short detour over the already mentioned Frege-Hilbert controversy will 
be instructive. In particular, a comparison of two recent commentaries on the historical debate 
by Tappenden (1997) and Shapiro (2005) will help to clarify the semantic implications of 
Hilbert’s account. Both papers attempt to relativize to a certain degree the received view of 
the conceptual gap between Frege’s universalist and Hilbert’s model-theoretic conceptions. 
They differ substantially, however, in their understanding of how Frege and Hilbert’s 
respective semantic assumptions can actually be related to each other.  
 
Tappenden (1997) discusses the historical controversy primarily with a view to reconcile 
Frege’s own reconstruction of the axiomatic method with Hilbert’s essentially modern 
account. He starts by stressing the former’s clear opposition to the latter’s “schematic” 
understanding of primitive terms and of axioms as “unquantified schemata”:  
 
Frege makes it evident that he is opposed to the idea that one can determine a subject matter by 
writing down a set of such uninterpreted sentences and indirectly fixing a family of interpretations for 
them. (ibid, 208) 
 
Nonetheless, Frege, as we noted in Section 1.2, formulated an alternative version of the 
semantic innovation (3) in the framework of his interpreted higher-order logic. Concerning 
this reconstruction in terms of higher-order concepts, Tappenden states: 
 
That is, although he objects to the idea of resting with a set of only partially interpreted schemata and a 
class of models for them, he has no objection in principle to the exploration of families of models 
using second-order quantification. (ibid, 209, my emphasis) 
 
This point is further strengthened. Tappenden holds that there is in fact no effective logical 
difference between this “substantive” expression of (3) and Hilbert’s own schematic approach 
in the formulation of axioms. This claim is based on two crucial assumptions: first, that Frege 
understood higher-order quantification substitutionally. In this sense, the quantifiers range 
over a substitution class of linguistic expressions and not, as in the extensional treatment, over 
a universe of higher-order entities (relations, sets, etc.). Second that this substitutional account 
is semantically equivalent to a schematic conception of logic:  
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As is well known, the distinction between quantified sentences and schemata essentially disappears 
when the quantifiers are substitutional; the quantifiers serve just as indicators of substitutional order. 
(ibid, 210) 
  
With respect to (3) Tappenden’s claim can thus be paraphrased this way: If Frege held a 
substitutional interpretation of higher-order quantifiers, then the class of models quantified 
over in a sentence like (∀R)(AS(R) →  ϕ(R)) is in effect identical to the one in Hilbert’s (now 
standard) schematic treatment. Thus, given the additional assumption concerning the implicit 
semantics of the “substantive” logicist tradition, the two versions of (3) result to be logically 
equivalent.  
 
I see a problem in this account that does not concern the semantics of Frege’s “substantive” 
logic. (I will simply sidestep the debate here on whether Frege actually held a substitutional 
account of second-order quantification).91 The problem, in my mind, rests on a misconception 
of Hilbert’s “schematic” account of axiomatics. It is certainly true that he introduced in 
Hilbert (1899) the notion of disinterpreted, schematically understood mathematical 
primitives. This is precisely the semantic innovation (1). It would be a mischaracterisation, 
however, to label his theory as generally schematic in character. This can be illustrated by 
looking at the informal logic used in his expressions of the geometrical axioms. Tappenden’s 
account seems to suggest that Hilbert’s axiomatization is schematic in the sense of a first-
order theory with axiom schemes. This would be to confuse, however, the schematic 
conception of primitives with a schematic version of axioms. While it is true that the bulk of 
Hilbert axioms for geometry can easily be formalized in FOL, his main continuity axiom, the 
axiom of completeness, can only be expressed in HOL. Generally, the axiom plays a pivotal 
role in Hilbert’s theory of Euclidian geometry. It is introduced to secure the completeness (in 
terms of model maximality and categoricity) of the axiom system and thus also its adequacy 
in relation to analytic geometry.92 The way it is expressed in the Grundlagen der Geometrie, 
it effectively involves quantification over all possible domains (and thus over all models) of 
the theory, quite similar to the idea of a definition of the class of structures of an axiom 
system expressed by (3). Given this, it would clearly be misleading to characterize Hilbert’s 
axiomatic approach to geometry as purely schematic.   
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 Compare Heck (2007), Linnebo (2004) and the references given there. 
92
 See Chapter 3 for further details on Hilbert’s axiom and Carnap’s reception of it. See also Hallett (2008). 
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A similar point can be made for the case of arithmetic. Here too, it is sometimes argued that 
the schematic first-order version of the Peano system does not adequately capture out 
intuitions about arithmetic.93 The bone of contention here is obviously the axiom of induction. 
In the first-order formulation, it is expressed as the axiom scheme  
(AI1)                                  (ϕ(0) & (∀x)(ϕ(x) → ϕ(S(x)))) → (∀x)ϕ(x). 
The schematic letter ϕ allows instantiation by all formulas FOL that define a property or set 
of the intended individual domain. If the axiom is formalized in this sense, then there is in fact 
no substantial difference between AI1 and a Fregean reconstruction of the axiom in 
substitutionally interpreted HOL. The possible instances for the schematic letter ϕ (in the 
modern schematic version) are effectively the same as those of the bound predicate variable X 
(in the “substantive” quantified version).94  With the move to second-order Peano arithmetic, 
ϕ is also substituted by a bound variable X. The second-order version of AI then reads:    
(AI2)                             (∀X)([X(0) ∧ (∀x)(X(x) → X(S(x)))] → (∀y)(X(y))). 
Unlike in the “substantive version”, the range of X is not restricted here to definable 
properties, but includes all properties (or sets) on the given individual domain of the intended 
model. Thus, in contrast to AI1, the range of possible arithmetical relations quantified over in 
AI2 is not limited by definability in the formal language.95  
Tappenden’s proposed reconciliation between Frege’s substantive-but-substitutional approach 
and the modern model-theoretic one holds in the cases of geometry and arithmetic only if the 
respective formal theories are understood in the first-order version (i.e. without a 
completeness axiom and a second-order axiom of induction).96 However, in both Hilbert’s 
and Peano’s original presentations of their theories informal but explicit use of higher-order 
quantification was made: in the first case over all Euclidian “systems of things” in the axiom 
of completeness, in the second case over all arithmetical properties in AI2.97 Thus, both 
axioms were not conceived as first-order axiom schemata in early modern axiomatics, but as 
fully interpreted second-order principles of the respective theory. Given this, one could in fact 
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 Compare e.g. Kreisel (1972). 
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 For additional, more subtle differences between the two accounts see Chapter 3.  
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 Compare Shapiro (1991, 110-113), for a more detailed account of the differences between the two versions. 
96
 Compare again Shapiro (1991) on the difference between the two formalizations: “The second-order axioms of 
induction, completeness (…) apply to any subset of the domain, whether definable in the language or not.” (ibid, 
111) More specifically: “Each of the first-order theories, formulated with a scheme, entails that for each model 
M, the relevant principle (induction, completeness, or replacement) applies to every first-order definable subset 
of, or function on, the domains of M. But that is all. They do not, and cannot, state that the principle applies to 
every subset of the domain.” (ibid, 112) 
97
 Compare Awodey and Reck (2002) for further details on the historical axiomatizations.  
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reverse Tappenden’s argument in this way: given Frege’s “substantive” conception of logic, it 
is not substitutional (or definable) but full second-order quantification that is needed in order 
to capture the original intentions behind these axioms in these early axiomatic systems. A 
formal reconstruction in which the higher-order domains are conceived nonstandard cannot 
adequately capture the modern axiomatic practice.   
 
In Shapiro (2005), greater focus than on Frege’s conception is laid on the actual logical 
assumptions in Hilbert’s account, specifically on the question whether there are “substantive” 
assumptions in his informal use of logic. Similarly to Tappenden (1997), it is also stressed 
here that Hilbert is a major proponent of the “algebraic,” model-theoretic tradition (in 
opposition to the “substantive” or, in Shapiro’s terms, “assertory” conception of logic of the 
logicists like Frege) (ibid, 68). However, what Tappenden sees as the overall “schematic” 
conception of Hilbert’s axiomatics, is characterized differently here:   
 
One can take any algebraic sentence and interpret it directly as a proposition about all systems of a 
certain sort. Consider, for example, the Euclidian sentence that there is a point that lies between any 
two distinct points. From the algebraic perspective, this comes to something like this:  
(*) In any (possible) Euclidian system S, for any two distinct objects a, b in S that are ‘points-in-S’, 
there is a third object c that is also a point-in-S, and c lies between-in-S a and b. (ibid, 68) 
 
Shapiro points out here an implicit universalist structuralism, more precisely the tacit 
quantification over all (possible) models of a system in Hilbert’s schematic version of 
expressing his axioms. Concerning the implicit semantics of this structuralist account, he 
remarks:  
 
What is the status of statements like (*)? It would seem that for the algebraist [GS: i.e. Hilbert], such 
sentences must themselves be assertory. (…) Moreover, it would run counter to the spirit of Hilbert’s 
approach to think of the opening quantifier in (*) as itself restricted to a particular system. (ibid, 68)   
 
Shapiro’s claim made here is this: The implicit quantifiers in sentences like (*) in Hilbert’s 
theory were conceived to be fully interpreted and to range over all possible models of the 
axiom system. Thus, as in Frege’s treatment of axiomatic systems, there is also a tacitly 
assumed generalization over the interpretations in Hilbert’s theory. His informally used logic 
in Grundlagen der Geometrie is “assertive” (or “substantial”) despite the general algebraic 
nature of the project.  
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Concerning the notorious controversy with the ‘logical universalist’ Frege, Shapiro mentions 
that “such statements [GS: as (*)] are at least implicit in Hilbert’s motivating remarks and in 
the correspondence with Frege.” (ibid, 68) Frege’s own attempt “to recapture Hilbert’s 
perspective“ was thus to construct “statements like (*) in his own logical system. And, of 
course, for Frege such statements, like all others in mathematics, are assertory.” (ibid, 68)  
This reading, as the one proposed by Tappenden, both attempt to reconcile the two historical 
positions by stressing their mutual assumptions. The fundamental difference of Shapiro’s to 
Tappenden’s interpretation concerns precisely the nature of this (allegedly) shared 
assumption: The latter assumes a substitutional interpretation of Frege’s logical language. He 
argues that a “substantive” reconstruction of axiomatics with this restricted semantics meets 
Hilbert schematic conception. Shapiro, in contrast, emphasizes the fact that not only in 
Fregean logicism, but also in Hilbert’s algebraic context, statements like (*) have an 
“assertory” sense, viz. they are substantive claims in an informal but interpreted logic.  
In Hilbert’s case, these logical resources are not visible given the fact that Hilbert (1899) is 
fully written in colloquial language and thus not a formalized theory. Moreover, we already 
mentioned that most of his axioms can be expressed formally in FOL. Take for instance the 
axiom of order underlying Shapiro’s example (*). Hilbert and Bernays (1934) give the 
following formalization of the axioms in FOL: 
                                                (∀x)(∀y)(x ≠ y → (∃z)(Zw(z,x,y))) 
where x, y, z are individual variables that range over points and Zw is a tertiary relation that 
expresses ‘betweenness’ (ibid, 6). 
The mathematical motivation of the algebraist to turn to higher-order quantification (over 
models) does not concern this object-level in which the theory is expressed. It concerns the 
theory’s metatheory. Shapiro’s main point is that in Hilbert’s axiomatics, despite his 
schematic conception in the object theory, there has to be an assertive use of logic in his 
interpreted metatheory. This is necessary in order to develop the well-known (semantic) 
consistency and independence results in Hilbert (1899) (see ibid, 70).98 We saw that this full 
use of (higher-order) logic is also present - on the object-level – in Hilbert’s axiom of 
completeness. The axiom is clearly metatheoretic from a modern point of view since it 
involves the quantification over the models of the base theory.99 More generally, as Shapiro 
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 For the central importance of a metatheoretic account in Hilbert (1899) see also Hallett (2008) and Hintikka 
(forthcoming). 
99
 Compare 3.2 for a closer discussion of the axiom as well as of Carnap’s formal reconstruction of it as a 
maximal axiom. 
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makes clear, sentence (*) itself has to be considered as a metatheoretic reformulation of the 
original axiom in this sense:   
  
 (*) For all individual domains P and all assignments to Zw: (∀x)(∀y)(x ≠ y → (∃z)(Zw(z,x,y))) 
 
This is a quantified out version of Hilbert’s original axiom that is fully in line with the 
universal structuralist account described above. Note that the underlying semantics for the 
meta-mathematical sentence (*) has to be strong enough in order to allow talk of “all ranges 
of P” and “all assignments to Zw”, hence to quantify over all possible interpretations of the 
terms as defined by the axiom.100 The most natural way to secure this is to assume a fully 
semantics for the language in which (*) is expressed. Thus, irrespective of whether the 
background language in a given metatheory is formalized or kept informal (as in Hilbert’s 
account), the quantification indicated in (3) as well as in sentences like (*) is most likely 
supposed to be standard in modern axiomatics. Thus, when Hilbert tacitly assumed the prefix 
“for all models” for all of his axioms, he most likely meant every (mathematically possible) 
model and every model expressible in a given language.  
Here again, the difference between this view and Tappenden’s account with respect to (3) 
should be stressed. Tappenden claims that Frege’s reconstruction of (3) via substitutional 
higher-order logic is equivalent to Hilbert’s schematic definition of the class of models. From 
Shapiro’s perspective, the mistake of this view lies in the fact that (3) is certainly not 
expressed in the object theory, but in the metatheory. As such it is not a schematic but an 
assertive statement that presupposes sufficiently strong mathematical resources to refer to all 
models of a theory. Hence, one can view Shapiro’s interpretation of the Frege-Hilbert 
controversy in direct opposition to Tappenden’s version: according to the former, Hilbert’s 
metatheoretic and thus assertoric treatment of (*) (and (3)) and Frege’s formal reconstruction 
are in fact comparable under the premise that Frege actually assumed full higher-order 
quantification in his logical system.  
  
                                                 
 
100
 Compare Hintikka on the necessary semantic presuppositions of the axiomatic account: “When a certain type 
of structure is studied mathematically, this study is not restricted to what can be found out about all such 
structures or about some subclass of them. A perhaps even more important task in practice is to reach an 
overview over all such structures.“ (Hintikka (forthcoming)) 
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1.6.2 Consequences for Carnap’s version  
Shapiro’s understanding of metatheoretic sentences like (*) implicit in Hilbert axiomatics on 
first sight also seems to apply to Carnap’s reconstruction of similar sentences in higher-order 
quantification. In Carnap too, (*) would clearly be understood as a substantive truth in his 
“applied logistic”. Similarly, this holds for his explication of (3) via “Explizitbegriffe”.  
Now, one might object to this comparison by stressing an important difference between 
Carnap’s account from 1928 and the modern model-theoretic treatment of this issue. In the 
modern account sentences like (*) are expressed in an interpreted meta-language. In contrast, 
in Carnap’s case, they are formulated on the object-level, i.e. in a single logical object 
language. We saw that in his Untersuchungen, this ‘universal’ background system is his type-
theoretic “basic discipline”, in which both the axiomatic theories and their (semantic) 
metatheory (including sentences like (*)) are captured. The examples of the metatheoretic 
sentences or formulas (all clearly semantic in content) discussed in Section 1.5.1 are further 
cases in point for this.101 
However, concerning statements about the semantics of an axiom system (like (3)), the 
missing object-/meta-language distinction is not a consequential difference to the algebraic 
tradition. First, Hilbert in Grundlagen der Geometrie clearly engaged in semantic 
metatheoretic investigation for his axiom system without possessing anything like a proper 
meta-perspective, let alone a proper formal meta-language. Here, too, the informal metatheory 
(in particular his independence and consistency proofs) is expressed in one and the same 
language as the axiom system, in his case in colloquial German. Sentences like (*) described 
by Shapiro would thus also be expressed in this universal colloquial language.  
Second, it is questionable whether a metatheoretic perspective has to be considered as a 
conditio sine qua non for large parts of formal semantics. In Frege’s as well as in Carnap’s 
formal reconstructions of axiomatics, there is no stringent reason why (at least some) of their 
explications of semantics notions cannot be expressed in the proper object language. This is 
true in particular if the languages in question have strong enough logical resources, e.g. 
                                                 
 
101
 The missing distinction between meta- and object-theory in Carnap’s Untersuchungen has been discussed 
extensively in recent scholarship. Compare Coffa on Carnap’s “monoliguistic approach“: “Carnap’s book was 
thus inspired by the somewhat epicyclic aim of showing that everything of value in metamathematics can (or 
should) be expressed within the monolinguistic framework of Principia Mathematica.” (Coffa 1991, 274) A 
more differentiated account is given in Reck (2004):  “(…) if looked at in more detail his [i.e. Carnap’s] 
approach is only partly metamathematical and model-theoretic, since he does not separate precisely between 
object-language and meta-language, and since he does not yet have a full understanding of the model-theoretic 
notion of an interpretation for a formal language at his disposal.” (Reck 2004, 170). See Awodey & Carus (2001, 
158-161) for a critical discussion of Carnap’s ‘universalist’ approach in his treatment of the “Gabelbarkeitssatz”. 
Compare also Bonk and Mosterin (2000, 35-36). 
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sufficient (interpreted) higher type-levels to present the semantics of the expressions and 
formulae of the lower type-levels. Carnap’s underlying universal language for the “basic 
discipline” is finite STT. Here, this condition is clearly met. The higher interpreted type levels 
can definitely be used to present the semantics, e.g. the models for theories (like Peano 
arithmetic) expressed in the lower regions of the language. A move to a separate meta-
language is therefore not necessary, especially for the axiomatic theories discussed in Carnap 
(2000).  
 
Where the discussed accounts actually differ from each other is in the implicit background 
semantics, more specifically in the tacit assumptions concerning the language in which 
sentences like (*) and also (3) are expressed. In other words, where Frege’s and Hilbert’s 
position can conceptually differ from each other is in the semantic understanding of the 
higher-order quantifiers of the respective (formal or informal) background language.  
Applied to Carnap’s case, the main point to see is that Hilbert’s informal use of quantification 
and the formal use of quantification in the former’s STT are “assertory” or “contentual” in 
different senses. I fully agree with Shapiro (and contra Tappenden) that there is an assertoric 
use of quantifiers in ‘Hilbertian’, viz. modern axiomatic practice, in particular in the 
presentation of the model-theoretic results like (3). I would add that the semantic or set-
theoretical resources necessary for expressing this result are most neatly codified in a SOL (or 
alternatively in ZFC). Moreover, talk about “all (possible) models” of a theory seems to 
presuppose a full, standard interpretation of the underlying metalanguage. The quantification 
involved here ranges over all “possible” models, i.e. all Euclidian structures in which the 
theory in question holds. Therefore, I take it that the intended metatheory for Hilbert’s theory 
of Euclidian geometry, if formalized, would have to be cast in fully interpreted SOL (or 
something equivalently strong).102 It follows from this that any formal reconstruction of (3) 
has to employ equally strong logical resources if the aim is to capture Hilbert’s 
metamathematical account.  
We saw in Section 1.4.5 that for Carnap the possible models of an axiom system are those 
expressible (or definable) in his formal background language. In particular, the definability 
assumption led him to treat formal models in a substitutional way, i.e. a tuples of (logical) 
constants of STT. Moreover, Section 1.5.2 showed that the same logicist definability 
condition for the introduction of higher-order entities led him to assume a nonstandard 
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 Compare Shapiro (1991) for a detailed discussion of the set-theoretic import of different versions of SOL.  
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semantics for the higher-order domains of his logical language. In his work on the semantic 
metatheory of axiomatics, this affects cases that involve quantification over the models of an 
axioms system: the range of a bound “model-variable” of an axiom system is thus restricted to 
the logically definable models. It also follows from this that Carnap’s concept of an 
“Explizitbegriff” effectively determines the class of definable models of an axiom system and 
not of all mathematically possible models. It therefore remains limited in context to the 
model-theoretic assumption (3) in modern axiomatics.  
 
1.7 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to provide a close survey of Carnap’s early theory of axiomatics 
from the 1920s. We saw that his formal reconstruction of axiom systems and their model 
theory was based on a tacit but consequential logicist assumption inherited from Frege and 
Russell. Carnap’s discussion of formal models is subject to a strong definability assumption in 
the sense that each model of a theory has to be expressible in this logical background system. 
One consequence of this was that Carnap effectively upheld a nonstandard semantic 
conception of higher-order logic, for the case of first-level relation quantifiers, definable SOL. 
A second consequence was that certain of the crucial semantic innovations of modern 
axiomatics, most importantly the idea that a theory semantically defines the class if its models 
could not be adequately captured in his formal reconstruction. These limitations resulting 
from the definability condition (and thus the nonstandard semantics for his type-theoretic 
language) not just affect Carnap’s “Explizitbegriffe.”  It also has strong limiting effects on his 
overall project in Untersuchungen to provide a formal explication of the (semantic) 
metatheory of axiomatics. For Carnap’s “Gabelbarkeitssatz,” this was already discussed in 
Awodey and Carus (2001) and Reck (2007). It is important to stress that the tacit logicist 
definability assumption for models also affects Carnap’s formal reconstruction of the 
individual notions of completeness, most importantly that of categoricity (“monomorphism”). 
The categoricity of a mathematical theory, e.g. of second-order Peano arithmetic, is nowadays 
usually proved in a fully interpreted higher-order metatheory (see Shapiro 1991, 82-83). The 
fact that Carnap assumed a nonstandard interpretation of his universal background logic 
makes his explication of the notion in Untersuchungen problematic at best.  
In this chapter we have gained an understanding of the inherent limits of Carnap’s work on 
axiomatics, in particular his attempt to provide a formal semantics for axiomatic theories. We 
will see in the next chapter, on the other hand, that his early account of formal models has in 
several ways anticipated constitutive features of the modern notion. 
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Chapter 2: Carnap’s early semantics: models, extremal axioms, analyticity 
 
2.1 Introduction 
One interpretive issue concerning Carnap’s early contributions to formal semantics, 
specifically his theory of models for axiomatic theories formulated in the only recently 
published manuscript Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Axiomatik in 1928 (Carnap (2000)) 
has yet not been resolved conclusively. It concerns the question whether Carnap conceived his 
models to allow for domain variation, i.e. whether he held a variable domain conception (in 
the following VDC).103 Whereas the first, published part of Carnap’s manuscript does not 
provide conclusive evidence for deciding on this issue, I will show that the results of the 
second, projected part, which exists in fragmentary form in Carnap’s Nachlass (RC 080-01-01 
to RC 080-01-33), parts of which were published in Carnap and Bachmann (1936), will give 
decisive cues for the understanding of his early conception of the domain of a model.  
It has been stressed recently, most notably by Hintikka that due to Carnap’s ‘universalistic’ 
conception of logic – mainly inherited from Russell – the idea of changing a universe of 
discourse for a language was simply inconceivable for him.104 Drawing to van Heijenoort’s 
now classic distinction between two opposing conceptions of logic, the logic as calculus vs. 
the logic as language (van Heijenoort (1967)), Hintikka argues that the “universality 
assumption” involved in the second is also a tacit invariant in Carnap’s thinking throughout 
his intellectual career. With regards to semantic issues this background assumption results in a 
“one domain thesis“ (Hintikka 1991) according to which the domain of an interpretation, i.e. 
the range of the individual quantifiers, is invariantly fixed with the specification of a 
language:105 
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 For recent work on Carnap’s axiomatic project see Awodey and Carus (2001), Reck (2007), Goldfarb (2005), 
Bonk and Mosterin (2000), and Awodey and Reck (2002). 
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 See esp. Hintikka (1991) and Hintikka (1992).  
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 “[Carnap] assumes that, in order to interpret a first-order language, we have to specify some one given 
domain of individuals to which that language pertains. (...) the members of that given domain of individuals can 
still assume different structures. They can have different properties and different relations to each other.” 
(Hintikka 1992, 175) Hintikka’s main focus here is Carnap’s specific understanding of possible worlds in his 
modal semantics in Carnap (1947). Nevertheless, as we will see, he takes the same remarks to hold also for his 
theory of models for standard logical languages.  
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I will in the following term this assumption the fixed domain conception (in short FDC).106 
According to Hintikka, FDC concerning logical, formal languages systematically hinders 
Carnap, being one of the inventors of formal semantics, from a full apprehension of a 
standard “model-theoretical viewpoint“ (ibid.). It is also held that Carnap’s tacit FDC can be 
traced back to his early contributions to the philosophy of logic and mathematics and related 
topics in formal semantics. In support of this claim, Hintikka (1991) refers to Carnap and 
Bachmann (1936), a neglected technical article that presents (with slight modifications) 
results formulated in the second, projected part of Untersuchungen.107 The paper marks a 
highly innovative contribution to a topic in mathematical axiomatics broadly discussed at the 
time, namely the use, function and limits of “extremal axioms”, i.e. mathematical axioms that 
impose minimal or maximal conditions on the models of a theory in question. Hintikka makes 
two interpretive claims about Carnap’s treatment of extremal axioms: first that his formal 
explications misrepresent the actual use of the corresponding axioms in mathematical 
practice, i.e. that Carnap fundamentally misconceives the usual intentions underlying axioms 
like Hilbert’s completeness axioms for geometry and analysis or Peano’s axiom of induction 
for arithmetic. Second that this misconception on Carnap’s side can be explained by the fact 
that he already presupposed something like FDC in his theory of models at this early phase in 
his intellectual career.   
The principle aim of this chapter is twofold: first, to provide a precise and historically 
sensitive account of Carnap’s early conception of models. For this, I will draw extensively on 
unpublished material from Carnap’s Nachlass. Second, it is to argue against both of 
Hintikka’s claims. I will show that the conclusions Hintikka draws for Carnap’s tacit 
semantics result from an inadequate understanding of the latter’s heterodox conception of 
models in Untersuchungen. Hence, the former fails to take into account a number of subtle 
distinctions concerning Carnap’s (and Bachmann’s) auxiliary notions of ‘model structure’, 
‘model domain’, and ‘model extension’ that provide the conceptual framework for Carnap’s 
formal explication of extremal axioms. In this chapter I first sort out different conventions 
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 Hintikka gives the following more general specification of this assumption: “If we cannot in our theorizing 
assume a different set of language-world relations in general, we cannot assume a different set of name-object 
relations, either. What this means is that a specification of the domain of individuals is part and parcel of the 
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language.“ (Hintikka 1991, 328) For a similar assessment of Carnap’s limitative assumptions underlying his 
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discussion. A short commentary can be found in Bonk and Mosterin (2000) where Carnap’s theory is presented 
and the projected structure of the second part of Untersuchungen is outlined. For a short discussion see also 
Awodey and Reck (2002) and Reck (2007). 
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introduced by Carnap to allow domain variation for his models in the axiomatic context. 
Second, it is argued that once a more balanced account of Carnap’s underlying semantics of 
these auxiliary notions is provided, Hintikka’s interpretive claims cannot be upheld. To the 
contrary, a more refined picture of Carnap’s account of models and model extensions will 
suggest that he - despite the heterodox character of his notion –conceived domain variation 
for his models in a sense structurally comparable to the modern notion.  
The chapter will be organized as follows: In Section 2.2 an outline of Carnap’s theory of 
extremal axioms (as presented in Carnap and Bachmann (1936)) is given. Following a 
discussion of Carnap’s notion of a model’s structure (Section 2.2.1) and the presentation of a 
simple example of extremal structures (Section 2.2.2), Hintikka’s interpretive claims 
concerning the theory will be discussed (Section 2.3). The main aim in Section 2.4 will be to 
develop a detailed analysis of Carnap’s heterodox conception of formal models. Certain 
differences concerning the conceptual framework of Carnap’s definition of a formal model 
between the 1936 paper and Untersuchungen will be discussed (Section 2.4.1). This allows 
outlining what I will term a ‘domain-as-fields’ conception of models held by Carnap (Section 
2.4.2). Moreover, by drawing to unpublished material from Carnap’s Nachlass, a second 
convention for domain variation based on a type flexible understanding of his formal 
background language will be discussed (Section 2.4.3.) With this in hand, an interpretation of 
Carnap’s technical notions of ‘submodel’ and ‘model extension’ alternative to Hintikka’s 
account will be presented in Section 2.5. It will be argued - contra Hintikka - that the 
explications given in 1936 are fully consistent with the informal use of these notions in 
mathematical practice. Additional evidence for this view is presented by taking into 
consideration Carnap & Bachmann’s treatment of genuinely mathematical examples of model 
extension from “basic arithmetic” and geometry (section 2.5.1). Finally, an alternative 
convention for models extensions via language transitions outlined in the final section of 
Carnap and Bachmann (1936) will be discussed in Section 2.5.2. I will argue that this 
provides additional support for my reading of Carnap’s notions of model and model 
extension. 
 
2.2 Extremal axioms 
In the first part of Untersuchungen, Carnap describes of formalized version of axiomatic 
systems as “theory-schemata” that can be presented logically as systems of sentential 
functions. The ‘basic terms’ (‘Grundzeichen’) of a theory are expressed by typed relation or 
class variables. Systems with more than one primitive term of the form f(P, Q, R, …) are 
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abbreviated by a ‘model variable’ (‘Modellvariable’) M of a specified type (see Carnap 2000, 
88). The resulting system f(M) allows different empirical and formal interpretations. The term 
‘formal model’ is reserved for the second type of interpretations. The variable M ranges over 
the set of adequate models (“zulässige Modelle”) of f. A model M1 is then defined as an 
ordered sequence of relations (and thus as a relation itself) of a specified type that present 
admissible values for the predicate variables (P, Q, R, …) and “satisfy” the axiomatic system 
f (see ibid, 95). 
 Given this, the second, projected part of the manuscript deals with different versions of 
maximal and minimal axioms, i.e. axioms introduced in order to fix the intended 
interpretation of a mathematical theory (RC 081-01-04 to -33). A mathematical instance of a 
maximal axiom Carnap discusses extensively is Hilbert’s axiom of completeness (AC) for 
geometry first published in the French edition of Grundlagen der Geometrie in 1900. As an 
example of a minimal axiom Carnap refers to Peano’s axiom of induction as well as to 
Fraenkel’s axiom of restriction devised for axiomatic set theory around 1920.108 All these 
cases share a similar limiting structure: they impose that the domain of elements D of the 
possible models of the axiom system in question cannot be extended/restricted to a 
larger/smaller domain of individuals D’ without violating the relations implicitly defined by 
the theory. Thus e.g. Hilbert’s AC for geometry imposes that the models satisfying AS+AC 
are the maximal models of the base system AS, i.e. models, whose domain of elements cannot 
be extended without violating one or more of the relations defined by AS. The underlying 
idea here is to rule out non-intended models and fix intended models for an axiom system. In 
Hilbert’s case, the aim behind the addition of AC is to rule out models of Archimedean 
Euclidian Geometry that are submodels of analytic geometry (e.g. certain algebraic models 
satisfy AS+Archimedean axiom defined for independence proofs in §9 in Hilbert (1900)) and 
to secure the identity of (the models of) his axiomatic theory with “ordinary” analytic 
geometry.109 
As already mentioned we can get a detailed impression of Carnap’s attempt to provide a 
formal explication of these types of axioms around 1928 by looking at his joint paper with the 
German mathematician Friedrich Bachmann with the unifying title “Über Extremalaxiome” 
published a couple of years later (Carnap and Bachmann (1936/1981)).110  Here the topic is 
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 For a closer discussion of Carnap’s reception of Fraenkel’s axiom of restriction see Schiemer (2010). 
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 For a detailed presentation of Hilbert’s axioms of completeness see Awodey/Reck (2002) and Ehrlich (1997). 
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 The origin of the 1936 paper can be retraced from Carnap’s correspondence with Bachmann documented in 
Carnap’s Nachlass. In a letter dated July 27, 1934, Carnap invites Bachmann to write a joint paper that should 
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taken up again. At the outset of the paper a provisional explication of extremal axioms is 
given by elucidating their domain-fixing function: 
 
Axioms of the sort of Hilbert’s axiom of completeness, which ascribe to the objects of an axiomatic 
theory a maximal property in that they assert that there is no more comprehensive system of objects 
that also satisfies a series of axioms, we call a maximal axiom. The same axiomatic role as that of the 
maximal axioms is played in different axiom systems by minimal axioms which ascribe a respective 
minimal property to the elements of the discipline. Maximal and minimal axioms we call collectively 
extremal axioms. (Carnap & Bachmann 1981, 68-69)111  
 
The remainder of the paper is essentially a conceptual clarification and formal explication of 
their understanding of these informal notions. Before turning to the specifics of their formal 
versions of extremal axioms, one point concerning Carnap’s tacit semantics involved here 
should be emphasized: the task of giving a formal explication of these axiom types prima 
facie seems to presuppose a semantic apparatus comparable to modern model theory, i.e. an 
understanding of models and model extensions that allows domain variation. Without such an 
assumption a discussion of different models (of differing power) of a theory could hardly be 
meaningful. Note the way in which the intended effects of the maximal axioms are described 
above: the axioms “ascribe” a “maximal property” to the “elements of the discipline”, i.e. its 
“systems of objects”. From this intuitive picture alone, it is difficult to see what led Hintikka 
to claim that Carnap tacitly assumes a FDC in his theory of models. To address this, it will be 
instructive to take a closer look at Carnap’s notion of a model’s “structure” that plays a 
crucial role in his conception of model extensions. As will become clear in the next sections, 
the central difficulty in assessing Carnap and Bachmann’s formal version of extremal axioms 
lies in the fact that whereas Hilbert (as well as modern accounts) speak of model extensions in 
terms of extensions of the individual domain of a model, Carnap and Bachmann – 
unconventionally - speak of extensions of a model’s structure.  
My main point will be to show that Hintikka’s interpretive claims about Carnap’s underlying 
semantics and his misconception of mathematical practice essentially stems from a 
misreading of Carnap’s emphasis of structures over domains of individuals. For clarification, 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
combine his results from part two of Untersuchungen with Bachmann’s own work on extremal axioms (RC 028-
02-01). 
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 Now, it is well known that extremal axioms like Hilbert’s AC are, from a modern point of view, logically 
problematic for they “conflate formal languages with their model-theoretic semantics” (Shapiro 1991, 185). One 
of my main points in this paper will be to show precisely in what regards Carnap’s account differs from a full-
fledged modern conception of model theoretic semantics.  
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I will briefly outline in the following two sections Carnap’s notions of a model’s structure and 
of structure extensions which I take to be at the core of this misinterpretation. 
 
2.2.1 Model structures 
A central notion employed by Carnap in his treatment of axiomatics is that of a relational 
“structure”, a concept originally adopted and further developed from the theory of relations in 
Principia Mathematica.112 The main characteristic of a relation’s structure is its abstract 
character, i.e. the fact that it abstracts from any information about the extension of a given 
relation possessing this structure. In §22 of Carnap’s Abriss der Logistik (Carnap 1929) we 
find the following characterization of the “structural properties of a relation”:  
 
A relation is fully specified by its structure with regards to its formal properties if we understand them 
to consist of those properties that result from considering exclusively the identity and difference of the 
relational elements, irrespective of their other nature. (Carnap 1929, 54)113, 114 
 
Applied in Untersuchungen, Carnap’s main intention is to define formal properties of 
mathematical models axiomatically. Here, the following definition is given:  
 
The property fP of relations is called “structural property” if, in case it holds for a relation P, it also 
holds for every relation isomorphic to P.” (ibid, 74)115  
 
Expressed in Carnap’s formal terms, this reads: (P, Q)[fP & Ism(Q,P) → fQ]. A substantial 
part of Part 1 of Untersuchungen is reserved for the exact type-theoretic definition of a 
“generalized” or “complete isomorphism” Ism(P,Q) between n-ary relations Q and P where 
the elements of the different domains are of different types.116 It is shown that the 
                                                 
 
112
 See Whitehead and Russell (1962, §21 and §30-38), compare also Russell (1919, 60-61). 
113
 “Eine Relation wird durch ihre Struktur vollständig charakterisiert in Bezug auf ihre formalen Eigenschaften, 
wenn wir hierunter diejenigen ihrer Eigenschaften verstehen, die sich bei bloßer Berücksichtigung der Identität 
und Verschiedenheit unter den Relationsgliedern ergeben, unter Nichtbeachtung der sonstigen Beschaffenheit 
der Glieder.“ (Carnap 1929, 54) 
114
 This notion of a relation’s structure is closely related to Carnap’s concept of “structure descriptions” of 
relations in Carnap (2003). In §11, he gives the following characterization of a relation’s ‘formal properties’: 
“By formal properties of a relation, we mean those that can be formulated without reference to the meaning of 
the relation and the type of objects between which it holds.” (ibid, 21) 
115
 “Die Eigenschaft fP von Relationen heißt eine “strukturelle Eigenschaft”, wenn sie, falls sie einer Relation P 
zukommt, auch jeder mit P isomorphen Relation zukommt.” (ibid, 74) 
116
 For Carnap’s theory of relations as well as his theory of (model-)isomorphism see Carnap (2000, §1.7) as 
well as Carnap (1929). 
  67 
construction of an isomorphism correlation between relations is closely connected to 
specification of their ‘structure’. Two relations that are isomorphic also share “the same 
structure.” This, in turn, can be defined via the isomorphism class of the relation by stating 
that fP holds as a “structural property” of a relation if it also belongs to all relations 
isomorphic to P (ibid, 74).117 Since models are treated as higher-level relations, similar 
remarks hold also for a model’s structure.  
This approach can - as Carnap himself specifies - in fact be viewed as an approach to define a 
structural property of a relation via an invariance condition over “isomorphic 
transformations” of a certain kind (ibid, 74). However, it is not clear how the transformations 
referred to here are actually understood, especially when models are considered as the 
subject.118 Fortunately, in Carnap and Bachmann (1936), the authors get more specific about 
the concept of a ‘model structure’. Again the definition closely leans on the notion of 
“complete isomorphism”:  
 
Since the complete isomorphism between n-place models (i.e., sequences with n members) is a 2n-
equivalence relation, n-place relations can be defined over the field of this relation, i.e., over the 
totality of constants of the basic, assumed language which can appear as elements of models, such that 
the n-place relations have the following properties: for each model there exists exactly one such 
relation which is satisfied by the constituents of the model and is satisfied by the constituents of two 
different models if and only if the models are completely isomorphic. The relations so determined we 
will call structures and will say that model M1 has structure S1 if ’S1(M1)’ is analytic. (Carnap and 
Bachmann (1981, 74), my emphasis)     
 
This passage is highly instructive in helping to clarify the semantics of Carnap’s approach. In 
the theory of models proposed here, each model comes with a single structure that specifies a 
relational architecture, i.e. the arity and type structure, shared by its isomorphism class. This 
structure of a model M1 of type n can itself be expressed as a relation S(M) of type n+1.119 I 
will return to this in Section 4.  
                                                 
 
117
 A similar remark on the defining features of relations can be found in Carnap’s Abriss: “A property is 
characterized as a structural property if it belongs to any relation R it also belongs to all relations of the same 
structure, that is to all relations isomorphic to R. Expressed in terms of classes: α presents a structural property if 
every relation belonging the a relation isomorphic to α also belongs to α (...).“ (Carnap 1929, 54) 
118
 Compare also Bonk and Mosterin (2000) on this point. 
119
 This conception of a model’s structure is closely captured by Corcoran’s more general remarks on the 
historical notion of a structure as opposed to its modern understanding as a model: „From a philosophical and 
historical point of view it is unfortunate to that the term ‘mathematical structure’ is coming to be used as a 
synonym for ‘mathematical system’. In the earlier usage (…) two mathematical systems having totally distinct 
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Given these preliminaries, we can turn to Carnap and Bachmann’s theory of ‘extremal 
structures’ of an AS that lay the proper ground for their explication of minimal and maximal 
axioms. They are also, as I will argue, the root of Hintikka’s misinterpretation. 
 
2.2.2 Extremal structures  
We have seen that for Carnap in Untersuchungen a model’s structure characterizes a model in 
the sense that it fixes its isomorphism class. Accordingly, an axiom system has a ‘structure 
number’ referring to the numbers of different structures it defines. Each of these structures 
fixes one isomorphism class of models. An axiom system with only one structure is 
categorical (‘monomorphic’), one with more than one structure non-categorical 
(‘polymorphic’) (see Carnap 2000, 128). 
In Carnap and Bachmann this idea of structures possessed by an axiomatic theory is further 
developed.120 Axiom systems are conceived here again as propositional functions can 
“possess a certain number of structures” that characterize their possible models.121 A segment 
TSF of this class of structures can be classified by the relation of a ‘proper substructure’ 
holding between set of structures of the system. A structure S is a ‘proper substructure’ of a 
structure T, if S and T are not identical and there are at least two models M and N, where M is 
a ‘proper part’ of N and M satisfies S and N satisfies T. Put in Carnap and Bachmann’s formal 
terms, S is a proper substructure of T if the two conditions hold (ibid, 75): 
(i) S ≠ T   
(ii) (∃M)(∃N) (S(M).T(N).M⊂N)  
It is important to emphasize they way in which Carnap and Bachmann address this issue. 
They speak of a model’s structures and substructures and not, as one would expect, of models 
and submodels of an axiom system. Also, the ‘extremal conditions’ imposed by minimal and 
maximal axioms are in the following cashed out in terms of structures, not in terms of the 
models themselves. Given the explications above, a ‘structural diagram’ of an axiom system 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
elements can have the same structure. This in this sense a structure is not a mathematical system rather a 
structure is a “property” that can be shared by individual mathematical systems. At any rate a structure is a 
higher order entity. (…) For mathematical purposes it would be possible to ‘identify’ a structure with the class of 
mathematical systems having that structure, but such ‘identification’ may tend to distort one’s conceptual grasp 
of the ideas involved.” (Corcoran 1980, 188) For a history of the term ‘structure’ in modern mathematics and 
logic see also Mancosu (2006).  
120
 In this section I am following closely Section 3 of Carnap and Bachmann (1936).   
121
 In (RC 081-01-05), Carnap’s assumed relation between the models of a theory and the structures described by 
it is further specified in this way: “Given that a formal AS is satisfied by every model of a structure in case it is 
satisfied by one model of the structure, we say in this case: the AS is “satisfied” by the structure.” (ibid.) 
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can be defined as the relation TSF of a “proper substructure restricted to the structures 
belonging to ‘F(M)’ ” (ibid, 75).122 S is termed a ‘beginning structure’ of F if it belongs to the 
domain of TSF. S is termed an ‘end structure’ of F, if it belongs to the range of TSF. Finally, S 
is called an ‘isolated structure’ if it belongs to F, but not to TSF (see ibid, 76).  
Note that these definitions are closely related to the theory of relations expressed in Russell 
and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica as well as Carnap’s own more introductory 
presentation in Abriss der Logistik.123 The main innovation in the 1936 paper is its application 
to formal models with the aim to classify different limiting types of model structures defined 
by an AS: ‘minimal structures’ consist of the beginning- and isolated structures; ‘maximal 
structures’ are the end- and isolated structures of an axiom system (see ibid, 76).  
 
Carnap & Bachmann present a simple example of an axiom system in order to illustrate how 
these different types of structures and their mutual relations are to be understood. Presumably, 
the example is also intended to outline how the above given specifications concerning a 
model’s structure are to be related to the type of minimal and maximal conditions that 
extremal axioms impose on the models of a theory. As I will show in Section 2.5, in this 
second role it is to a certain extent misguiding.   
The axiom system f(R) in question consist of four axioms with one basic binary relational 
variable R. Axioms (1) to (3) define the properties of injectivity, asymmetry, and non-
reflexivity of R. Axiom (4) states that the field of R contains exactly four elements.124 A set of 
topological “arrow diagrams” illustrate the different kinds of model structures the system 
captures:125 
         (ibid, 76) 
Obviously, each diagram here presents not a specific model but a model’s structure that is 
defined by f(R). Each of these individual structures can be interpreted differently, by 
assigning models with different domains of four elements. What is also immediately evident 
                                                 
 
122
 An essentially identical approach can be found in the notes for Part 2 of Untersuchungen in Carnap’s 
Nachlass (RC 081-01-05).  
123
 See esp. (ibid, 35-38). 
124
 In Part 2 of Untersuchungen, cardinality axioms such as this are termed ‘absolute existence axioms’ that fix 
the ‘Urklassen’ of a theory (RC 081-01-10). 
125
 The diagrams are to be understood in the sense that the (cardinality of the) field of a relation R (fld R) is 
presented by the points, its domain (dom R) by the starting points of the arrows and its range (ran R) by their 
arrowheads. Compare Behmann (1927, 42). See also Carnap (1929, 26-28).  
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from this illustration is that the different models satisfying these possible structures of the 
axiom system are not isomorphic to each other, i.e. f(R) does not capture its models up to 
isomorphism.  
The crucial point to see, however, is that Carnap and Bachmann seem to intend the sequence 
of structures (a) to (g) to illustrate their account of model extensions (and restrictions 
respectively). A possible model extension for a given model M1 of the theory (say, of 
structure (e)) is prima facie conceived as the extension to a model M2 with one of the 
succeeding structure (say (g)). Obviously, in this case, no extension of the domain of 
individuals of M1 to M2 is involved. This idea strongly suggests a kind of FDC concerning the 
models of a theory. This is further strengthened by looking at how the different extremal 
conditions of axiom systems described above are to be explained via this sequence of 
structures. Given the topological arrow diagrams above, one can classify the types of relations 
that are intended to satisfy the extremal conditions of f(R). Thus, Carnap & Bachmann 
develop a “structure diagram” of the axiom system that allows classifying the maximal and 
minimal structures of the theory:  
                                                        (ibid, 76) 
The structures (a) and (d) in the graph are beginning structures, g and f are end structures and 
b is an isolated structure. Therefore (a), (b), and (d) are minimal structures and (b), (f) and (g) 
are maximal structures respectively (see ibid, 76). Carnap’s theory can be further illustrated 
by building a number of simple models Ma, Mb, … Mg of f(R) that share an individual domain 
of four natural numbers, say A= {1, 2, 3, 4}, but assign different valuations to the binary 
relation variable R over A2 so that Ra = 〈(1,2); (3,4)〉; Rb = 〈(1,3); (1,2); (1,4)〉; …; Rg = 〈(1,3); 
(4,1); (1,2); (2,4)〉. The way the relations (and therefore the models) can be clustered is by 
drawing to the notion of a partial relation: e.g. Ra is a partial relation of Rc, Re, Rf and Rg. Now 
(g) expresses a maximal structure due to fact that it cannot be extended by adding ordered 
pairs from A2 (like (1,4)) without violating one of the axioms (in this case, the axioms 1 and 
2). Similar holds for the structures (b) and (f). In contrast, (a) presents a minimal structure 
because there exists no partial relation of Ma that satisfies the axiom system. The same holds 
for structures (b) and (d). Finally, b is an isolated structure since there neither exists a partial 
relation of Rb nor is Rb a partial relation of a more comprehensive relation that satisfies f(R). 
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2.3 Hintikka’s interpretation 
Hintikka’s critical discussion of Carnap and Bachmann (1936) sets in at this point. As I have 
mentioned above, it essentially consists of two interpretive claims. They can be paraphrased 
in this way (see Hintikka 1991, 332): 
 
(1) The specific formalized version of extremal structures in the 1936 paper is nonstandard 
compared to mathematical practice in the sense that it does not capture the informal 
conceptions of limiting conditions on a theory’s domain expressed in the corresponding 
axioms by Hilbert, Peano and Fraenkel.    
(2) This misconception on Carnap & Bachmann’s side is a direct consequence of the tacit, but 
guiding “one domain assumption“ in Carnap’s conception of semantics.   
 
Due to his assumed FDC - Hintikka argues – Carnap was forced to conceive the idea of 
‘extremal assumptions’ in a fundamentally different way than they were originally codified in 
the mathematical completeness and restriction axioms. Hintikka puts the point as follows:  
 
Because of this one-domain assumption, Carnap and Bachmann had to reinterpret tacitly the entire 
problem so as to speak of the extremality of a model with respect to properties and relations, not with 
respect to individuals, as Hilbert among others, had considered the problem. The result was less than 
magnificent (...). Indeed, the only really interesting thing about Carnap’s ill-fated paper seems to be its 
reliance on the one-domain assumption. (Hintikka 1992, 176)    
 
According to Hintikka, the focal point of this misconception lies in the Carnap’s treatment of 
the extension of a model that is not understood as the extension of the domain of individuals 
but as the “structural” extension of the primitive relations over a fixed domain of individuals. 
Compare again Hintikka on this point: 
 
Instead of asking whether a given model can be extended by introducing new individuals while the 
axioms stay satisfied, Carnap and Bachmann are asking whether a given model can be extended by 
assuming the relations involved in the axiom system to hold between more individuals among the 
members of the given fixed domain. (Hintikka 1991, 332)  
 
Now, if understood in this sense, Carnap and Bachmann undoubtedly had misconceived the 
mathematical intentions behind the different extremal axioms they attempted to formalize. By 
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looking at the way the minimal and maximal conditions are defined above via structure 
extensions, this claim also seems to be highly plausible. The crucial fact in the simple 
example described above is that the individual domain remains constant for all model 
extensions. In contrast to the standard account, the cardinality of the domain of individuals is 
axiomatically fixed (by axiom (4)) for all possible models of f(R). Interpretations of f(R) 
differ only in the structure of their relations. If one compares this e.g. to Hilbert’s original 
formulation of the limiting condition expressed in his AC for geometry in Grundlagen der 
Geometrie the conceptual difference becomes obvious:126 Whereas the extensibility in the 
completeness condition expressed here concerns the level of individuals of the theory in 
question, maximality in Carnap and Bachmann is defined as the non-extensibility of the 
axiomatically defined primitive relation R over a fixed domain of individuals.  
 
However, as a will suggest in the remainder of this chapter, this is not a valid interpretation of 
Carnap’s theory, despite the prima facie plausibility it gains from Carnap and Bachmann’s 
example. To show this, it will prove worthwhile to further refine Hintikka’s interpretive 
claims. In fact, there seems to be a sub-claim involved in (2) that can be put this way: 
 
(2i) A FDC (or the “one-domain assumption”) concerning the interpretation of a   formal 
language implies a FDC concerning the models of an AS formulated in that language.  
 
This is in fact a perfectly natural consequence of (2) if one assumes a standard conception of 
models, in which the interpretation of the language’s quantifiers, i.e. the range of the bound 
variables, is actually part and parcel of the models. However, as I will show in the next 
section, this is not a sound assessment concerning Carnap’s understanding of a model. So, to 
anticipate my argument: Hintikka interpretation fails since he misses to take into proper 
account Carnap’s underlying heterodox conception of models. Where he is wrong is his 
assumption that for Carnap, a “one domain assumption” concerning a language necessarily 
involves a FDC concerning the models of a theory. With (2i) shown to be an inadequate 
assumption, Hintikka’s claim (1) will also prove to be untenable. 
                                                 
 
126
 In the original version, the axiom reads: ”It is not possible to add new elements to a system of points, straight 
lines, and planes in such a way that the system thus generalized will form a new geometry obeying all the five 
groups of axioms. In other words, the elements of geometry form a system which is incapable of being extended, 
provided that we regard the five groups of axioms as valid.“ (Hilbert 1902, 25) A structurally similar axiom of 
completeness specifying the non-extensibility of the system of real numbers can be found in Hilbert’s 
axiomatization of the real number field in Hilbert (1900). Compare Awodey and Reck (2002).  
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2.4 A heterodox conception of models 
What is Carnap’s early conception of models in Untersuchungen and Carnap and Bachmann 
(1936)? Does it allow domain variation in some sense comparable to the modern 
understanding? Finally, how are models related to the interpretation of a given logical 
language, in which an axiomatic theory is formulated? In order to address these interpretive 
questions, let us start with Carnap’s most detailed explication of formal models in the first 
part of Untersuchungen. In section 2.3 he introduces the notion in this way:127   
 
If we write for f(R, S, T), in short f(R), and if R1, S1, T1 are specific, e.g. arithmetic relations that are 
admissible values of the variables R, S, T, then we can also introduce an abbreviatory notation for the 
ordered system of relations R1, S1, T1, say R1. The model R1 is then a value of the model variable R. 
Each of the relation variables R, S, T of the axiom system has a specific type (…); the sentential 
function for f(R, S, T) only yields a true or false sentence if the values of these types are inserted. If the 
three relations R1, S1, T1 are admissible values of the variables R, S, T, i.e. if they can adopt the type of 
the three variables R, S, T (by declaring a specific domain of discourse in them to be the domain of 
individuals), we name the system of relations (R1, S1, T1), or short R1 an “admissible model” of fR, 
irrespective of whether R1 satisfies fR or not; fR1 is then in any case meaningful, i.e. either a true or a 
false sentence. An admissible model R1 of fR is only then also a model of fR if fR1 is not only 
meaningful, but also true. (Carnap 2000, 95)128 
 
In Carnap 1930 the following shortened definition for models is given:  
 
If fR is satisfied by the constant R1, where R1 is an abbreviation of a system of relations P1, Q1, …; R1 
is called a “model” of f. A model f(R1) is a system of concepts of the basic system, generally a system 
of numbers (number classes, relations and so forth). (Carnap 1930, 303).129  
 
Note that a central feature of modern model theory, the domain variability of a model, is not 
explicitly specified in Carnap’s explications. Models are defined as “systems of numbers 
(number classes, relations and so forth)”, i.e. as sequences of the form 〈R, S, T, …〉, where  
                                                 
 
127
 See also Chapter 1, Section 2.3 for further discussion of Carnap’s notion of a ‘formal model’.  
128
 See fn.36. 
129
 “Wird fR durch die Konstante R1 befriedigt, wobei R1 Abkürzung für ein System von Relationen P1, Q1,.. ist, 
so heißt R1 „Modell“ von f. Ein Modell ist ein System von Begriffen der Grunddisziplin, meist ein System von 
Zahlen (Zahlklassen, Relationen u.dergl.).“ (Carnap 1930, 303) 
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R, S, T, … stand for classes or relations of a given type. Apart from this rather intuitive 
qualification, no further indication is given with regards to his understanding of the domain of 
a model. In particular, unlike in the modern definitions of a model as a tuple 〈D, I〉, where D 
stands for the domain of the model and I for an interpretation function, there exists no 
notational sign indicating the domain of a specific model in the above definition.  
Given this, the question arises whether of not Carnap conceived of something comparable to 
modern domain variability from his use of models in his theory of axiomatics. Intuitively, 
Carnap’s overall motivation in Untersuchungen to provide a logical reconstruction of formal, 
i.e. reinterpretable axiom systems and its semantics alone seems to suggest that he aimed for a 
theory of models that allow VDC. Nevertheless, in the first part of Untersuchungen Carnap’s 
position on the issue of domain variability is not fully conclusive. In fact, one can find prima 
facie conflicting evidence by looking at Carnap’s remarks throughout the manuscript. On the 
one side, there is strong textual evidence pointing in the direction that Carnap actually 
intended domain variation in his treatment of models. Note first that in the definition above 
Carnap speaks of “declaring a specific domain of discourse in them [GS: the relations] to be 
the domain of individuals”, which seems to indicate that the domain of individuals can be 
varied in a sense.  Second, there are also several explicit remarks on the notion of “domain of 
discourse” (Grundbereich) in Untersuchungen pointing towards a VDC.  
One is related to the specification of an isomorphism correlation between models by 
stipulating its “step number” or, which amounts to the same, the type-level of individuals 
assumed in a specific case. One of the ways this can be done is by indicating a domain of 
discourse to act as the domain of individuals for a specific model:  
 
The step number can in a specific case [be fixed] (…) by reference to a domain of discourse which 
will act as a domain of individuals for a model (…). (ibid, 120)130  
 
One can thus in this way specify a domain of individuals for a specific model. It seems 
plausible that in the same way, one could also assign a different domain to this model.  
This view finds additional support by considering to a second passage in which - in a slightly 
different context – the issue of a model’s domain is discussed. In §2.11 Carnap introduces the 
notion of a “q-step model structure” and remarks that the structure of models with finite 
                                                 
 
130
 “Die Stufenzahl kann in einem bestimmten Falle (…) festgelegt sein: (…) durch Angabe eines 
Gegenstandsbereichs, der für ein Modell als Individuenbereich gelten soll (…).“ (ibid, 120) 
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number of elements is presentable via a “q-step inventory list of a model” (“q-stufigen 
Bestandsliste eines Modells”) in which all constants are substituted by variables (ibid. 121). 
Inversely, the resulting “schemes of inventory lists” (“Bestandslistenschemata”) can be used 
for model building: one can get different models from interpreting, i.e. assigning different 
domains of discourse to them. The central passage here reads:     
   
(…) if a q-step model structure is given by an inventory list with variables, one can always specify a 
model which has this structure and whose individuals (relative to step q) belong to an arbitrary, 
stipulated domain of discourse by inserting arbitrary elements of the domain of individuals for the 
variables in the inventory formula. In short: (…) if a finite (q-step) structure and a domain of 
individuals is given, one can specify a (q-step) model belonging to it. (ibid, 122)           
 
Carnap explicitly speaks of an “arbitrary, stipulated domain of discourse” here. This again 
seems to suggest VDC. Second, this remark on model construction in effect seems to come 
close to the modern conception of a model as assigning construction from a (non-empty) set 
of individuals to the expressions of a language. What is clearly missing is something like an 
interpretation function I that assigns elements and subsets of the domain to the non-logical 
constants of the language. This however, is insignificant for Carnap’s account since he is 
working with a pure higher order language, i.e. a simple type theoretical language with an 
empty signature L, in his theory of axiomatics. Given this, models for an AS can be taken as 
assignments from a chosen domain of individuals to the variables of L or, in Carnap’s own 
terms, the method of “inserting arbitrary elements of the domain of individuals for the 
variables” (ibid, 122).  
 
Against this essentially modern reading of Carnap’s conception of models (more precisely 
models’ domains), several remarks in Untersuchungen can be mentioned that seem to indicate 
a FDC for models. They concern Carnap’s use his logical language, more specifically the use 
of quantification in the formulation of axiom systems. One can find an insightful remark that 
is crossed out in the final version of the manuscript on an alternative to his version of 
formalizing axiom systems. It illustrates clearly Carnap’s nonstandard conception of 
quantification involved in his project:   
 
A different conception on the nature of axiom systems which, however, does not seem acceptable to 
us, does not consider the basic relations of the axiom system, but the elements of these basic relations 
as the variables that transform the axiom system into a sentential function. The basic relations are 
  76 
treated as constants. The elements do occur as variables, although as bound variables (...), those can 
also appear in a sentence since they do not transform the axiom system into a sentential function. (ibid, 
89, my emphasis)131  
 
The last sentence here is particularly insightful. In Carnap’s own approach to formalize 
axiomatics theories are expressed as sentential functions and the primitive terms as free 
variables. What he argues in the passage above is this: If these variables were to be bound by 
quantifiers, then the free reinterpretability of the AS would be restricted to a fixed range, a 
fixed interpretation of the background language in use. The underlying assumption 
concerning the semantics of the language involved here becomes even clearer in an example 
of a simple transitivity axiom he gives for this alternative version:  
 
I we express it with the help of the M-elements, the axiom is:  
                                               (x,y,z) ([M(x,y) & M(y,z)] → M(x,z)) 
Here x, y, z are not free variables, but bound by the universal operator in front. If M were now a 
constant, then the expression would be a sentence; it can only then be a sentential function, if M is a 
variable. (ibid, 89)132  
 
This indicates that for Carnap, when formalizing an axiomatic theory, the logical language in 
use comes equipped with a (fixed) universe and not, as in modern semantics, allows changing 
its interpretations. Further textual evidence for such a fixed interpretation of the background 
logic, and thus a fixed range of the language’s quantifiers can be found in a remark 
concerning the question of “decidability” (Entscheidungsdefinitheit) of the discussed systems:  
 
Therefore, not singular domains are demarcated by the different axiom systems, but every deduction 
of any consequence of any axiom system is performed in the one domain of logic. (ibid, 149)133 
                                                 
 
131
 “Eine andere Auffassung über das Wesen der Axiomensysteme, die uns aber nicht zulässig erscheint, 
betrachtet nicht die Grundrelationen des Axiomensystems, sondern die Glieder dieser Grundrelationen als die 
Variablen, die das Axiomensystem zu einer Aussagefunktion machen, die Grundrelationen selbst aber als 
Konstante. Die Glieder treten allerdings als Variable auf, aber als gebundene Variable (…), solche aber können 
ja auch in einer Aussage vorkommen, sie machen also das Axiomensystem nicht zu einer Aussagefunktion.“ 
(ibid, 89) 
132
 “Drücken wir die mit Hilfe der M-Glieder aus, so lautet das Axiom: (x,y,z) ([M(x,y) & M(y,z)] → M(x,z)). 
Hier sind x, y, z keine freien Variablen, sondern durch den vorn stehenden Alloperator gebunden. Wäre nun M 
eine Konstante so wäre der Ausdruck eine Aussage; er kann nur dann eine Aussagefunktion sein, wenn M eine 
Variable ist.“ (ibid. 89) 
133
 “Daher werden durch die verschiedenen Axiomensysteme nicht einzelne Gebiete abgetrennt, sondern jede 
Ableitung irgendeiner Folgerung irgendeines Axiomensystems vollzieht sich in dem einen Gebiet der Logik.“ 
(ibid, 149) 
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Here again, what Carnap seems to be assuming in his theory of axiomatics is a universal, fully 
and invariantly interpreted background language, close to what Hintikka describes as the 
“one-domain thesis” in Carnap’s thought. 
Now, to be specific, the exact nature of the tension between remarks like this one and talk of  
“arbitrary, stipulated domain(s) of discourse” of a model cited above arises form lack of 
clarification on Carnap’s side of the exact relationship between the semantics for axiomatic 
theories formalized in a language L and the semantics for L itself. Put differently, it concerns 
the way his theory of models is related to the interpretation of L. As we have seen, Carnap’s 
remarks on this issue are not fully conclusive in the first part of Untersuchungen.  
Fortunately, Carnap and Bachmann, in their 1936 paper, get more explicit. 
 
2.4.1 Models and analyticity 
Recall the passage in Carnap and Bachmann (1936) quoted in Section 2.2.1, in particular the 
last sentence concerning the model’s structure:  
 
The relations so determined we will call structures and will say that model M1 has structure S1 if ’S1 
(M1)’ is analytic. (Carnap and Bachmann (1981, 74), my emphasis)     
 
The fact that the notions of structure and model are treated in a highly similar fashion in 
Carnap’s 1928 manuscript and in 1936 should not lead one to overlook the substantial 
differences in their explication. The passage above witnesses a significant shift in Carnap’s 
underlying conception from what has been termed a Russellian “monolinguistic” approach in 
1928 (see Coffa (1991)) to an explicit metatheoretic stance formulated in Logical Syntax of 
Language (in the following LSL) (Carnap (1934)). Put differently, the conceptual framework 
within which Carnap’s theory of models was developed had changed, by 1936, from a 
universalist approach to that of LSL. This new horizon is most evident in his above use of the 
metatheoretic notion of analyticity to state that a model M1 satisfies a given structure: a 
“model M1 has structure S1 if ‘S1(M1)’ is analytic.“ Similarly, models themselves are now 
defined via the notion of analyticity:  
 
Let ’M1’ be an abbreviation for a sequence of constants of the language S. We say that M1 is a model 
of the axiom system ‘F1(M)’ if the sentence ‘F1(M1)’ is analytic in S. (ibid, 67)  
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Compare this to the corresponding segment in Carnap’s earlier explication of an “admissible 
model” of an axiom system in the 1928 manuscript: “An admissible model R1 of fR is only 
then also a model of fR if fR1 is not only meaningful, but also true.” (Carnap 2000, 95, my 
emphasis). In Carnap (1930), the concept of truth used above is substituted by that of 
‘satisfaction’: “If fR is satisfied by the constant R1, where R1 is an abbreviation of a system of 
relations P1, Q1, …; R1 is called a “model” of f.“ (Carnap 1930, 303)  
Now, the nominal difference between the 1936 definition and those in Untersuchungen seems 
to concern only the substitution of the terms “truth“ (and “satisfaction“ respectively) with that 
of “analytic in S“ (viz. in a type-theoretic language like LII defined in LSL). Nonetheless, this 
conceptual background of the respective definitions makes all the difference. First, note that 
both concepts - truth and satisfaction - used in the earlier definitions are used in a strictly 
informal sense and thus in no sense comparable to Tarski’s formally explicated versions given 
in (Tarski 1935). No further remarks can be found in Untersuchungen on how the notion of 
truth is understood or what conditions have to be met in order to speak of a theory to be true 
in a model. Carnap, anno 1928, simply does not have something corresponding to a formal 
concept of truth in a model.134 In contrast, the explications of a model and a model’s structure 
given in Carnap & Bachmann (1936) are based on the formal definition of the notion of 
‘analytic for LΙΙ’ first published in a side paper to LSL (see Carnap (1935)).135 With this in 
hand, Carnap’s background semantic apparatus used in his definition of models in 1936 is 
essentially identical with Tarski’s recursively defined notions of truth and satisfaction.136  
Second, with the shift to the conceptual framework of LSL, there is also a change in the 
explication of the intended semantics of the background languages in use. In Untersuchungen, 
Carnap is not fully conclusive on the intended interpretation of the ‘contentful basic system’ 
(‘inhaltliche Grunddisziplin’). Given his overall logicist program at that time and the two 
passages quoted in Section 4, one could argue that he is assuming a universal and fully 
interpreted logical language with quantifiers ranging over a fixed but unspecified universe of 
type theoretic objects (but see Section 4.3). In contrast, the ranges of the quantifiers in 
Carnap’s languages LI and LII studied in LSL are stipulated explicitly.137 It is crucial to note 
that here, as in 1928, Carnap’s conception of the semantics of a logical language like LII is 
                                                 
 
134
 There is some evidence that truth in the axiomatic context is understood here by Carnap as “being 
tautological“. Compare Bonk and Mosterin (2000, 38) on this point. 
135
 In a footnote in the 1936 paper, Carnap and Bachmann explicitly refer to Carnap (1935) for the formal 
definition of ‘analytic in ΙΙ’ used in their explication of models (see ibid, 84).   
136
 For a closer comparison with Tarski’s semantic notions see Coffa (1991, 288-293). 
137
 See Carnap (2002, §6 and §26). 
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not comparable to a modern model-theoretic account, where quantifiers are subject to free 
reinterpretation (on a given type level). As Lavers stresses in a recent paper, a pure type-
theoretic language like LII in LSL is used not as a formal language in the modern sense, but as 
a “meaningful formalism”, i.e. a language with a fixed intended interpretation for each type 
level (see Lavers 2008, 10). Thus, there is a clear continuity between 1928 and 1936: logical 
languages are fully interpreted and the interpretation is fixed.  
The real difference to Untersuchungen, however, is that where Carnap was most likely 
operating with a single universal language ranging over a universal domain of typed objects, 
there is now a move to a logical pluralism concerning the choice of formal languages and 
their specific interpretations. The intended semantics for a language like LII is still invariant, 
however not longer universal. Quantification in a language can be freely stipulated to range 
over specific mathematical systems and not the type-theoretical universe. For instance, the 
individual quantifiers of LII are set to range over “a domain isomorphic to the natural 
numbers” (Lavers 2008, 10). In contrast, in Carnap and Bachmann 1936, one can find the 
following remark on a (syntactically) similar language:  
 
We think of a language [GS: like LII], excepts that the domain of individual contains the natural 
numbers and also the points of a line of Euclidian geometry among which two points are 
distinguished. (Carnap & Bachmann 1981, 71) 
 
Unlike in the ‘basic system’ in 1928 the individual variables here do not range over all logical 
objects of type 0, but instead over a stipulated classes of mathematical objects, namely natural 
numbers and a denumerable set of points. Similar holds for the higher-order variables in LII.  
 
Having underlined these transitions in Carnap’s approach – i.e. to shift from an informal 
notion of truth to a formal notion of analyticity (in LII) on the one hand, a full explication of 
the intended interpretation of LII on the other – we are finally in a position to better 
understand the exact nature of the connection between the semantics for a language and his 
conception of models. Put differently, the main effect of this shift is a new explicitness of the 
intrinsic relation between the domain of models and the semantics of the background 
language in use. Given the conceptual framework of LSL the link between models and truth 
conditions for a formula in a given interpretation becomes transparent. The dependency on the 
language’s interpretation gets evident when considering the application of the truth condition 
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expressed in Carnap’s account of analyticity for a type-theoretic language like LII to his 
definition of models.138 
To illustrate this, consider a simple example of an axiom system f(M), consisting of just one 
transitivity axiom (borrowed from Carnap’s example above). The axioms (implicitly) define a 
single primitive term, expressed as a binary first-level relation variable M: 
 (1)                                (∀x)(∀y)(∀z) ([M(x,y) & M(y,z)] → M(x,z)) 
A possible model of f(M) consists of the binary relation M1. If M1 is substituted for the free 
variable M then the interpreted axiom system f(M1) turns into the closed formula  
(2)                                (∀x)(∀y)(∀z) ([M1(x,y) & M1(y,z)] → M1(x,z)) 
that according to §43 in LSL, is analytic in LII iff  
(3)                                             [M1(a,b) & M1(b,c)] → M1(a,c) 
is analytic in LII for all numerals a, b and c in the substitution class of LII (in short DLII). 
Similar truth conditions hold for cases in which the formulation of an axiom involves higher 
order quantification over relations or properties. Take for instance the second order version of 
the axiom of induction for arithmetic as g(z,S) and an interpreted version with a model g(S1) 
as  
(4)                                (∀X)([X(z) ∧ (∀x)(X(x) → X(S1(x)))] → (∀y)(X(y))) 
where S1 is an interpretation of the function variable S. Then g(0, S1) is analytic in LII iff  
(5)                                    [X(0) ∧ (∀x)(X(x) → X(S1(x))] → ∀y(X(y))) 
is analytic in LII for all possible assignments (in Carnap’s terms “valuations”) of relations on 
DLII, i.e. all subsets of D2 to the predicate variable X (assuming given substitutions for x and 
y). The main difference to the case of bound individual variables is that Carnap treats higher-
order quantification extensionally in LSL. Instead of being restricted to a substitution class of 
predicate symbols in LII, the quantifier ‘(∀X) …’ is supposed to range over all relations or 
properties of the set of numerals d of LII, thus e.g. over all subsets of Dn for an n-ary relation 
variable.139  
Two points can be made here. First, this account of specifying the truth of an AS in a model 
in the (proto-) semantic framework of LSL seems irreconcilable with a current understanding 
of model-theoretic truth. In particular, note that in contrast to the modern account of truth in a 
structure, the question whether an axiomatic theory is true in a model is not reduced to truth 
                                                 
 
138
 For Carnap’s detailed definition of ‘analytic in LII’ see Carnap (2002, §34). 
139
 For further historical details concerning Carnap’s move to an extensional treatment of higher-order 
quantification see Coffa (1991) and Awodey and Carus (2001).    
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conditions relative to that model here. Instead, it is conceptually linked to the fixed 
substitution class of numerals DLII of LII, thus to the intended interpretation of the language. 
Instead of specifying truth conditions for formulas via the assignment of elements of and 
relations on a variable model’s domain of discourse to the variables of the formal language 
Carnap states conditions of analyticity based on assignments from a fixed interpretation of the 
language.  
Second, given the above examples, it is prima facie not clear how the domains of different 
models are related to the range of individuals of the language. Several interpretive options to 
understand this are possible: (a) In the first, all models’ domains are supposed to coincide 
with DLII. In this case, the result is a FDC concerning models suggested by Hintikka. Against 
this, one can hold that there is no reason intrinsic in Carnap’s explication to assume that DLII 
necessarily has to coincide with the domains of M1, M2, etc. for an axiom like (1). Moreover, 
such an understanding would be in conflict with Carnap’s remarks cited in §4 and more 
generally with Carnap’s overall attempt to reconstruct (Hilbertian) formal axiomatics plus its 
informal model theory.  
(b) The second option would assume that with each model, the range of quantification is 
reinterpreted with the model’s domain. Thus, with each new assignment to M in (1) the range 
of x, y, and z is interpreted to the domain of M. The earliest account of this – genuinely 
modern approach I found formulated in the first volume of Hilbert and Bernays’ Grundlagen 
der Mathematik, published in the same year as Carnap’s LSL (Hilbert and Bernays 1934). 
Here, Hilbert and Bernays give a presentation of an axiom system of Euclidian geometry with 
two predicates R (for greater than) and S (for between). The axiom system is expressed in a 
strikingly similar sense to Carnap’s version as the propositional function U(R, S) and a model 
accordingly as a certain tuple 〈R1, S1〉. The central point for our discussion is a passage in 
which the specification of the models domain is explained:   
 
It should be noted that together with the assignment of the predicates one also has to fix the domain of 
individuals, on which the variables x, y, … are to refer. It is in a way introduced in the logical formula 
as a hidden variable. (ibid, 8-9)140 
  
                                                 
 
140
 “Zu beachten ist, dass man zugleich mit der Bestimmung der Prädikate auch den Individuenbereich 
festzulegen hat, auf den sich die Variablen x, y, … beziehen sollen. Diese geht gewissermaßen als versteckte 
Variable in die logische Formel ein.“ (ibid, 8-9) 
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Such a stipulation of the range of individuals with the ‘assignment’ (‘Bestimmung’) of the 
predicates R and S clearly implies a VDC concerning the individual domains of the 
interpretations of U(R, S). At the same time, it also implies a VDC for the language itself. In 
fact, models are here explicitly understood as the combination of the “individual domain” and 
the chosen ‘value-ranges’ (‘Wertverläufen’) of the primitive predicates, based on which “the 
satisfaction of the axioms” (“das Erfülltsein der Axiome”) can be shown (see ibid, 12).  
Note that this is not what Carnap has in mind in 1936. In fact, such an understanding is simply 
not consistent with Carnap’s own definition where analytic means analytic in LII. The 
conditions for analyticity of a formula are explicitly linked to the interpretations of the 
language, in the case of individual variables to DLII. Thus, any attempt to understand (3) (or 
(5)) as specifying the truth of an AS in a given model in something comparable to the modern 
sense will fail since the conditions for “analytic in LII” require the preservation of truth over 
all possible assignments from DLII and not over a specific (but principally variable) model 
domain.  
The crucial interpretive question we are thus confronted with is this: How can Carnap’s 
account of truth conditions for a type-theoretic language like LII with a fixed, intended 
interpretation be reconciled with Carnap’s scattered remarks in Untersuchungen and in 
Carnap and Bachmann (1936) cited in Section 2.4.1 where something comparable to a VDC 
for models is explicitly indicated? I suggest that the key to solving this tension lies in the 
acknowledgement of the genuinely heterodox character of Carnap’s conception of models 
involved in his theory. It is to see where exactly his account differs from the modern 
architecture of models. 
 
2.4.2 Domains as fields 
Carnap’s definition of models via analyticity given in 1936 seems to involve two separate 
semantic systems: the intended interpretation of the given language on the one hand, the 
models for a theory expressed that language on the other. This renders impossible the modern 
account in which the interpretation of the language, i.e. the range of its quantifiers, is intrinsic 
or “built into” the conceptual architecture of a model.141 Note, however, that the apparent 
tension arising from this can be resolved once the domain of discourse of a model is 
understood as independent from the truth conditions defined above. More precisely, if the 
                                                 
 
141
 Compare Bays (2001) for a similar remark on Tarski’s early conception of models. 
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domain is not assumed – as in modern understanding - to be identical with the range of the 
individual variables of LII but as a subset of DLII gained by effectively restricting its 
quantifiers of LII. How does Carnap conceive such a restriction of the range of the (bound) 
variables to the domain of a specific model expressed in this language? To my understanding, 
the most plausible interpretation of his underlying conception is also the simplest one: 
consider again the above example of a transitivity axiom:  
                                         (∀x)(∀y)(∀z) ([M(x,y) & M(y,z)] → M(x,z)). 
What specifies the individual domain of an admissible model of this axiom is not the fixed 
intended interpretation of the language but the different assignments to the free variable M 
themselves, i.e. the relations M1, M2, etc. substituted for M. Where Carnap speaks of a model 
domain he most likely thinks of the field of the possible relation assigned to M. More 
generally, a specific sequence of relations M1 = 〈R1, S1, T1, …〉 that satisfies an axiom system 
thus simultaneously fixes the domain of the theory. It simply consists of the union of the 
respective fields of R1, S1, T1, …. Note that this conception of model domains is still closely 
linked to the semantics of the background language in use. It follows from Carnap’s 
explication of models via analyticity that all (first level) relations of a sequence constituting a 
model are defined over the individual class of the language. In our example, any domain of a 
model for M is thus a certain segment, a subset of DLII. Thus, while the range of the 
quantifiers in LII if fixed to DLII, a specific assignment to the model variable M in fact 
restricts their effective range to the domain of the given model. For the subsequent discussion, 
I will dub this the ‘domain-as-fields’ view.  
 
There exists extensive textual evidence in Carnap’s writings on axiomatics in support of the 
view that he actually conceived models and model domains in this way. In Carnap and 
Bachmann (1936), in a passage on the ‘complete isomorphism’ between two relations, the 
authors mention the “fields of their field elements (i.e., for certain segments of the individual 
domain of the language)” (ibid, 73, my emphasis). A few lines further below, in the passage 
already cited in Section 2.2.1, concerning the isomorphism between “n-place models” it is 
stated that   
 
(…) n-place relations can be defined over the field of this [GS: isomorphism] relation, i.e., over the 
totality of constants of the basic, assumed language which can appear as elements of models (…). 
(ibid, 74, my emphasis)     
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It is clear from this that Carnap understands a model’s individual domain as a specific subset 
of the “totality of constants“ of the specified background language.142 Given this 
substitutional approach, models with different domains are constructed by carving out 
segments of the substitution class of individual constants, i.e. mostly numerals of the 
language. The specific domain of a model is here again conceived as union of the fields of 
individuals of the primitive relations constituting the model.   
This identification of domain of discourse of a model with the (union of) field(s) is articulated 
more explicitly in a separate, but closely related work on axiomatics by Carnap’s collaborator 
Bachmann (Bachmann 1934). In his inaugural dissertation on the logical foundations of 
arithmetic, Bachmann presents different possible axiomatizations of “elementary arithmetic” 
in a many-sorted language and a detailed study of their respective logical relations.143 He 
discusses different axiom systems of the form f(x R α) with three free variables (for 
individuals, relations and classes respectively) that stand for the primitive terms of the theory 
(Bachmann 1934, 1). Models for the theory are defined here in a way similar to Carnap’s 
account in Untersuchungen: “Each triple of values that transforms the axioms in true 
sentences when inserted for x R α is termed a model of arithmetic.“ (ibid, 1)144 Note that - in 
contrast to the axiom system presented in Carnap and Bachmann (1936) – there exists a class 
variable α here that is conceived as an explicit notational sign for the domain of discourse, i.e. 
the number set of an arithmetical model of f(x R α). Moreover, according to Bachmann, α can 
be interpreted differently: as the “set of the natural numbers,” as the “set of natural numbers 
greater then 37,” as the “set of primes,” etc. (see ibid, 4-5). Bachmann also discusses the 
question whether an axiom system of “basic arithmetic” f(R) can be constructed with just one 
primitive term, i.e. with one free variable that is “generally equivalent” to f(x R α).145 The 
crucial point for our discussion is that he explicitly mentions a condition concerning the 
relation of R to α the models of that f(x R α) have to fulfill in order that the two theories 
become equivalent:   
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 A similar informal remark concerning the composition of models can be found in Untersuchungen:  “(...) we 
speak in short of “models“ of an axiom system und mean by this logical constants, i.e. “systems of concepts of 
the basic system“ (and these are mostly systems of numbers).“ (ibid, 94) 
143
 This work, supervised by Heinrich Scholz, anteceded the collaboration with Carnap. Nevertheless, Bachmann 
was well acquainted with (published) Carnap’s work on axiomatics. He refers to Carnap (1929) and Carnap 
(1930) repeatedly in the text (see e.g. Bachmann 1934, 47). 
144
 “Jedes Wertetripel, dass in x R α eingesetzt die Axiome in wahre Aussagen überführt, heißt ein Modell der 
Arithmetik.“ (Bachmann 1934, 1)  
145
 A discussion of the details of Bachmann’s notion of ‘general equivalence’ of axiom systems would take us 
too far afield here.  
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The reason why the reduction to R as the single free variable was not possible so far lies in the fact 
that there were no sufficiently strong connections between R and α; for it was simply demanded by f(x 
R α) that α is contained in the field of R, not that α is identical with the field of R. We therefore add to 
out AS the condition F.  (∀z)(∃y) (yRz → z ∈ α) (...). (ibid, 43, notation changed)146  
 
Given this additional condition that any successor of a number is to be contained in the class 
α, Bachmann effectively shows that f(x R α) + F imposes that, in any model, the domain is 
identical with the field of the relation R. Given this extended AS, it is thus possible to provide 
a functional definition of α in terms of R (see ibid, 43-44). An additional primitive indicating 
the domain of a model besides R thus becomes redundant given that the domain is already 
stipulated with the assignment to R. A version of Bachmann’s axiom system of “elementary 
arithmetic” with one variable R that defines a class of “progressions” will be discussed in 
Section 2.5.1. What is important here is to note that Bachmann’s dissertation must be 
considered as the immediate background for the theory of axiomatics outlined in Carnap and 
Bachmann (1936). With this in mind, the remarks made in the passage above on the 
connection of α and R should be valued as direct evidence for the ‘domain-as-fields’ 
interpretation of the conception of models outlined above. 
Decisive textual evidence in support of this view can also be presented from Carnap’s own 
works.  As mentioned in Section 2.4, Carnap is not fully explicit on his conception of models 
in the first part of Untersuchungen. Nevertheless, by drawing to Carnap’s Nachlass, in 
particular to the manuscript documents for the projected second part of Untersuchungen it 
becomes clear that he already conceived models in essentially the same way in the late 1920s 
and thus years before the conceptual turn to LSL. In the two typed documents titled 
“Complete isomorphism” (“Vollständige Isomorphie”) (RC 081-01-15) and “Domains of a 
model” (“Bereiche eines Modells”) (RC 081-01-16), both dated from 1928, Carnap develops a 
clear and detailed discussion of the auxiliary notions underlying his theory of models. 
Carnap’s method of explication here is to first describe the different domains of a given, 
disinterpreted axiom system in terms of a ‘domain analysis’ (‘Bereichsanalyse’). Based on 
this purely structural description, the corresponding domains of a model are then stipulated in 
                                                 
 
146
 “Dass die Reduktion auf R als einzige freie Variable bisher nicht möglich war, liegt daran, dass zwischen R 
und α nicht genügend starke Bindungen bestanden; denn es wurde in f(x R α) nur verlangt, dass α im Feld von R 
enthalten ist, nicht dass α mit dem Feld von R identisch ist. Wir fügen daher zu unserem AS die Forderung F. 
(∀z)(∃y) (yRz → z ∈ α) hinzu (…).“ (ibid, 43, notation changed) 
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a second, independent step. Briefly, the ‘domain analysis’ can be understood as a way to 
specify the type structure of the theory beginning with the relations of highest type and 
descending the relational hierarchy defined by an system until reaching the elements of type 
level 0.  One thus starts with the ‘base domains’, i.e. the different domains of the primitive 
relations R, S, T, etc. defined by the theory. In case these base domains can be further reduced 
to domains of a lower type level, then the analysis proceeds until one reaches the non-
reducible ‘individual domains’ of type level 0 of an axiom system (RC 081-01-15). An 
individual domain of a system is thus defined as the “domain from which no other domains 
descend” (ibid.).  Given this, a “family tree of domains of an AS” (“Stammbaum der Bereiche 
des AS”) is constructed by assigning each domain in the AS a fixed “type expression” 
(“Typenausdruck”).  Note that up to this point, models are not mentioned. The domains of an 
axiom system are understood in a purely structural way so far. The analysis of domains 
concerns exclusively the type-theoretic structure defined by an axiom system.  
This changes, however, in the following section on “Bereiche eines Modells” (RC 081-016) 
where Carnap describes, in analogy to the “family tree of domains” of an axiom system f(…) 
the compositions of domains of a given model M for f(…). Here again, models are conceived 
as the relations substituted for the model variables of f(…).147 Carnap specifies the point in 
this way: 
 
Let M be an admissible model of the AS f(...). M assigns to each primitive term of f a logical constant; 
in order that this is possible, there always has to be an n-ary relation corresponding to each n-ary 
relation. It follows that exactly one set in M is assigned to each domain of f as its “corresponding 
domain“. (ibid, my emphasis)148    
 
The central notion here – not mentioned in Part 1 of Untersuchungen – is that of 
‘corresponding domains’ of a model. The different domains (of different type levels) of a 
model are treated in strict analogy with the structural domains of the theory specified before. 
Here, however, as the passage above shows, they are treated extensionally, i.e. as ‘classes’ of 
(tuples of) individuals, relations on classes of individual, relations on relations on classes of 
individuals etc.. The relevant point for our discussion is the way in which Carnap understands 
                                                 
 
147
 Perhaps the most explicit statement of this understanding can be found in a remark where Carnap speaks of 
“the values R (the models)“ of an AS f(R) (RC 081-01-12, my emphasis). 
148
 “M sei ein zulässiges Modell des AS f(…). M ordnet also jedem Grundbegriff von f eine logische Konstante 
zu; damit dies möglich ist, muss einer n-gliedrigen Relation auch stets eine n-gliedrige Relation entsprechen. 
Daraus folgt, dass jedem Bereich von f genau eine Klasse in M als “entsprechender Bereich“ zugeordnet ist.“ 
(ibid, 105 my emphasis) 
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the ‘individual domains’ of a model in this context. In a footnote in this section he makes the 
following insightful remark:   
 
k1 in M1 is called an “individual domain“ in relation to AS if the corresponding domain k of the AS is 
an “individual domain“ or, in case k1 corresponds to several domains k, k’, ... of the AS: if all these are 
individual domains of the AS. (ibid.)149 
 
Thus, the individual domains (note the plural) of a model are understood as the (possibly) 
different sets of individuals that can occur in a model. It is but a small step from this to 
consider the domain of individuals of a given model as the union of these sets of individuals. 
In fact, Carnap at several places in his manuscript explicitly speaks of the ‘union’ 
(‘Vereinigung’) of ‘corresponding domains’ of an axiom system and – on the level of 
extensional relations of the domains as “unions of equi-level relation domains” 
(“Vereinigungen gleichliegender Relationsbereiche”) (RC 081-01-18).  
 
I consider these remarks in the projected second part of Untersuchungen in combination with 
those made in Carnap and Bachmann (1936), Bachmann (1934) to be conclusive evidence 
that Carnap, from 1928 onward, understood formal models of axiomatic theories as sequences 
of relations and a universe of a model as the union of the fields of these relations. This said, 
three points of commentary are in order here. First, what follows from this heterodox account 
of the domain-as-fields account is that – even if one assumes a fixed interpretation of the 
background language - models of an AS can have different, variable domains. Assuming this 
conception of formal models of an axiom system as the interpretations of its primitive terms, 
one can specify models with different domains in one language without violating the truth 
conditions codified in Carnap’s notion of analyticity. Since the relations’ fields stipulated as 
domains can be chosen freely as subclasses of a more comprehensive class of syntactical 
signs that form the individual constants of the language in use, Carnap’s approach is de facto 
structurally comparable to the modern variable domain conception of models. Thus, VDC for 
the models of an axiomatic theory is provided in Carnap’s account. What this amounts to is 
the possibility of assigning extensionally different relations M1, M2, etc. to the model variable 
M. Thus, if one understands an n-ary relation R as defined over Dn of LII and the extension of 
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 “k1 in M1 heisst ein “Individuumbereich” inbezug auf das AS, wenn der entsprechende Bereich k des AS ein 
„Individuumbereich“ [inbezug auf das AS] ist, oder falls dem k1 mehrere Bereiche k, k’, … des AS entsprechen: 
wenn alle diese Individuumsbereiche des AS sind.“ (ibid.) 
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R as a set A of n-tuples the relation is true on, where A ⊆ Dn, then the domain of a model 
expressed by R consists simply of the set of individuals contained in A, i.e. the field of R. 
Within the limits of DLII extensionally different relations can be formed as the models of an 
AS.150    
Second, it should be noted here that variants of the ‘domain-as-fields’ view have recently 
been discussed extensively in an ongoing scholarly debate on the proper understanding of 
Tarski’s notion of models in the 1930s.151 In the light of the discussions there, several striking 
resemblances between Tarski’s and Carnap’ accounts become visible. In an instructive paper, 
Mancosu presents an interpretation of Tarski’s understanding of “domains of discourse” of an 
axiomatic theory that is essentially identical to Carnap’s approach (Mancosu (2006)).152 
Mancosu shows that at least for some formalizations of axiomatic theories given by Tarski, 
there is no prefixed “identity between the intended domain of the theory and the range of the 
quantifiers” which is antecedently fixed for the used background type-theoretic logic (ibid, 
226). In order to allow the variation of the domain of discourse of a theory, the fixed range of 
quantification is in some cases effectively restricted by a non-logical domain-predicate 
additionally introduced to the language.153 This convention used in Tarski’s formal axiomatics 
certainly comes close to the suggested ‘domains-as-fields’ view for Carnap’s theory. 
Nonetheless, one important difference to Tarski’s approach concerning the method of logical 
formalization of axiomatic theories can be mentioned here. At least in some examples of 
Tarski’s formalizations of a ‘deductive theory’, he is in fact operating with a logical language 
with a non-empty signature, i.e. a language including non-logical, schematically understood 
constants to express the primitive terms of an axiomatic theory. In Carnap’s account, as we 
have seen, axioms systems are always expressed in a pure type-theoretic language without the 
use of non-logical constants. Here, the domain of a theory is fixed by the interpretation of the 
model variable, i.e. by the assignment of a specific extensionally understood relation (or a 
sequence of relations) to the model variable (or the variables expressing the disinterpreted 
                                                 
 
150
 For Carnap’s notion of a relation’s extension see Carnap (2000, 65-67) as well as Carnap (1929, 66).  
151
 See Bays (2001), Gomez-Torrente (1996) and (2009), Mancosu (2006), Jané (2006) and the literature cited 
there for further references. 
152
 In fact, Mancosu explicitly mentions – without going into specifics - “Carnap’s conception of models” in 
Untersuchungen and describes it as “very similar to Tarski’s”. He further states that: “In general (…) one should 
devote a whole paper to the relationship between Carnap and Tarski on the notion of model and logical 
consequence.” (Mancosu 2006, 215). At least regarding Carnap’s notion of models, this suggestion is taken up in 
the present chapter. 
153
 Compare also Bays (2001) for a similar interpretation of Tarski. For lack of space I cannot go into the subtle 
differences between Mancosu’s and Bays’ understanding of Tarski’s domain conception, but see Gomez-
Torrente (2009) for a detailed comparison.  
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primitive terms). Thus there is no quantifier relativization involved here via a non-logical 
domain-fixing predicate. However, as is also shown in, there are cases in Tarski’s writings 
where he as well is operating with a pure simple theory of types as the background language 
for reconstructing axiomatic theories.154 In these cases Tarski’s method of domain 
specification is practically identical to the one suggested by Carnap. Compare Mancosu on 
Tarski’s method:  
 
(…) the ‘universe of discourse’ of the mathematical theory in question (…) will be given by a class 
taken as the value of the variable corresponding to one of the primitives of the theory (…) . (ibid, 224, 
my emphasis)    
 
One could hold that there is one subtle difference compared to Carnap’s account. In the 
latter’s case, there is no specific single relation in sequence constituting a model, i.e. in  M = 
〈R, S, T, …〉, explicitly reserved for specifying the domain of the theory. Thus, there is no 
functionally distinct variable used for relativizing the quantifiers in LII. However, in Mancosu 
(2006), at least in one example in Tarski’s writings from the 1930s is discussed where a 
convention identical to Carnap’s can be identified. In describing an axiom system defined in 
Tarski (1935a) with only one primitive binary relation R, Mancosu holds: 
 
A model for such a theory is given by the finite sequence containing only the relation R (the ‘universe 
of discourse’ is implicitly defined by the field of R). (ibid, 224) 
 
Given this, we can witness here a striking similarity between the two approaches to a logical 
formalization of axiomatic theories in 1920s and 1930s. Both authors seem to assume variants 
of the ‘domain-as-fields’ approach. This is particularly insightful given the fact that there 
seems to be no direct line of influence in either direction between Tarski and Carnap.155 I take 
this conceptual similarity in dealing with formal models as an expression of a by then 
standard practice for the formalization of the semantics of axiomatic theories. Moreover, it 
clearly shows historical point that Carnap, even before Tarski’s work in the 1930s (and, most 
importantly, Tarski’s classical paper on models and logical consequence (Tarski (1936))), was 
                                                 
 
154
 Goméz-Torrente describes in detail “Tarski’s pluralism“, i.e. “his disposition to work within a variety of 
different frameworks” in his formalization of axiomatic theories (see ibid, 250-251). 
155
 At least in the Carnap Nachlass, no documents can be found that would suggest an influence on Carnap from 
Tarski’s side while working on Untersuchungen. This is also not surprising given the fact that the first points of 
personal contact between Carnap and Tarski took place in 1930. Compare Awodey and Carus (2001) on this 
point.   
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introducing a convention to treat formal models with variable domains in the axiomatic 
context. 
Finally, note that this conception of ‘domains-as-fields’ is in Carnap’s case perfectly 
consistent with Hintikka’s sweeping assumption of a “one domain thesis” concerning the 
logical languages used by him. It can be consistently argued – along the lines of Hintikka - 
that for Carnap every “formal language in use” comes with a fixed interpretation and still 
hold that he conceived of the variability for his formal models. The reason for this is, as we 
have seen, that Carnap, in his theory of axiomatics, seems to draw a distinction between the 
range of the quantifiers of the ‘contentual’ background logic in which a theory is formalized 
and the domain of discourse of a theory captured in a specific model. Hintikka’s attribution of 
the “one domain thesis” to Carnap’s semantics for his language, his claim (2), thus has no 
stronger implications for his method of model construction. So, whereas it makes perfect 
sense to hold that Carnap’s semantics involved in his axiomatic project is in crucial ways 
heterodox compared to the modern understanding of models it would be wrong to argue that 
he assumes a FDC for his models. Where Hintikka evaluation of Carnap’s semantics misses 
track is in his conclusion that a “one domain assumption” concerning a language necessarily 
involves a FDC for the models in Carnap’s theory of axiomatics. Given Carnap’s heterodox 
treatment of models, claim (2i) that a FDC for the language in use implies a FDC for models 
shows to be a non sequitur.  
 
2.4.3 VDC via type ascent 
So far, our discussion has left unquestioned the assumption that Carnap, in his theory of 
axiomatics, is using fully interpreted background languages in which the range of 
quantification at each type level is invariantly fixed. This is essentially Hintikka’s claim (2). 
According to him, for Carnap “a specification of the domain of individuals is part and parcel 
of the interpretation of any one language. If the domain of individuals is changed, we are 
dealing with a different language.“ (Hintikka 1991, 328) This “one-domain-assumption” is in 
fact an interpretational claim concerning Carnap’s use of formal languages commonly shared 
in recent scholarship.156 It is held that due to Carnap’s logicist doctrine inherited from Frege 
                                                 
 
156
 Compare Hintikka (1999), Awodey (2008), Awodey and Carus (2001), and Reck (2004). 
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and Russell, quantifiers were conceived by him as logical constants with a fixed interpretation 
throughout his intellectual career.157, 158 
Support for this view is usually provided via textual evidence from his later works, 
particularly from Carnap’s works in his Series of Semantics in the 1940s (See Awodey 2008). 
Moreover, also the passage cited in this chapter in Section 4 on “the one domain of logic” can 
be considered as support for such a universal conception for logical languages with fixed 
range of quantification in Untersuchungen.159 
Nevertheless, I want to argue here that this interpretive claim of fixed assignments to the 
quantifiers of each type level does not do proper justice to Carnap’s actual use the simple type 
theoretic language in the axiomatic context, i.e. in his attempt to symbolize axiomatic 
theories, its metatheory and its interpretations. My point is that at least for Carnap’s early 
work on axiomatics this understanding of his tacit semantics for STT is not adequate. The 
reason for this is the following: In his attempt to express the models of an axiomatic theory in 
this formal language Carnap is assuming and fruitfully implementing a kind of type flexibility 
concerning the semantics of his language, i.e. a certain flexibility concerning the type 
assignments to the variable expressions of a given syntactic level or category that is in direct 
conflict with the “one domain assumption”.  
Carnap’s convention of a type flexible treatment of STT is based on a certain tolerance 
concerning the type status of logical objects assigned to the variables of the language. In 
particular, he allows a certain relativity concerning the level of individuals of a given 
language: for the 0-type-level variables, the actual range of quantification is not fixed to a 
specific class of elements, e.g. logical elements of type 0, but allows different interpretations 
also in (classes of) higher-typed constructs. In Part 1 of Untersuchungen, Carnap puts the 
point this way:   
 
                                                 
 
157
 This is considered as a premise in the logicist tradition since the seminal work of van Hejienoort (1967). 
Compare Goldfarb’s often cited description of this point: “The ranges of the quantifiers – as we would say – are 
fixed in advance once and for all. The universe of discourse is always the universe, appropriately striated.” 
(Goldfarb 1979, 352) 
158
 A similar point was made for some of Tarski’s works. Compare again Mancosu: “It is the type-theoretic 
framework that in the first place decides what the class of individuals (V) is.  (…) The type-theoretic framework 
comes interpreted. In particular, the quantifiers play the role of logical constants and thus, (…), there is no 
reinterpretation of the quantifiers.” (Mancosu 2006, 232)  
159
 Compare also Awodey and Carus on this point in Carnap (2000): “What made Carnap’s definitions seem 
natural to him is his “universal” conception of logic (…). There is only one logic, in this conception. Not only 
were all possible axiom systems fragments of this universal system; all logical analysis of and statements about 
this system has also to be stated within this same universal system.”  (Awodey and Carus 2001, 159) 
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Which elements are considered as “individuals” in respect to a given variable is not determined by the 
variable’s type; at one point elements of this kind can function as individuals, at another point the 
elements of another kind. Accordingly, elements of a given kind can count as individuals at one time 
can count as relations at another time. (Carnap 2000, 107)160 
  
What is considered as the class of individual for a given language like SST is thus relative to a 
given context of use.161 The notion of ‘individuals’ is thus not an “absolute” but a “relative 
concept” whose extension in STT, i.e. the range of its first-order variables, has to be 
stipulated for each case of application of the language.162 There is thus no unifying universal 
class of individuals in terms of a fixed class of type-theoretic objects taken as the level of 
individuals of the language. So, for instance, the individual variables of STT can range over 
the type 0 objects in one theory and over relations or functions on these, i.e. over type 1 
objects in another. If applied to mathematical theories this means that in one case the 
language might range over a class of natural or real numbers as the individuals of the theory. 
In another case the language ranges over elements of a higher type that can be constructed 
from the class of real numbers (see Carnap and Bachmann (1936) and the discussion below).    
Several consequences of this convention concerning the use for STT as an ”applied logistic” 
are worth noting here. First, it should be clear that when Carnap is speaking of the context-
relativity of individuals, he means different formalizations of axiomatic theories in STT. The 
use of flexible types is thus explicitly devised for the axiomatic context, i.e. for symbolizing 
axiomatic theories their models as well as certain metatheory for them.163 Second, note that 
for a formal type-theoretic language, this effectively calls for a conventional stipulation of the 
interpretation of the type-levels of the language, i.e. a stipulation which elements of a typed 
universe are considered as the individuals of the language at a given time. Note that his type 
flexibility has the effect that the range of a given variable is de facto reinterpretable. The 
ranges of the variables of each level are not fixed in the sense of ranging over a certain 
specified invariant class of elements in the type-theoretic hierarchy. Instead, assignments to 
                                                 
 
160
 ”Welche Gegenstände als “Individuen” inbezug auf eine bestimmte Variable anzusehen sind, ist durch den 
Typus der Variabeln nicht festgelegt; das eine Mal können Gegenstände dieser, das andere Mal Gegenstände 
jener Art als Individuen fungieren. Und demgemäß können Gegenstände einer bestimmten Art das eine Mal als 
Individuen gelten, das andere Mal als Relationen.“ (Carnap 2000, 107) 
161
 Compare also Carnap (1929, 19). 
162
 Note that a related account of “relative types of variables“ dependent on the given context of application can 
already be found in the convention of typical ambiguity in Principia Mathematica. See e.g. Whitehead and 
Russell (1962). 
163
 The main context in which this relativized version of “individuals in respect to step n“ is used is in the 
explication of “complete isomorphism“ between models. See Carnap (2000).  
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the variables are supposed to change when STT is applied to another theory. Given this, 
Carnap is in fact assuming a kind of VDC concerning his background language that is based 
on the idea of keeping flexible the semantic ties between the formal language and the type-
theoretic universe. His convention allows that the relations between this type-theoretic 
hierarchy and the levels of the language can be treated as flexible and most importantly, as 
changeable. Variability is thus secured here in terms of variable type assignments to the 
syntactic expressions of the language.164  
Finally, the comparison with Tarski’s use of formal language to formalize axiomatic theories 
in his work in the 1930s can be taken up here again. In Mancosu (2006) - with hindsight to 
Tarski’s case - an interesting distinction between two alternative ways to understand the 
semantics of a type-theoretic language is drawn. In both version, STT is fully interpreted and 
the interpretation is fixed. In the first, “strong” FDC, the individual quantifiers of STT range 
over a fixed class of logical objects, Tarski’s class of individuals V.165  
In the second, suggested account of a “weak” FDC, languages like STT are introduced as 
“specific interpreted languages” for a given axiomatic theory.  
 
Every theory comes equipped with its background theory of types and with its own interpretation of 
the theory of types. (…) Thus, there is a certain flexibility in choosing what the class of individuals is 
that will be assumed in the background. (Mancosu 2006, 233) 
 
Thus, if STT is used for the formalization of an arithmetical theory, the individual variables 
are to range over the class of natural numbers. In case STT is used for symbolizing an axiom 
system of geometry, the first order variables range over points (or lines etc.). 
Now, Mancosu offers two ways of explanation how this more tolerant version of FDC can be 
made consistent with the “universalist” assumption of an all-encompassing type-theoretical 
universe, based on a fixed class of individual objects. One is to suggest a class-theoretic 
                                                 
 
164
 Note that this flexible type theory has no stronger implications for the traditional logicist understanding of 
type- theoretic hierarchy described above. In particular, the convention is fully consistent with the view that the 
“logicist” Carnap assumed, anno 1928, a universal universe of type-theoretical objects. Moreover, it also does 
not conflict with the Russelian view that a logical language is universal in the sense of ranging over this all-
encompassing universe of objects. What is does come in conflict with is the claim that for Carnap, in his logical 
approach to formal axiomatics, the universal background language STT comes fixed with a single, invariant 
interpretation in which each range of quantification for a given type-level is assigned a fixed class of type 
theoretical objects. Where the flexibility of types becomes virulent is in the assignment of these universes to the 
different type-levels of STT. 
165
 Compare Mancosu (2006): „The theory of types comes already with the meaning of the quantifiers fixed and 
that determines the range of the individual variables in all possible theories that can be formulated over the 
theory of types. The range of individual variables (thus the class V) is taken to be the “real” universe of 
individuals.” (ibid, 232) 
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understanding of the type-theoretic universe. The domain (of individuals) is considered here 
as a proper class “from which we can manage to carve out set-theoretical interpretations of 
higher and higher cardinality.” (ibid, 235) According to the second reading, the individual 
class (henceforth IC) assigned to the individual variables of the language can be freely 
stipulated when the language is introduced for a given task (see ibid, 236).  Thus, IC can be 
interpreted differently in different theoretical context by substituting different classes of 
mathematical objects to it. (Thus, it can consist of countable set of the natural numbers in on 
context and of the incountable set of real numbers in another). There exists no prior, in some 
sense logically privileged individual class of STT. Nevertheless, once the language is set up in 
this way for a specific mathematical formalization, its interpretation remains fixed. There is 
thus no way to change or reinterpret IC in a given formalization of a mathematical theory.  
Now, this account of a weak FDC seems to come close in spirit to Carnap’s understanding of 
languages like LII in his 1936 paper. One can in fact find passages in Carnap’s work from the 
early 1930s that seems to suggest such a weak conception of FDC for his background 
language. In Carnap (1931), in providing a general explication of STT, he states that:  
 
To type 0 belong the names of the elements (“individuals”) of the domain of thought that are treated in 
the respective context (for instance a, b …). (Carnap 1931, 96)166 
 
In the paper “Die Mathematik als Zweig der Logik” from 1930, in the context of discussing 
the “existential character“ of Russell and Whitehead’s axioms of infinity, reducibility and 
choice, he makes the following remark:  
 
The axiom of infinity is not valid solely because of its form alone; it is valid, if at all, somewhat by 
coincidence. For some domains of individual it holds, for others it does not. Whether one can speak at 
all of an absolute domain of individuals, seems problematic. (Carnap 1930a, 306)167  
 
These passages strongly suggest that Carnap understood the semantics for STT, if applied in 
the axiomatic context, in a way similar to the “weak” conception described by Mancosu. 
Moreover, the last sentence of the second passage could be taken as evidence that Carnap 
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 “Zum Typus 0 gehören die Namen der Gegenstände („Individuen“) des Denkbereiches, der in dem 
betreffenden Zusammenhang behandelt wird (etwa a, b...).“ (Carnap 1931, 96) 
167
 “Das Unendlichkeitsaxiom gilt aber nicht aufgrund seiner Form allein; sondern es gilt, wenn überhaupt, 
gewissermaßen zufällig. Für manche Individuenbereiche gilt es, für andere nicht. Ob man von einem absoluten 
Individuenbereich reden kann, erscheint problematisch.“ (Carnap 1930a, 306)  
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seems to sympathize - contra the universalist picture - with a ‘substitutional’ explanation of 
weak FDC in Mancosu’s sense, where IC is considered to be but a class structure that has to 
be filled or substituted with a specific class of mathematical entities.  
Nevertheless, this similarity should not lead one to overlook where Carnap’s account differs 
essentially from Mancosu’s Tarski. One can see the former’s convention of a type flexible 
interpretation of STT as a special kind of weak FDC. It is, however, not a substitutional 
understanding in Mancosu’s sense that follows from this convention. The main body of 
evidence discussed above shows that Carnap, unlike Tarski assumed a fixed class of type 0 
objects at the basis of the hierarchy of types. The first-order variables of the language can be 
interpreted, not via substitutions of different, non-related classes of elements, but by 
assignments of classes from different levels in the hierarchy of objects. Thus, any two 
interpretation of the individuals quantifiers of STT, say IC1 and IC2, stand in a fully 
explicable connection via their respective position in the objective type-theoretic hierarchy. 
The elements of IC2 (say the real numbers) can be related to the elements of IC1 (say the 
natural numbers) by making explicit the logical construction of the former in terms of the 
letter. With this convention, Carnap’s weak FDC can be understood as a kind of a 
substitutional account that is consistent with a fixed universe. Moreover, this is also a better 
explanation of the possibility of domain variation given a fixed hierarchy than Mancosu’s 
explanations since it follows naturally – at least for Carnap’s theory – from the traditional 
‘universalist’ assumptions concerning the type-theoretic hierarchy. 
A second, more substantial difference to Mancosu’s Tarski is this: recall that Mancosu 
explicitly holds in his explanation that once a specific IC is assigned to the language for a 
specific formalization, it remains fixed. Note that this is not necessary when siding with 
Carnap’s convention of flexible types. Here, in a specific application of an interpreted 
language to an axiomatic theory, it is possible to vary the interpretation of the individual 
variables (and thus the range of individuals) of STT by assigning different classes from the 
type-theoretic hierarchy. Moreover, and more importantly, this type flexibility concerning the 
variables of the language opens up a possibility to consider a second kind of VDC for models 
of an AS formalized in STT that is independent from the ‘domain-as-fields’ approach 
sketched above. Recall from Section 2.4 Carnap’s remarks on an “arbitrary, stipulated domain 
of discourse” of the models (ibid, 122) and of “declaring a specific domain of discourse in 
them to be the domain of individuals“ (ibid, 95). In addition to the convention outlined above, 
Carnap conceives of a second version how model formation and the VDC indicated here can 
be gained. It is directly related to the type structure of the AS in question or, more precisely, 
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to the type-theoretic architecture of models in Carnap’s account. I will dub this approach as 
“domain variation via type ascent”. In a set of notes from the projected Part 2 of 
Untersuchungen Carnap gets explicit on how the idea of type flexibility can be used for 
domain variation for models. Recall that in his presentation of a model’s individual domain, 
the level of individuals for a given theory depends on the type-structure of the axiom system. 
The individual domain in M1 can only be specified “in respect to AS”. In the document titled 
“Domains of a model” (RC 081-01-16) Carnap further discusses the connection of the type-
structure of an AS and the type level of the  “corresponding domains” of a model. He points 
out that two models M1 and M2 of an axiom system f can have (individual) domains of 
different types if the type of the variable indicating the corresponding domain in f is 
‘undetermined’ (‘unbestimmt’):  
 
There is notably as difference between M and f: M consists of constants, thus any two constituents of 
M therefore have a specific type-relation, they are either of the same or of a different type and if 
different, then in a certain relation to each other; in contrast, k1 and k2 are variables, there are 3 
possibilities: of the same type, of different types, undetermined. (RC 081-01-16)168 
 
The crucial point here is that for a given variable R of f, two admissible models can be 
constructed that are “of different type” (“typenverschieden”), given that R is undetermined. 
Given Carnap’s notion of “corresponding domains” between two models M1 and M2, the 
undetermined type expression of the primitives of an axiom system allows that there can be 
corresponding domains K1 and K2 of M1 and M2 “in respect to AS that have a different type 
level” (see also RC 081-01-18). As Carnap makes explicit, this holds in particular for 
individual domains:  
 
The type of the individual domains [GS: in an AS] does not at all have to be the same (since the AS 
can stipulate for 2 such domains either that they are type-identical or it lets the type relation 
undetermined (…). (RC 081-01-18)169 
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 “Es ist eben ein Unterschied zwischen M und f: M besteht aus Konstanten, irgendzwei Gebilde von M haben 
daher ein ganz bestimmtes Typenverhältnis, sie sind entweder von gleichem oder von verschiedenem Typ, und 
wenn von verschiedenem, so in bestimmtem Verhältnis; k1 und k2 hingegen sind Variablen, das sind 3 
Möglichkeiten: typengleich, typenverschieden, unbestimmt.“ (RC 081-01-16) 
169
 “Der Typ der Individuenbereiche [GS: in einem AS] braucht durchaus nicht derselbe zu sein (den das AS 
kann für 2 solche Bereiche entweder bestimmen, dass sie typengleich sind, ode es lässt das Typenverhältnis 
unbestimmt (…).“ (RC 081-01-18) 
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It is not difficult to see the possible impact of this use of syntactically undetermined type 
levels for the question of domain variability of the models of f. It can be considered as a 
certain complementation or strengthening of the domain-as-fields convention. Under the latter 
convention, the variables symbolizing the theory’s primitive terms of a given theory f(R, S, 
T), if left unspecified, can be (re-)interpreted by different models M1 and M2 where the 
respective model constituting relations R1, S1, T1 and R2, S2, T2 are extensionally different. 
Nevertheless, their respective fields consist of elements of the same type level. In other 
words, the type structure of the relations is held constant here, i.e. all relations have fields 
consisting of elements of the same type level. Now, adding the convention of flexible types, 
to class of possible models for AS can be extended to models like M3 where the relations R3, 
S3, T3 are not of the same type level as the corresponding relations in M1 or M2. This allows 
the reinterpretations of f with models whose domains consist of individual elements of 
different types.  
Interestingly, Carnap and Bachmann are not silent on this issue in their 1936 paper. In fact, 
the idea of domain variation via type ascent is explicitly mentioned here. In the final section 6 
of the paper one can find an explicit argument why such a strengthened form of domain 
variability might be productively used for some formalization of axiomatic theories. Carnap 
and Bachmann discuss “informal extensions” in mathematical practice based on models that 
are ‘stepwise’ distinct, i.e. not of the same type level: 
 
In actual informal thought, one has no hesitation in permitting systems of higher level as extensions 
and it is even quite customary to extend domains by constructing new domains from the elements of 
the original domain through one or more steps of class construction. (ibid, 83, my emphasis) 
 
Note that ‘systems’ means models and ‘domains’ means model domains here. The above 
passage stresses that there are kinds of domain variation in informal mathematical practice 
that involve an informal ascent to higher-level constructions that, if recast in a type theoretic 
setting, involve a type ascent of domains described above. Thus, “class construction” in a 
type-theoretic framework simply means that for a given set T of n-typed objects, n+1-typed 
objects can be constructed as certain relations of functions on T. As one “classic” example for 
such informal kinds of model extensions Carnap and Bachmann mention the field of real 
numbers as the extension of the field of rational numbers gained “by regarding classes of 
fundamental sequences of rational numbers as elements” (ibid, 83). Thus, in respect to a given 
axiomatization of fields, one can view the above example as a typical instance of model 
variation via type ascent. Carnap and Bachman go on to outline a version of a “type-flexible 
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presentation” (“stufenmäßig bewegliche Darstellung”) (in contrast to the traditional 
presentation with rigid type distinctions) of axiom systems in STT aimed to logically 
reconstruct these kinds of domain variations in mathematical practice. The cornerstone is here 
again a certain flexibility concerning the types of the variables of the formal language:  
 
The variables and those logical constants that in general belong to the type systems would (…) be 
flexible as to type, i.e., they would have no definite type but run through a denumerably infinite 
sequence of types, beginnings with the “base type” of the given sign. (ibid, 85, my emphasis) 
 
Given this flexible conception of variables in STT, the effect for the interpretations of AS is 
this: “To a given axiom system then there may belong models of different levels.” (ibid, 85) 
We have seen that this convention of symbolizing axiomatic theories in a non-type-rigid 
version of STT, devised explicitly to capture kinds of model variation in mathematical 
practice essentially goes back to Carnap’s earlier ideas of flexible types from 1928. 
 
To recapitulate: We have shown in Section 2.4.2 that Carnap’s heterodox conception of 
models, in particular the ‘domain-as-fields’ convention shared with Tarski is perfectly 
consistent with the assumption of a FDC concerning the background language in use. Thus, in 
terms of Hintikka’s claims, inference from (2) to (2i) is invalid in Carnap’s case since he can 
perfectly well hold a VDC concerning the models of a theory and still hold a FDC concerning 
the formal language in which the theory is formalized. However, given Carnap’s additional 
convention of a flexible type theory and of model variation via type ascent outlined above, 
Hintikka’s sweeping claim (2) that the ranges of quantifiers of a given type level are fixed 
itself seems problematic at best. This is so at least when it is directed, as in Hintikka (1991), 
at Carnap’s use of formal languages in the axiomatic context.170 Given the “type-flexible 
presentation” of axiom systems, Carnap’s conception of STT allows a kind of 
reinterpretability of its ranges of quantification that is in direct conflict with the “one domain 
assumption”.  Thus, to summarize, we can state that both claims made by Hintikka, (2i) and 
(2) ware shown to be untenable in the case of Carnap’s axiomatics. The remaining question 
now is: what follows from this for Hintikka’s first claim (1)?  
                                                 
 
170
 Let me emphasize this point: my claim here is not to say that (2) (or something equivalent) is wrong tout 
court as a characterization of Carnap’s general conception of formal languages. It is to say that it is not a valid 
characterisation of Carnap’s specific use of a language like STT in the axiomatic context, i.e. for the logical 
reconstruction of mathematical axiomatic theories.  
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2.5 Submodels and model extensions 
Did Carnap, as Hintikka (1991) argues, completely misconceive the use of extremal axioms 
and thus the informal understanding of model extension in formal axiomatics? Does his 
formal explication misrepresent the basic intentions behind the completeness and restriction 
axioms introduced by Hilbert, Peano and Fraenkel?171 Given the above refutations of 
Hintikka’s claim (2) and his tacit sub-claim (2i), one should be more than skeptical about his 
claim (1). Nevertheless, in order to address these questions thoroughly, it will be necessary to 
see what exactly Carnap’s understanding of submodels and model extensions tacitly assumed 
in his theory of extremal axioms was. In particular, it is to see whether he held a conception of 
model extensions that is comparable to modern account and this despite the continuous 
emphasis on model’s structures and structure extensions outlined in Section 2.2.1. In fact, it 
seems that at the time of working on the Untersuchungen manuscript in 1928, Carnap was not 
quite certain of the exact relation between “structure extensions” and “model extensions”. In a 
document of Part 2 in the Nachlass, we can find him asking himself:  
 
Should we consider “partial relation” and “families” (with respect to the partial relation) as well as 
“maxima” and “minima” (with respect to the partial relation) for the relations or the structures? (RC 
081-01-05)172 
  
The remarks on the extremal structures of an AS as well as his toy example presented in 1936 
suggest that Carnap chose the second option. Nevertheless, closer inspection of how the 
extremal structures and the corresponding extremal axioms are presented in Carnap and 
Bachmann (1936) will show that the above made distinction between structure and model 
extensions turns out to be  less consequential. In other words, the distinction alluded to in the 
passage above between structure extension and model extensions has no stronger implications 
for Carnap’s overall theory if both terms are understood in sufficiently broad sense. My point 
in this section will be to show that –contra Hintikka’s interpretation – Carnap assumed a 
version of model extensions in 1936 that is fully compatible with the informal uses of model 
extensions in mathematical practice he aims to capture. To see this, a closer look at the formal 
                                                 
 
171
 Compare Schiemer (2010) for a closer discussion of Carnap’s mathematical influences for his account of 
extremal axioms. 
172
 “Sollen wir “Teilverhältnis” und “Familien” (inbezug auf das Teilverhältnis) und “Maxima” und “Minima” 
(inbezug auf das Teilverhältnis) für die Relationen oder für die Strukturen betrachten?“ (RC 081-01-05) 
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details of Carnap and Bachmann’s auxiliary notions of submodel and extension of a model 
introduced will prove to be instructive. 
 
Following their explications of minimal and maximal structures, Carnap and Bachmann 
(1936) go on to present their account of the corresponding extremal axioms in §4 of their 
paper: Informally, a maximal axiom imposes on a model M that “there is no extension N of M 
such that F(N) holds (…).” Accordingly, a minimal axiom imposes that “there is no N such 
that F(N) holds an M is an extension of N (…)” (ibid, 77). The notion of extensions used here 
is defined more formally in terms of the models of a theory: for any two models M1 and N1, 
N1 is an extension of M1 if M1 is a “proper part” of N1, i.e.  
                                                        M1 ⊂ N1.M1 ≠ N1. 
Given this, a further ramification of this kind of extension is mentioned. The conceptual 
motivation for it is to make a distinction between two types of extension based on whether or 
not the extended models are admitted that can be isomorphically embedded in the original 
model. In Carnap’s own terms, whether or not it is axiomatically stipulated that the 
“structures of models are really distinct” (ibid, 77). In the first case, the relation of extension 
is defined via the notion of “proper part” as Carnap conceives it in the sense above. This 
leaves open the possibility that two models share what he terms a “dividable structure”.173 
In the second case of extension, structures of the two models are deliberately fixed to be 
“undividable”, the admissible models are thus non-isomorphic – a condition explicitly 
“included in the definition of extension”. These two concepts of extension, terminologically 
fixed as “model-extension” and “structure-extension”, are given the following formal 
presentations (see ibid, 77): 
                                            Erwm(N; M) =df M ⊂ N . M ≠ N 
                                        Erws(N; M) =df M ⊂ N . ∼Ismv(M, N)  
Note that the first condition for extensions is weaker than the second: the use “proper parts” 
leaves open the possibility that there exits a proper extension N1 of a given model M1 such 
that N1 is isomorphic to M1. This explicitly ruled out in the more restrictive case of second 
type that also rules out any isomorphic extensions of M1.174    
                                                 
 
173
 A structure is called “dividable” if there exists a proper submodel M of a model N that satisfies the structure 
of M, put formally (∃M)(∃N) (S(M). S(N). M ⊂ N. M ≠ N).  It follows in this case that models are “isomorphic 
with a proper part of itself” (ibid, 74-75). 
174
 Given these two types of extensions, Carnap & Bachmann distinguish between two versions of extremality 
axioms: in the case of maximality axioms, between “maximal model axioms“ and “maximal structure axioms“: 
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Surprisingly, this distinction between model-extension and structure-extension is not 
mentioned in Hintikka’s commentary. Neither does he get more explicit about Carnap’s 
specific understanding of the notions of “part” or “proper part” of a model, i.e. Carnap’s use 
of the “inclusion” relation in his treatment of what in a modern terms amounts to a (proper) 
submodel featured in both definitions. Obviously, Carnap’s specific understanding of ‘M ⊂ N. 
M ≠ N’ in this context turns out of be crucial for his tacit assumptions concerning the 
extensions (or restrictions) of a model and, in consequence, extremal axioms in an 
axiomatization.   
Let us see how Carnap’s notion of a “proper part” relates to the modern model-theoretic 
notion of a submodel. Here, given two models U = 〈A, s〉 and W = 〈A’, t〉  of a language, U is 
considered to be a submodel or substructure of W (or inversely, W an extension of U), if the 
following conditions hold: 
  (i) A ⊆ A’ 
  (ii) for every n-ary relation symbol RU = RW ∩ An 
  (iii) for every n-ary function symbol, fU = fWAn 
  (iv) for every constant symbol, cU = cW.175  
Is Carnap’s notion of a “proper part” of a model structurally comparable to this? Is he 
assuming a condition like (i)? Note that according to Hintikka this cannot be the case since it 
would involve the possibility of actually changing the individual domain. This - according to 
his second claim - was simply inconceivable for Carnap. However, we have seen that this 
reading shows to be untenable as soon as one acknowledges the heterodox character of 
Carnap’s conception of models. Where does this insight leave us in our understanding of his 
central use of submodels in his theory? Here again, a closer look at what Carnap actually says 
about the very notion of “proper parts” proves to be instructive. Recall again that models in 
Untersuchungen are understood as sequences of relations (of a specified type level) of the 
form M1 = (R1, S1, T1). In an insightful footnote in §3 of Carnap & Bachmann (1936) the 
meaning of ‘M ⊂ N’, is further specified: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Maxm(F; M) =df ∼(∃N) (M ⊂ N. M ≠ N. F(N)); Maxs(F; M) =df ∼(∃N) (M ⊂ N.  ∼Ismv(M, N). F(N)). The second 
axiom rules out extensions of a model M that do not share a “dividable structure” with M; the first and stronger 
axiom rules out extensions of M per se (see ibid, 77).  
175
 Compare e.g. Enderton (2001, 95) for a similar definition. 
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Let ‘u, v, …, w, F, G, …H’ and ‘x, y, …, z, J, K, …, L’ be two series of variables, where ’u’, …, ’z’ are 
the individual variables and ’F’, …, ’L’ the predicate variables, which are abbreviated by ’M’ and ’N’; 
then ’M ⊂ N’ is an abbreviation for ’u = x . v = y. …. w = z. F ⊂ J. G ⊂ K. … . H ⊂ L’. (ibid, 75)176 
 
Note that here, as in the official definition of a “formal model” cited in Section 2.4 an explicit 
notational specification of the model domains in the sense of condition (i) in the modern 
definition is missing. In fact, one might be tempted to read the series of individual variables 
‘u, v, …, w’ and ‘x, y, …, z’ in the 1936 passage as indicators of the respective domains of the 
models. In that case, the crucial question would be how to make sense of the series of 
conjunctions of identity relations between the individual variables of the two structures ’u = x 
. v = y. …. w = z’. Now, if understood as a relation between the respective individual domains 
of M and N, a serious tension with our main interpretive claim that Carnap held a VDC for his 
models would arise. This is due to the fact that in this case, the domain of a model would be 
fixed to a specific set given the fixed sequence of individual variables. Moreover, the series of 
identity relations would clearly imply a nonstandard conception of submodels for it imposes 
on the fields of the two models to be identical or at least equinumerous. In this reading, 
closely in line with Hintikka’s critical remarks, Carnap theory clearly would miss a modern 
account of submodels since the domain restriction necessary for condition (i) simply could 
not be expressed. This interpretation of Carnap’s theory of submodels also gains prima facie 
plausibility in the light of Carnap and Bachmann’s point set example mentioned in Section 
2.2.2 where the individual variables stand for the elements of a fixed finite set of individuals 
that stays invariant through all structure extensions. 
Nonetheless, Carnap and Bachmann did not take the sequences of individual variables as 
indicating the respective universes of discourse of two models. This is so for several reasons: 
first, the use of ‘u, v, …, w’ and ‘x, y, …, z’ for presenting the models’ universes would limit 
the formal treatment to models with a finite domain. This is due to the fact that the sequences 
are restricted to a finite number of “basic signs”, i.e. variables of a specified level. Carnap & 
Bachmann explicitly mention this condition of the finiteness in 1936: “M” is an abbreviation 
for a finite sequence of variables.” (ibid, 70, my emphasis)  
                                                 
 
176
 A similar but simplified version of the notion of a “submodel” (“Teilmodell”) (note the explicit use of the 
term here!) can be found in his notes in Carnap’s Nachlass. Here, Carnap states that for two models P: R, S, T 
and P’: R’, S’, T’ the submodel relation P ⊂ P’ expresses R ⊂ R’, S ⊂ S’, T ⊂ T’ (see RC-081-01-19/119, 
notation slightly changed). 
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Moreover, given this syntactic restriction, the attempt to understand the series of individual 
variables as a convention to indicate a model’s domain becomes especially implausible with 
regard to Carnap’s examples of actual model extensions in mathematics, including extensions 
of models with infinite domains (see the following Section). It would in fact be inconsistent 
with Carnap’s presentation of models with infinite powers since here the fields of the relations 
are simply not presentable by a finite series of variables.   
If ‘u, v, …, w’ and ‘x, y, …, z’ are not used as syntactic indicatory of domains, what are their 
respective roles in the presentation of a model’s structure? I think the most plausible reading 
is to understand them simply as placeholders for the “primitive individuals” 
(“Grundindividuen”) of an axiomatic theory. There is textual support for this view in 
Untersuchungen and Carnap and Bachmann (1936) in the discussion of mathematical axiom 
systems, most notably that of Peano arithmetic, where Carnap mentions the basic individuals 
of the theory in the sense above:   
 
The axiom system of elementary arithmetic in the Peano form with “0”, “successor” and “natural 
number” as basic concepts can be represented as a predicate taking as arguments one individual 
variable, one two-place, and one one-place predicate variable of the first level.” (ibid, 169)    
 
We have seen that in Carnap’s conception of axiomatics, unlike in the modern schematic 
account, Peano arithmetic is symbolized as a propositional function f(x, S(x, y), N(x)) in pure 
STT where x stands for the primitive constant zero, S(x, y) for successor and N(x) for the class 
of natural numbers. A model of f of the form 〈0, S1, N1〉 then assigns a binary relation to S, a 
class to N and an individual constant to x. In my mind, it is in this respect that ‘u, v, …, w’ - if 
satisfied by a model - expresses a finite number of individuals that are assigned to the 
individual variables of the AS in question.  
Note that the example discussed in this passage is somewhat atypical in Carnap’s formal 
reconstruction of axiom systems and its models. In the majority of cases, Carnap does not 
explicitly refer to the level of individual expressions related to a model. Commonly, models 
are presented as sequences of relations of this form (R1, S1, T1, …), i.e. without any mention 
of individual constants. A reason for this convention can be found in a section for Part 2 of 
Untersuchungen titled “Reduction of the primitive concepts” (“Reduktion der 
Grundbegriffe”) (RC 081-01-12). Here, Carnap argues that the primitive individual terms can 
usually be ‘eliminated’ as ‘primitive terms’ from the AS if a “structural description” can be 
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given for them in terms of the other primitive relations of the AS.177,178 What is important 
here is that this idea of the structural eliminability of primitive individuals explains why 
individual variables are in most cases simply not mentioned in a model’s structure. Moreover, 
if the series of individual variables in the above passage are understood as (potentially 
eliminable) primitive individuals of the AS, they of course have no restricting effect on the 
domains of the models satisfying the AS. In this case, the series of identity relations between 
the individual variables of the two structures ’u = x . v = y. …. w = z’ simply hold that for any 
two models M1 and N1 of an AS there has to be a direct mapping between the respective 
assignments to the (finite set of) primitive individuals of the AS. Thus, it essentially expresses 
condition (iv) in the modern definition of submodels.  
 
Given this, it remains to see how the inclusion relations ‘F ⊂ J. G ⊂ K. … . H ⊂ L’ are 
understood in the context of models. Recall that, Carnap’s use of the inclusion sign was 
already exemplified in the point set example discussed above: Here, F was a partial relation of 
J, G a partial relation of K etc. This relation between the constituents of two models is further 
specified in Carnap’s manuscript in the Nachlass. In a document for the second part of 
Untersuchungen, the connection between a “proper submodel” (“echtes Teilmodell”) Tm(P, 
P’) and a “proper partial relation” (“echte Teilrelation”) Tr(P, P’) is made explicit (RC 081-
01-07). Carnap states here that given two models with model variables P = (R, S, T) and P’= 
(R’, S’, T’):  “Tm (P,P’) means: ((Tr(R,R’) ∨ R = R’) & (S…) & (T…) & (Tr(R,R’) ∨ Tr(S,S’) 
∨ Tr(T,T’))” (RC 081-01-07, notation slightly changed.)  In addition, he states that “TmR 
(bzw. TmR,S bzw. TmR,S,T) means: Tm, given that a proper partial relation holds for R (or for 
R, S or for R, S, T respectively), for the rest proper or improper relations.“ (ibid, notation 
slightly changed.) This makes evident that a submodel was conceived here as a set of (proper 
or improper) partial relations. More specifically a proper submodel is understood as the 
sequence of disjunctions of partial relations (of the relations constituting the original model).      
Now, Carnap does not get more precise on his understanding of the notion of a partial relation 
here (nor in Carnap and Bachmann (1936)). Nonetheless, one can get a clear grip on his use 
of the notion by taking his related work into account. For example, in Carnap (2000), the 
following definition of a partial relation Trl(P, Q)  is given (ibid, 67): 
                                                 
 
177
 Carnap, in the first first of Untersuchungen also mentions this possibility and refers to Principia Mathematica 
§122 for the presentation of such an elimination in the case of Peano arithmetic (see Carnap 2000, 88-89). 
178
 Carnap’s discussion of such descriptions of primitive terms would take us too far afield here. On this topic, 
compare also Carnap’s notes on the notion of “Homotopie“ in (RC 081-01-20 and -21). 
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                                   Trl(P, Q) =Df  (u, v, …z)[P(u, v, …z) → Q(u, v, …z)] 
 
In Abriss, written around the same time, a more detailed, ramified presentation is given that 
grosso modo corresponds to the modern version and explicitly refers to the “restriction of the 
field” of relation:  
 
The partial relation of R which results from the restriction of the domain of R to the class α, is 
expressed by α↑R (read as “R pre-restricted to α“); accordingly the restriction of the range: R↓β (“R 
post-restricted to β“); in case of both restrictions: α↑R↓β, in case of the restriction of the field: R↑↓γ 
(“R restricted to γ“). (Carnap 1927, 37, notation slightly changed)179  
 
The crucial point to note here is that since models are conceived as sequences of n-ary 
relations by Carnap, all three kinds of restriction also apply to his conception of submodels. 
Most importantly, keeping in mind the ‘domain-as-fields’ convention only the third kind of 
restriction of a relation’s field “to a class γ“ necessarily involves a restriction to a subset of 
individuals of the original universe of a model. One can thus plausibly understand a submodel 
N1 of model M1 as a set of relations restricted to a subset of the field of the relations of M1. 
Thus, in order to reconcile Carnap’s definition of submodels with the modern definition one 
simply has to reformulate the conditions mentioned above: recall again that the models M1 
and M2 - unlike U and W – share the same range of individuals of the given background 
language. Nevertheless – assuming the domains-as-field convention – an equivalent to 
condition (i) (and thus (ii) and (iii)) is met by the restriction of the field (more precisely, the 
restriction of the union of the fields) of M1 to that of M2. Thus, (i) is met in Carnap’s 
conception by understanding the restrictions implied in (ii) (and (iii) to simultaneously result 
in a restriction of the domain of M1 to the domain of M2. 
 
If submodels (or more specifically partial structures representing different admissible models) 
are understood in this way, Carnap’s resulting theory of extremal conditions becomes 
consistent with the standard account. Nevertheless, this should not lead one to overlook the 
                                                 
 
179
 “Die Teilrelation von R, die durch Beschränkung des Vorbereiches von R auf die Klasse α entsteht, wird 
bezeichnet mit α↑R (gelesen “R vorbeschränkt auf α“); entsprechend bei Beschränkung des Nachbereiches: R↑β 
(“R nachbeschränkt auf β“); im Falle beider Beschränkungen: α↑R↓β, bei Beschränkung des Feldes: R↑↓γ (“R 
beschränkt auf γ“).“ (Carnap 1927, 37, notation slightly changed)  
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fact that there remains a central difference to the modern account of extensions. Not all types 
of extensions conceived by Carnap involve an effective extension (or restriction) of the 
individual domain in the sense of (i). The finite point set example mentioned in §2.2 is a case 
in point. As we have seen, the extensions described here simply do not imply the addition of 
new elements to the field of (interpretations) of the primitive variable R, but include only 
extensions over an invariant field. The point to stress here is that all structure extensions in 
this example present instances of “pre-“ and “post-restriction”, i.e. versions of M ⊂ N 
expressing a restriction of the domain or the range of N. Notably, these kind of restrictions are 
perfectly compatible with an invariant fixed field shared by both relations M and N. Thus, the 
interpreted structures Ra, Rb, and Rd are partial relations of Rc, Re, Rg, and Rf that result from a 
restriction of the respective domain or range but not of the respective field. For instance, in  
Ra ⊂ Re, Ra results from restricting the range of Re, viz. {1, 3, 4} to the smaller class {1, 4}, 
provided that the fields of Ra and Re stay invariant. Quite plausibly, Hintikka’s misconception 
of Carnap and Bachmann’s theory of model extensions is based specifically on this toy 
example. It is important, however, to see that the invariance of the models’ domains presents 
a contingent rather than an essential feature of his theory. In particular, we have to see that the 
example of point set models with different structures does not – contrary to Hintikka’s 
assumption – have any strong implications for his their general theory of model extensions. 
Carnap and Bachmann emphasize the fact that the example deals with “finite, therefore 
undividable, structures.” (ibid, 78) In contrast, the examples of model extensions from real 
mathematics discussed in the paper all have “infinite structures” where the extension of a 
model necessarily involves the extension of set of individuals, i.e. the field of a relation.180 
This is to say that, from a mathematical point of view, Carnap and Bachmann’s example of 
point set models is clearly misleading, since all extensions of mathematical models with 
infinite powers discussed in the remainder of the paper clearly and necessarily presuppose the 
extensibility of the respective domains of individuals. To see this, a closer look at the 
mathematical examples they give will be instructive.  
 
                                                 
 
180
 This move from the toy example to instances of model extension in mathematics corresponds to what Carnap 
terms in Untersuchungen the distinction between “finite” and “infinite” axiom systems, i.e. axiom systems with 
models of “infinite structures (structures of models with an infinite number of immediate and mediate elements)” 
(see Carnap 2000, 149-150) 
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2.5.1 Examples of mathematical model extensions  
My point in the above section was this: if one grants that Carnap understood models in 1936 
and before as sequences of relations and their domains as the respective union of fields, then 
his theory of extremal axioms shows to be perfectly consistent with the informal versions of 
completeness and minimal axioms of Hilbert, Fraenkel and others. This point can be 
strengthened by looking at examples of genuinely mathematical model extensions discussed 
by Carnap and Bachmann. In fact, the examples from mathematical axiomatics in Carnap & 
Bachmann 1936 show their clear conviction to capture mathematically relevant instances of 
model extensions (and thus also those instances including the extension of individual domain 
of a given model).  
The most extensively discussed example in 1936 is an axiomatization of “elementary 
arithmetic” presented at the end of §4.181 The axiom system defines a primitive binary relation 
R based on Russell’s concept of progressions.182 It consists three first-order axioms 
expressing the “endlessness” (b1), injectivity (b2), and the existence of a unique base element 
(b3) as well as one second-order “minimal structure axiom” (b4) (ibid, 79).183 What is 
insightful for our concern here about example is their discussion of model classes for the two 
“base systems” (“Rumpf-Axiomensysteme”) b1-b2(R) and b1-b3(R) and of the effects of 
adding a minimal axiom to those. In particular, it is shown that b1-b3 is satisfied by models 
with different model structures. The AS describes a dividable structure Prog (for 
‘progression’) as well as an infinite number of non-dividable structures, i.e. “zero to infinitely 
many cycles with from one to infinitely many elements” (ibid, 79).184 Thus, models of b1-
b3(R) can be instances of a progression or of more complex structures (i.e. progressions plus 
cycles of up to infinite elements, progressions of progressions etc.).185 Nevertheless, all 
relations b1-b3(R) (without the minimal condition b4) have fields of equal power as the set of 
                                                 
 
181
 The same axiom system is also discussed in (RC 081-01-10) in Carnap’s Nachlass. 
182
 Progressions are defined in Principia Mathematica as a specific type of series, i.e. as a class of all inductive 
cardinals whose “generating relation” satisfies the following conditions: (i) being 1-1; (ii) having a first term not 
included in ranR; (iii) being denumerably infinite; (iv) being closed under its “generating relation” R  
(Whitehead and Russell (1962, 245). The intention behind this last closure condition is to exclude those 1-1 
relations that result in independent chains of elements, i.e. infinite series with a serial number other than ω (see 
ibid, 245-248).  
183
 In formal terms: (b1) (x)(y) [ R(x,y) ⊃ (∃z(R(y,z))]; (b2) (x)(y)(z) [(R(x,y). R(x,z) ⊃ x = y). (R(x,y). R(z,y) ⊃  
x = z)]; (b3) (domR – ranR) ε 1; (b4) MinS(b1-b3; R) (see ibid, 79, notation slightly changed). 
184
 The concept of “cycle” (“Zykel”) is defined here as follows: “By a cycle with n elements we understand a 
one-one relation whose field consists of a single closed R-family with n elements. (…) In the limiting case n = ∞ 
there arise a one-one relation, with no first of last element, which consists of single open R-family.” (Carnap 
1929, 178) 
185
 Compare also Russell (1993). 
  108
natural numbers. This changes if one considers the possible model class of b1-b2(R). As 
Carnap and Bachmann point out, the base system consisting of b1-b2(R) allows different 
structures and thus models consisting of finite circular relations, i.e. single cycles of one to 
finitely many elements as well as of models of mixed infinite structures (ibid, 80). Thus, 
whereas all models satisfying b1-b3(R) have denumerable infinite domains, b1-b2(R) also 
allows instances of R whose fields are subsets of the set of natural numbers.186  
This point is further elucidated in Bachmann (1934). In discussing an similar theory of basic 
arithmetic, Bachmann points out that there are different “partial relations” of a progression R 
that come in one of three possible forms: (a) a finite segment (“Abschnitt”) of a progression, 
(b) several (up to infinitely many) finite segments of R or (c) an infinite segment of R. (see 
Bachmann 1934, 49-50). Relations of the first type have finite fields and are therefore non-
isomorphic to R. This illustrates that b1-b2(R) allows interpretations of R with different 
cardinalities. What is important to see is that here is that any extension of a model R1 of type 
(a) to a model R2 of type (c) necessarily involves the extension of the field of R1 to a 
denumerable infinite domain.  
Note also that if the base system b1-b3(R) is closed by a minimal structure axiom (b4) of the 
form ∼(∃N)(N ⊂ M. IsmV(M,N). F(N)) and its model class is therefore restricted to 
interpretations of infinite dividable structure, model extensions and restrictions have to be 
understood in the standard sense (see Carnap and Bachmann 1981, 80). The remaining class 
of admissible models consists of an infinite number of interpretations of R that are 
progressions and as such equal in power to the natural numbers.187  
 
One could make the following objection at this point: The cases of structure and model 
extensions discussed by Carnap and Bachmann for different base systems of elementary 
arithmetic show that they conceived of model extensions in the case of subsystems of 
arithmetic. However, (for whatever reason) this need not be so for stronger cases of 
mathematical model extensions, in particular extensions to systems with a non-denumerable 
universe. But again, there is textual evidence in Carnap and Bachmann (1936) that model 
extensions of these kinds are also understood in the sense outlined above, i.e. as extensions of 
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 In Carnap and Bachmann’s own words: “The axioms “b1-b2(R)” are satisfied not only by the models of “b1-
b3(R)” but also by single cycles and combinations of finitely many or infinitely many cycles.” (ibid, 80)  
187
 Nevertheless, universe of the progressions can be different as long as they can be isomorphically embedded 
into each other. For instance, the domain of M1 = 〈D1, R1〉 might be the set of natural numbers starting from 
number 100, the domain of M2 = 〈D2, R2〉 the whole set of the natural numbers. In this case, an M1 is a submodel 
of M2 in the proper sense since D1 ⊆ D2. 
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the field of the interpreted primitive terms of an axiomatic theory. One locus classicus for the 
reflection about models of different higher cardinalities is Hilbert’s axiomatization in 
Euclidian geometry in Grundlagen der Geometrie (Hilbert 1910). As is well known, §9 of the 
book contains Hilbert’s classic “model-theoretic” consistency proof for his axiom system. 
Consistency is in fact proved for two axiom systems. The first is the base system consisting of 
all axioms of the first four axioms groups plus the Archimedean axiom. The proof is based 
here on an interpretation of the primitive geometrical terms “point,” “line,” “between,” etc.  in 
a model with a countable infinite “domain” (“Bereich”) Ω ranging over a certain field of 
algebraic numbers (see ibid, §2).188 Consistency of the full axiomatization, including the 
axiom of completeness, is then proved in a second step via the interpretation of the primitives 
in an extended model with the domain Ω’ ranging over all real numbers (see ibid, 26).  
Carnap, in Untersuchungen, clearly had in mind this use of models when referring to Hilbert 
method repeatedly throughout the manuscript. In fact, at one place he explicitly discusses 
Hilbert’s consistency proofs by the “presentation of a model” (“Aufweisung eines Modells”), 
in particular his “arithmetic model” for Euclidian geometry:  
 
Every model of the axiom system can be mapped to the well-known model in which points are 
considered as triples of real numbers and the remaining primitive terms are interpreted accordingly. 
(Carnap 2000, 141)189 
 
Hence, the arithmetic model referred to here is Hilbert’s second one, ranging over closed 
ordered field of real numbers. Unfortunately, there is no explicit discussion, neither in Carnap 
(2000) nor in Carnap and Bachmann (1936) of the different models (or model classes) for the 
base systems of Hilbert’s axiomatization as in the case of elementary arithmetic. Nonetheless, 
there is direct support that the kind of model extensions from Ω to Ω’, i.e. from a model with 
a denumerable infinite to a model with a non-denumerable domain were supposed to be 
presentable in their formal framework. In Bachmann (1936), a side paper to Carnap and 
Bachmann (1936), Hilbert’s case is taken up again.  Theorem 1 in the paper states that an 
extremal axiom Ext(A1-An; M) is dependent on the base A1-An(M) if and only if there exists 
                                                 
 
188
 A comparable algebraic model is used in Hilbert’s “model construction”  (“Modellaufweis”) for the 
independence proof of the Archimedean axiom in §12 Here, however, the domain Ω(t) ranges over a 
denumerable set of algebraic functions (ibid, 29-33). Compare Awodey and Reck (2002, 13) for further details. 
189
 “Jedes Modell dieses Axiomensystems lässt sich eineindeutig abbilden auf das bekannte Modell, bei dem die 
Tripel reeller Zahlen als Punkte genommen, und die übrigen Grundbegriffe entsprechend interpretiert werden.“ 
(Carnap 2000, 141) 
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an extension of the model M that satisfies the base system. In formal terms, the extremal 
axiom is independent if the formula (3*) 
                                  ∼ (∃M)(∃N) A1-An(M). A1-An(N). Erw(N; M) 
is true (Bachmann 1936, 45). Bachmann’s example for this is illustrative for our concern: he 
states that Hilbert’s axiom of completeness is independent of its base axioms in this respect 
“since the algebraic model (Grundlagen §9) and the Cartesian analytic geometry are two 
models M1 and M2 for which the axioms I-VI and Erw(N1; M1) hold; therefore the negation of 
(3*) holds.” (ibid, 45)190 Given the fact that Bachmann (1936) is identical to Carnap and 
Bachmann’s joint paper from the same year with respect to terminology and background 
definitions, I take this as conclusive evidence that Carnap too, in his theory of extremal 
axioms, conceived model extensions fully in line with the then standard informal 
mathematical practice. Given this, little support remains for Hintikka’s claim (1) concerning 
the descriptive inadequacy of Carnap’s theory in view of the mathematical versions of 
extremal axioms.  
 
2.5.2 Extensions and language “transition” 
A further argument and more systematic that Carnap conceived model extensions close to the 
modern sense can be based on Carnap and Bachmann’s perceptive remarks on a possible 
limitation of their approach in the final §6 of the 1936 paper. These concern the strong 
dependency of a theory’s models on the intended interpretation of the background language. 
In particular, we saw that in Carnap’s conception, all possible domains have to be subsets of 
the range of individuals of the language in use. In the example discussed in Section 2.4.1, the 
domains of the models for f(R) are subsets of the substitution class of numerals DLII.  DLII thus 
presents an upper limit to possible extensions of a given model of f(R) that is expressed in LII. 
More generally, given Carnap’s account, the freedom to construct and extend models for an 
axiomatic theory formalized in a given language is restricted to its intended interpretation. 
When considering cases of mathematical model extensions as in Section 2.5.1, the question 
naturally arises how his reconstruction is supposed to capture extensions to models of higher 
infinite cardinalities in the case of analysis or geometry in the case the theories are expressed 
                                                 
 
190
 “(…) denn das algebraische Modell (Grundl §9) und die Cartesische analytische Geometrie sind zwei 
Modelle M1 und N1 für die die Axiome I-VI und Erw(N1; M1) gültig ist; also gilt das Negat von (3*).” (ibid, 45) 
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in a background language like LII with a denumerable range of individuals. This, in 
particular, if this language’s interpretation is supposed to remain fixed.   
Interestingly, §6 of Carnap and Bachmann (1936) clearly shows that the authors were fully 
aware of this possible weakness of their theory when compared to “informal extensions” in 
mathematics. This is again left unnoticed in Hintikka (1991). In fact, they acknowledge the 
language dependency as a “serious objection” against their account arguing that one can in 
principle devise cases where a (relatively) weak interpreted language effectively imposes 
constraints on model building (ibid, 83).191 The mathematical example mentioned to illustrate 
this is insightful:  
 
For example, if we regard the Hilbertian axiom system for Euclidian geometry as a propositional 
function of first level in a language with a denumerably infinite domain of individuals, there can be 
models which have only higher level extensions. (ibid, 83) 
 
Thus, working in a language like LII, Hilbert’s models with domain Ω (and Ω(t)) can be 
constructed. They cannot, however, be extended to Hilbert’s model with domain Ω’ ranging 
over full Cartesian space. It is important to stress here that these remarks alone underline that 
when Carnap speaks of model extensions he actually means extensions of individuals and not 
extensions of relations on a fixed set of individuals. This point can be further strengthened by 
looking at the different proposals outlined in §6 to block the potential limitation of their 
formal reconstruction. The first, most simple solution is simply to stipulate that the language 
in use is to be sufficiently rich in order not to limit model building for a given theory (ibid, 
83).192  
The second option outlined in §6 to vindicate the theory of extremal axioms was already 
discussed in Section 2.4.3 of the present chapter. It consists in introducing a flexible theory of 
                                                 
 
191
 Bear in mind that what is meant in this context by the relative weakness (or richness) of a language is its type-
levels or its syntactical resources, but the range of individuals, the cardinality of its intended interpretation. 
Compare Carnap and Bachmann on this point: “It is to be sure quite possible to do without the greater richness 
afforded by admitting extensions of higher levels if the background language is rich enough, especially with 
respect to its domain of individuals.  When, however, the language exhibits a certain poorness it is quite possible 
that extensions of higher level exist but none of the same level. (ibid, 83, my emphasis) 
192
 An explicit formulation of this option can be found in Bachmann (1936): “We presuppose that the domain of 
individuals of [a background language] Σ is rich enough in order to secure that the impossibility of extensions of 
models stipulated in the extremal axioms for the considered axiom systems is not a consequence of the poverty 
of the language. (Bachmann 1936, 39) Note that this condition seems to be implicitly assumed in Carnap’s 
theory of extremal axioms in Untersuchungen. There, in 1928, the theory was based on a universal background 
language. With the turn to the framework of Logical Syntax outlined in Section 2.4.1, such a condition on the 
language’s interpretation had to be explicitly stipulated via an additional premise. 
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types in use in order to be able to model “informal extensions” in mathematics that involve 
(informal) type ascents (see Carnap and Bachmann (1936, 84-85).  
The third attempt to block possible limitations of a language deserves closer attention here. 
Carnap and Bachmann suggest that the above mentioned restriction to model building can be 
circumvented by allowing model extensions that effectively transcend the limits of the given 
language in which the theory is formalized. Thus, the idea is to allow extensions of the kind 
mentioned above via the “transition” to a semantically richer background language (ibid, 84). 
In the case of Hilbert’s axiomatization of geometry, the extension from a model ranging over 
Ω to one ranging over Ω’ can thus be expressed by a change to a language with a non-
denumerable range of individuals. Clearly, the crucial challenge of this approach is to express 
this language transition for a given theory in the conceptual framework of Logical Syntax. 
More specifically, it is to modify Carnap and Bachmann’s heterodox definition of truth in a 
model via analyticity in a given language (presented in Section 4.1) in order to allow for these 
changes of the background language. Concerning this point, the authors present an insightful, 
slightly altered condition of analyticity: 
 
(…) in the case where the object language is weak, we amend the definition of “analytic in S1“ in such 
a way that a sentence of the form “(M)F1(M)“ is called analytic only when it remains analytic under 
transition to a language S2 with a larger domain of individuals. In this way the earlier discussion will 
remain valid. (ibid, 84) 
 
Let us name the revised scheme expressed here analyticity*. It can be rephrased in this way:  
 
(analytic*)   A sentence ϕ is analytic* iff ϕ, if analytic in S1, is also analytic in S2, where S2 is 
semantically richer than S1. 
 
Given this amended version, one can reformulate Carnap’s original version of truth in a 
model by saying that M1 is a model of F if F(M1) is analytic* in the sense specified here.  
Several points are worth to be mentioned here. First, note a number of subtle but significant 
differences to the original version. For starters, talk of the substitution class of individual 
constants is replaced by talk of the “domain of individuals” of a language. Thus, one can 
witness a tacit shift here in Carnap’s thought from a substitutional treatment of individuals (in 
terms of numerals) to an extensional understanding of individuals. Moreover, note that unlike 
before the new analyticity*-scheme explicitly involves quantification over models. The model 
variable M is not treated as free, but as a bound variable here, holding for all models of F1. 
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Given these variations, it is important to see what is actually implied in this definition and 
whether or not it presents a valid option to allow Carnap’s version of model extensions. 
Carnap and Bachmann’s intuitive motivation underlying the corrected definition of truth in a 
model was this: For a given theory F1, there exists an extension M2 of a model M1 that 
satisfies F1 but (unlike M1) cannot be captured by S1, since the domain of M2 is more 
comprehensive than the range of individuals of S1. Thus, S1 is too restricted to express M2. 
Nevertheless, M2 is clearly considered an admissible model of F1 in so far as it is an instance 
of the model variable M in (M)F1(M). The central point to see here is that the class of models 
of the theory expressed in (M)F1(M) is understood somewhat independently of a given 
language. It is the range of (M) that transcends the actual bounds of the original language S1. 
The notion of a “transition” to a richer language is introduced then in order to provide a 
formal valid account of how this quantification over all models can include all mathematically 
relevant cases of models (and model extensions), irrespective of the specific background 
language. How is the modified account of analyticity* conceptually connected to the 
analyticity conditions for a fixed language outlined in Section 4.1 above?193 Note that, in our 
example, the condition not only requires that M2 is a model of F1 if F1(M2) is analytic in S2. It 
expresses a stronger condition, namely that M2 can be expressed as a model extension of M1 
despite the transition to S2. Thus, the central difficulty in the amended definition is to redefine 
the analyticity condition for the expression ‘(M)F1(M)’ given the transition from S1 to a 
semantically richer language S2, where fld(M2) ⊆ DS2. How can this additional condition for 
analyticity properly be understood? In order to see what the requirement stipulated here 
amounts to, we need to spell out in closer detail what effect lies behind this new condition 
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 Given the lack of further specification, one could be inclined to view the condition for analyticity* in Carnap 
and Bachmann (1936) as conceptually related to Carnap’s technical notions of a “sub-language” and 
“translation” in Logical Syntax (Carnap 2002, §50 and §61 respectively). Briefly, a sub-language S1 of S2 defined 
as language for which following conditions hold: (i) every sentence of S1 is a sentence of S2 and (ii) every 
sentence analytic in S1 is also analytic in S2. S1 is also a “conservative sub-language“ of S2 if , in addition to (i) 
and (ii), also the following condition holds: (iii) if a sentence ϕ is analytic in S2 then, if contained in S1, is also 
analytic in S1 (See Carnap 2002, 179). Put informally, (ii) secures the conditional from analyticity in S1 to 
analyticity in S2. The third condition secures the semantic conservativeness of the language extension to the 
effect that S2 is conservative over S1 with respect to the class of analytical sentences. Accordingly, Carnap 
defines a “transformance” in §61 of Logical Syntax as a syntactic correlation f (of “expression classes”) between 
two “isomorphic” language S1 and S2. A syntactic correlation f is then a “translation” of S1 into S3 if S3 contains 
S2 as a sub-language (See Carnap 2002, 223-224). Note, however, that a comparison of “translation” and 
“transition” would overlook the different nature of language extension involved in the two cases. In contrast to 
Carnap’s sub-languages in Logical Syntax, language transitions as outlined above concern primarily the 
extension of the respective base of individuals. Extensions understood here not as new type level of predicates, 
but, as Carnap and Bachmann put it quite explicitly, as “a larger domain of individuals”. In the context of 
Logical Syntax a translation holds for languages with an identical interpretation of the individual variables. In the 
1936 case of a transition from S1 and S2 to crucial difference between the two languages is of course that S2 is 
essentially richer in terms of its domain of individuals. 
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expressed here that ““(M)F1(M)” is called analytic only when it remains analytic under 
transition to a language S2“. Carnap’s refined analyticity condition suggests this for the 
context of his model theory: Consider first the analyticity of (M)F1(M) in S1. The closed 
formula is analytic if for every instances of the model variables M, viz. for every model M1, 
M2, …, Mn expressible in S1, F1(Mn) is analytic in S1. With the transition to S2, the class of 
expressible models can be enlarged to Mn+1, …, Mm. In this case, (M)F1(M) is analytic in S2 if 
for any model expressible in S2, F1(Mm) is analytic in S2. Now, it is clear that the range of the 
relation variable M changes with the move from S1 to S2. Thus, the set of possible relations 
constructible from the respective range of individuals, i.e. the range of the metatheoretic 
sentence “for all relations of the individuals” is more comprehensive for S2 than for S1.  The 
higher-order quantifier ranging over models is enlarged here to a richer class of models. Note, 
however, that this transition to S1 does not alter the truth conditions for the theory in the 
models expressed in S1. Given our above specification of Carnap’s notion of a model, it is 
clear that this extended range of quantification has not restricting effect on the truth 
conditions for the class of models expressible in S1. Truth in model remains stable for each 
element of this class since the (extended) range of individuals of the language is effectively 
restricted to the field of the respective individual model. It is in this sense that the additional 
conditions in analyticity* simply holds that for any given model Mn, if F1(Mn) is analytic in S1 
then it is also analytic in S2.  
 
Given this, how does this account of treating model extensions via language transitions relate 
to our initial interpretive question concerning the domain variability in Carnap’s conception 
of models? On first sight, the definition of analyticity* could be read as evidence in support of 
Hintikka’s claim of a FDC for the models of a theory (and model extensions thereof) after all. 
An argument in this direction could go along these lines: Assuming (as Carnap allegedly did) 
a FDC concerning models, the only way to allow proper extensions of a model in the sense of 
extensions of the individual domain (and not simply as extensions of the existing relations on 
a fixed set of individuals) is to actually change the formal background language in which the 
theory is defined. Thus, assuming FDC for models, a change of individual is only possible by 
changing the underlying language.       
However, this argument would severely conflict with Hintikka’s original interpretation of 
Carnap’s account. For Hintikka makes the following stronger claim concerning the latter’s 
conception of extension: Carnap not only was unable to formalize mathematical standard 
model extensions in a proper way due to his FDC of the underlying language. He in fact 
  115 
conceived the very notion of model extensions in a nonstandard (and mathematically 
irrelevant) way. In this picture, there is simply no place for extensions of the individual 
domain in Carnap’s account, since extensions are expressed in terms of relations (or 
structures) and not in terms of individuals (see again Hintikka 1991, 332). In his interpretation 
of Carnap’s theory model extension is the extension of the relations (better relations’ 
structures) over an invariant domain.  
Hintikka does not provide any significant textual support for his view. In particular, he does 
not mention the concluding section of Carnap and Bachmann (1936). This is not altogether 
surprising since the very nature of the remarks made here on how model extensions can 
transcend the limits of a given language simply makes no sense in his notion of what counts 
as an extension for Carnap. If one were to follow Hintikka’s picture of Carnap’s account, the 
move to model extensions via language transitions would not be conceivable. In contrast, it 
makes perfect sense if one sides with the interpretation of Carnap’s conception of models 
outlined in the present chapter. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Summing up, the principal aim in this chapter was to provide a detailed survey of Carnap’s 
early conception of models in his work on axiomatics. Based on several documents from 
Carnap’s Nachlass, I proposed and defended a new interpretation of Carnap’s reconstruction 
of extremal axioms and his early contributions to formal semantics. Given the archival 
evidence as well as the systematic arguments for the heterodox ‘domains-as-fields’ version of 
models and the convention of model variation via type ascent, I showed that Hintikka’s 
interpretive claims concerning the FDC in Carnap’s early use of model cannot be upheld. I 
argued further that once a more balanced account of Carnap’s conception of model extensions 
(and restrictions thereof) is provided, also Hintikka’s second claim that Carnap, in his theory 
of extremal axioms, misconceived mathematic practice turns out to be untenable.  
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Chapter 3: Carnap’s extremal axioms and his mathematical influences  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 Recent scholarship on Carnap’s early theory of axiomatics (Carnap (2000)) has focused on 
his distinction between three metatheoretic notions of completeness: categoricity 
(“Monomorphie”), semantic completeness (“Nicht-Gabelbarkeit”), and syntactic 
completeness (“Entscheidungsdefinitheit”). In particular, Carnap’s somewhat misguided 
views on the equivalence of these notions prior to Gödel’s and Tarski’s metatheoretic results 
in the 1930s have been discussed extensively.194 So far, less attention has been drawn, 
however, to a forth kind of completeness concerning the interpretations of an axiom system 
that plays a prominent role in Carnap’s axiomatics, namely the “completeness of the models” 
(“Vollständigkeit der Modelle”) (Carnap and Bachman 1981, 82). In Carnap’s view, 
completeness in this sense describes a certain maximal property of the admissible models, i.e. 
the non-extendibility of the models of an axiom system. In modern terms, for an axiomatic 
theory T and the class of models M of T, this maximality assumption can be defined in this 
way:  
 
Model maximality The models in M are complete if they are maximal, i.e. if the universe of each 
member of M cannot be extended without violating the axioms of T.195 
 
As is well known, this kind of maximality property was first expressed in Hilbert’s famous 
axioms of completeness (henceforth AC) for analysis and geometry at the turn of the last 
century (see Section 1). Hilbert’s axioms played a central role in a broader discussion 
(involving mathematicians like Baldus, Baer, Finsler, Bachmann, and Bernays) on the kind of 
maximality conditions they impose on an axiomatic theory.196 Interestingly, the completeness 
of the models has an inverse, i.e. a less extensively discussed minimal property that can be 
paraphrased in this way:  
  
                                                 
 
194
 See Awodey and Carus (2001), Reck (2007), Goldfarb (2005), Bonk and Mosterin (2000). For modern-style 
definitions of the different notions of completeness discussed by Carnap see in particular Awodey and Reck 
(2002). 
195
 See Ehrlich (1997) for an alternative definition of this maximality assumption. 
196
 Compare Awodey and Reck (2002). 
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Model minimality The models in M are minimal if the universe of each model in M cannot be 
restricted without violating the axioms of T. 
 
As Hilbert’s AC was introduced to enforce model maximality, comparable minimal or 
restriction axioms were devised to impose the minimality of the intended models of an 
axiomatic theory. Their history, however, is more intricate than in the above case. As we will 
see in Section 3.3 and Section 3.4.2, the first explicit minimal principles can be found in 
Dedekind’s proto-axiomatic treatment of elementary arithmetic and, in succession, in 
Fraenkel’s axiomatization of set theory.  
Carnap, in his own metatheoretic work on axiomatics in the late 1920s, was among the first to 
notice the analogous character of the two completeness properties. In his resulting theory of 
extremal axioms – first developed in the projected second part of his Untersuchungen zur 
allgemeinen Axiomatik and then, in published form in Carnap and Bachmann (1936) – he set 
out to provide a unified account of the two concepts of model maximality and model 
minimality. Specifically, his theory was devised as a formal explication of the two groups of 
mathematical axioms that share the feature of imposing such “extremal conditions” on the 
possible models of an axiom system.  
 
The aim in this chapter is to provide a detailed and historically sensitive reconstruction of 
Carnap’s theory of extremal axioms and its theoretical evolution between 1928 and 1936. The 
main focus will be set on the unpublished documents of Part Two of Untersuchungen from 
Carnap’s Nachlass (RC 081-01-01 to 081-01-33) where his account is developed in most 
detail. In particular, Carnap’s theory outlined there will be surveyed with an eye to two 
interpretive points not properly considered so far. The first concerns Carnap’s mathematical 
sources, i.e. is the mathematical axioms based on which his formal versions were modeled. 
Here, especially, the case for minimal axioms is not fully clear. Notably, Carnap mentions the 
(second-order) axiom of induction (henceforth AI) in Peano arithmetic as a mathematical 
instance of his version of minimal axioms several times. Given that the induction axiom is 
usually not conceived as an extremal axiom as are Hilbert’s ACs, this might raise general 
doubts about his formal reconstruction. One critical objection would be to say that Carnap’s 
proclaimed unificatory approach is in fact comparing the incomparable. In a second, more 
critical reading, one might claim that Carnap’s formalized version of extremal axioms not 
only misrepresents mathematical axioms like AI that are not minimal in his specific sense, but 
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that he also failed to capture the informal conceptions of limiting conditions on a theory’s 
domain expressed in the relevant mathematical axioms.197 
The second interpretive issue concerns Carnap’s specific understanding of the relationship 
between his “completeness of the models” and the other metatheoretic notions of 
completeness discussed by him, most notably the categoricity of an axiom system. As we will 
see in Section 3.5, Carnap’s general account of the relationship outlined in Part Two of 
Untersuchungen can be embedded in a broader debate between Fraenkel, von Neumann, and 
Baldus in the late 1920s on whether the addition of an extremal axiom results in a categorical 
axiomatization of a theory. Here again the critical question can be raised whether Carnap’s 
formal presentation of extremal axioms presents an adequate setting for deciding on the issue. 
 
My attempt here is to approach these interpretive points with special attention to the historical 
setting of Carnap’s formal reconstruction and, in particular, to the mathematical influences 
that led him to devise a theory of extremal axioms in the first place. The main point I want to 
make is that the prima facie peculiarities of his approach can be resolved once Carnap’s main 
influence for modeling minimal axioms, namely Fraenkel’s axiom of restriction (henceforth 
AR) is studied in closer detail. Fraenkel’s relevance for Carnap’s theory of axiomatics, 
especially his three notions of axiomatic completeness was already mentioned in recent 
literature.198 In this chapter, I aim to show that his influence on Carnap’s conception of 
axiomatics had been more substantial than was assumed so far. It not only concerns Carnap’s 
notions of meta-axiomatic completeness and his formal reconstruction of minimal axioms but 
also Carnap’s overall conception of the semantic notions such as a “model” and a “domain” 
of a model that underlie his theory of axiomatics. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows: I start with a short outline of Carnap’s theory of extremal 
axioms – as presented in Carnap and Bachmann (1936) – and of the mathematical examples 
Carnap and Bachmann mentioned there (Section 3.2). Following this, Fraenkel’s axiom of 
restriction for set theory is presented (Section 3.3). In Section 3.4, I discuss Carnap’s original 
theory of extremal axioms as documented in his Nachlass (Section 3.4.1) and see how it 
relates to Fraenkel’s views (Section 3.4.2). The case of a minimal axiom in arithmetic is 
discussed in Section 3.4.3. Finally, Carnap’s views on the relation between completeness of 
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 See Hintikka (1991) for a related critique. See Chapter 2 for a critical discussion of Hintikka’s interpretation. 
198
 See, e.g., Reck (2007) and Bonk and Mosterin (2000). 
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models and categoricity will be discussed in Section 3.5. After reviewing a limitative result by 
Baldus (Section 3.5.1), Carnap’s more general account of the relationship will be evaluated in 
this light (Section 3.5.2).  
 
3.2 Extremal axioms in 1936 
We have mentioned in the second chapter that the only systematic treatment of Carnap’s 
extremal axioms in published form is Carnap and Bachman (1936). The paper starts with a 
provisional characterization of minimal and maximal axioms by highlighting their respective 
domain-fixing functions: 
 
Axioms of the sort of Hilbert’s axiom of completeness, which ascribe to the objects of an axiomatic 
theory a maximal property in that they assert that there is no more comprehensive system of objects 
that also satisfies a series of axioms, we call a maximal axiom. The same axiomatic role as that of the 
maximal axioms is played in different axiom systems by minimal axioms which ascribe a respective 
minimal property to the elements of the discipline. Maximal and minimal axioms we call collectively 
extremal axioms. (Carnap and Bachmann 1981, 68-69)  
 
Based on this informal account (and given the specification of several auxiliary notions such 
as that of a formal models, a model’s structure, and isomorphism correlation), a formal 
explication of different kinds of extremal axioms is presented in §4 of the paper. The 
distinction between different types of minimal and maximal axioms is based here on a 
ramification of the notion of a model extension.199 In particular, Carnap and Bachmann 
distinguish between “model extensions” and “structure extensions”. In the former case the 
original models are admitted to be isomorphically embeddable in extended model, in the latter 
they are not. Here, the condition that model extensions are non-isomorphic to the original 
model is explicitly “included in the definition of extension” (ibid, 77). The two notions are 
formally presented in this way (see ibid, 77): 200   
                                                    Erwm(N; M) =df M ⊂ N . M ≠ N 
                                                Erws(N; M) =df M ⊂ N . ∼Ismv(M, N) 
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 Compare Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of Carnap’s conception of models and model extensions. 
200
 A second ramification of the notion of extension Carnap and Bachmann do not work out in detail is based on 
the question on whether or not model extensions should allow extensions M of N where M contains a proper  part 
T isomorphic to N (ibid, 177). Compare Ehrlich (1997) for discussion of a similar point. 
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Based on these two types of extensions, Carnap and Bachmann present two versions of 
extremal axioms: “maximal” and “minimal model axioms“ and “maximal” and “minimal 
structure axioms“ (ibid, 77):  
 
                       (1) Maxm (F; M) =df ∼(∃N) (M ⊂ N . M ≠ N . F(N)) 
                       (2) Maxs (F; M) =df ∼(∃N) (M ⊂ N .  ∼ Ismv(M, N) . F(N)) 
                       (3) MinM (F; M) =df ∼(∃N) (N ⊂ M . M ≠ N . F(N)) 
                       (4) MaxS (F; M) =df ∼(∃N) (N ⊂ M .  ∼ Ismv(M, N) . F(N)). 
 
The axiom schemes (1) and (3) are more restrictive than (2) and (4): in the case of minimal 
axioms, (3) excludes any submodel of a given model M of a theory, also, if there are any, 
those isomorphic to M. (4), in contrast, only rules out non-isomorphic submodels of M (see 
ibid, 77). This distinction between structure axioms and model axioms will be relevant for one 
of the mathematical examples of a minimal axiom, namely the induction axiom, Carnap 
discusses in greater detail (see Section 3.4.3). 
Irrespective of this, it is clear that the intended effect of all four axioms was to impose a kind 
of completeness on the axiomatic theory to which they are added. In fact, after having 
presented the formal versions, Carnap and Bachmann made explicit the supposed effect for 
the case of a maximal axiom:  
 
The models of an axiom system that is closed by a maximal axiom possess a certain completeness 
property in that they cannot be extended without violating the original axiom system. (ibid, 82) 
 
This is precisely the “completeness of the models” of an axiom system, here the model 
maximality described in the Introduction.  
 
Turning to Carnap’s mathematical influences, i.e. the actual axioms on which his formal 
reconstruction of extremal axioms is based, his source is obvious in the case of maximal 
axioms. In fact, a version of Hilbert’s axiom of completeness for geometry is cited at the 
outset of the paper and again mentioned in the passage quoted above. In particular, Carnap 
and Bachmann refer explicitly to the original version of the axiom of completeness for 
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geometry in Hilbert’s second to sixth edition of Grundlagen der Geometrie (ibid, 68).201 As is 
well known, the axiom of completeness was conceived there as a means to impose the model 
maximality for the Hilbert’s base axiom system, i.e. his four groups of geometrical axioms 
plus the Archimedean axiom. As Ehrlich points out, the axiom was introduced to “distinguish 
“ordinary analytic geometry” from the remaining models of Archimedean Euclidian 
geometry” and, thus, fix the Cartesian space over the continuous ordered field R, C2(R), as the 
intended, single model of the axiom system (Ehrlich 1997, 57).  
Carnap and Bachmann explicitly held that Hilbert’s two AC (both for geometry and analysis) 
could be explicated in terms of their maximal model axioms, in particular via axiom scheme 
(1).202  
The mathematical influences for Carnap’s minimal axioms are less obvious. As mentioned 
above, Carnap referred to “Peano arithmetic” or “elementary arithmetic” on several occasions 
as one axiomatic theories to illustrate his theory of minimal axioms (see e.g. ibid, 79-80). This 
might seem peculiar to the modern reader since it is - on first sight - difficult to see how the 
central axiom of the modern version of Peano arithmetic, namely AI 
(AI2)                            (∀X)([X(0) ∧ (∀x)(X(x) → X(S(x)))] → (∀y)(X(y))) 
is related to the minimal axioms (3) or (4) presented in Carnap and Bachmann (1936). In fact, 
the closer look at AI and Carnap’s axiom schemes makes evident the conceptual gap between 
the modern presentation of AI in second-order logic and Carnap’s own reconstruction. In the 
induction axiom, the second-order quantifier ranges over arbitrary relations on a specified 
universe of a model in which Peano arithmetic is interpreted. The primitives ‘0’ (for zero) and 
‘S’ (for ‘successor’) are schematic non-logical constants interpreted in the same universe. In 
Carnap’s version, in contrast, the higher-order quantifiers in the minimal axiom schemes are 
not ranging over arbitrary relations on a given model’s domain, but over models as such. We 
saw before that models were conceived by Carnap as higher-level n-ary relations, more 
specifically as n-tuples of relations of a specified type. Moreover, all models were defined in 
a fixed universal interpretation of the formal background language.203 There are thus no direct 
                                                 
 
201
 There, Hilbert states his axiom in this way: “To the system of points, straight lines, and planes, it is 
impossible to adjoin other elements in such a manner that the system thus generalized shall form a new geometry 
obeying all of the five groups of axioms I-V; in other words, the elements of the geometry form a system which 
is not susceptible of [proper] extension, if all of the stated axioms are preserved.” (Hilbert 1900, 25) quoted 
from: Ehrlich (1995), 171) 
202
 Moreover, since the intended model in Hilbert’s axiom system for the Euclidian plane, viz. C2(R), is “non-
dividable”, i.e. it does not have submodels isomorphic to the maximal model, the axioms can also be symbolized 
by a maximal structure axiom (2) (see ibid, 178). 
203
 Compare 2.4.3 for a closer discussion of this issue. 
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equivalents in Carnap’s formalization to the schematic terms in AI above. Instead, the 
primitives of an axiom system are expressed by free or in the case of extremal axioms, by 
bound higher-order variables.204  
Given these conceptual differences, it is difficult to see what led Carnap to consider AI as an 
instance of his minimal axioms.205 Moreover, one might get the impression that in contrast to 
the case of model maximality, the issue of model minimality was not fully clear to Carnap. 
The point I want to make in the following is that this is not the case. In fact, the most fruitful 
way to see what exactly Carnap understood by model minimality will be to take a closer look 
at the second mathematical example he gives for a minimal axiom. This is Fraenkel’s 
meanwhile neglected axiom candidate for set theory, the axiom of restriction 
(“Beschränktheitsaxiom”) (AR). In Carnap and Bachmann (1936) there is only a one-line 
remark on the axiom: “The restriction axiom in Fraenkel’s axiom system for set theory can be 
formulated as a minimal-model axiom.” (ibid, 78) In Carnap (1930), AR is also mentioned as 
a minimal analogue to the axiom of completeness (ibid, 307). 
Now, despite the lack of a more extensive discussion of Fraenkel’s axiom candidate in 
Carnap’s published work, AR exercised a formative influence on Carnap’s understanding of 
minimal axioms and the kind of minimality condition they impose on an axiomatization. As I 
will show in Section 3.4.1, AR was (beside AC) Carnap’s main motivation for providing a 
formal reconstruction of extremal axioms in first place. Moreover, a closer look at Fraenkel’s 
different versions of formulating AR will help to better understand Carnap’s own version of 
minimal conditions expressed in his minimal axioms and how they relate to the case of 
arithmetic (and AI in specific). So, before turning to Carnap’s Nachlass to illustrate this line 
of influence, I will briefly present Fraenkel’s own views on his axiom candidate. 
 
3.3 Fraenkel’s axiom of restriction206 
In the 1920s, Fraenkel proposed two additional axioms for Zermelo’s axiomatic set theory. 
The axiom of replacement has meanwhile become a standard axiom of ZF. The second, AR, 
was devised to express a minimality condition for any set model satisfying the axioms set up 
                                                 
 
204
 For a more detailed account of Carnap’s conception of formal logical languages see Chapter 1. 
205
 In fact, it seems as though Carnap himself was not quite certain of the status of AI. In his only published 
report on Part 1 of Untersuchungen (Carnap (1930)), a small section is also dedicated to his extremal axioms. 
Here, AI is mentioned not as a minimal axiom, but as an example of a maximal structure axiom. See Carnap 
(1930, 307). 
206
 This section follows closely Schiemer (2010). 
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by Zermelo’s original system Z.207 His attempts to devise such a restriction clause on set 
models of Z varied in the course of his work on the topic and eventually led to different, 
partly independent versions of minimal axioms for set theory. In the following I present a 
brief reconstruction of the evolution of Fraenkel’s thought on AR from this period. 
 
3.3.1 Fraenkel’s motivation  
The first mention of AR can be found in (Fraenkel 1922). Here, Fraenkel presents two 
arguments why AR should be added to Zermelo’s theory. He first states that “Zermelo’s 
concept of set is more comprehensive than seems to be necessary for the needs of 
mathematics (…).” (ibid, 223) Fraenkel mentions two kinds of possible sets in the set-
theoretic “domain” (“Grundbereich”) that are consistent with the existing axioms, however 
irrelevant for mathematical purposes. The first are “non-conceptual“ sets, e.g. sets consisting 
of physical elements. The second are so called “non- well-founded” sets, i.e. such with 
infinite membership chains. Given their possibility within Zermelo’s axiomatization, Fraenkel 
remarked that: 
 
Whereas sets of the first as of the second kind are not necessary for set theory considered as a 
mathematical discipline, it in any case follows from the fact that they have a place within Zermelo’s 
axiomatization that the axiom system (..) does not have a “categorical character”, that is to say it does 
not determine the totality of sets completely. (ibid, 234)   
 
In the second edition of his monograph Einleitung in die Mengenlehre (Fraenkel 1924) a more 
structured presentation of his motivation for adding AR is given. Fraenkel argued here that 
the introduction of the additional axiom would lead to a "simplification of the set theoretic 
edifice“ by ruling out non-well-founded numbers. As an independent argument – the property 
of completeness in terms of categoricity is referred to:  
 
Moreover, without such a restriction it is not within reach that our axiom system captures the totality 
of admissible sets completely as is desirable for the construction of every axiomatization. (ibid, 218)  
 
Thus, one can identify here at least two related but different objections against Z: the possible 
existence of extraordinary sets and its non-categoricity. Moreover, it should be stressed that 
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 For a more detailed account of Fraenkel’s axiom candidate see Schiemer (2010). 
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Fraenkel explicitly expressed here the assumption concerning the connection between the 
intended restriction of the domain of sets and the categoricity of the resulting theory (compare 
Schiemer (2010, 312-313)). This point was further highlighted in his lectures from 1925. Here 
he remarked that:  
 
It means more than a mere flaw of our axiom system that the totality of all possible sets is not 
unequivocally fixed but that instead there are always narrower and more comprehensive 
interpretations of the concept of set that remain compatible with our axiom system. (Fraenkel 1927, 
101) 
 
According to Fraenkel’s view in 1924, the non-categoricity of Zermelo’s original axiom 
systems is mainly caused by the possible existence of “extraordinary sets”. As a solution to 
this, Fraenkel proposed his AR which was conceived in analogy to Hilbert’s AC:  
 
(…) As is the case there, the mentioned deficiencies can be remedied by setting up a (…) last axiom, 
the “axiom of restriction” that imposes on the concept of set or more appropriately the domain [of 
sets], the smallest extension compatible with the remaining axioms. (ibid, 234)      
 
Fraenkel’s motivation for adding AR to Z is clear: to rule out non-intended and non-well-
founded sets by restricting either the interpretation of the concept of set or the domain of set. 
This would also make the resulting axiom system categorical (see Schiemer (2010, 315)).  
 
3.3.2 Versions of restriction208  
Fraenkel’s remarks on the intended effect of his axiom candidate do not go beyond the level 
of informal remarks. The most detailed explication can be found in (Fraenkel 1922b). Here he 
formulates two alternative versions of AR for an axiomatization of cardinal numbers that also 
hold for the case of set theory.  
 
(1) AR as an axiom of closure: in the first version, AR is defined as expressing a minimality 
condition on sets: There exist no sets in a model of ZF apart from the ones implied by the 
given axioms. A similar version of this understanding of AR can also be found in Fraenkel 
(1924): “Aside from the sets imposed by the axioms [of Zermelo (1908)] there exist no 
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 This section closely follows Schiemer (2010).  
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further sets.” (Fraenkel 1924, 219)209 The mathematical idea underlying this is that of a 
closure of a given bases system under a specific operation. This implies a view of the 
intended domain (or model) as an algebraic closure that Fraenkel first introduced to axiomatic 
set theory. According to it, the intended set domain (or set model) is the closure of a base (in 
Fraenkel’s case the empty set, in Zermelo’s case a certain Urklasse) under the operations on 
sets defined in the axioms of ZF. AR is then understood as expressing a closure property on 
the set domain, i.e. as a kind of “restriction clause for closures” (Kanamori 2004, 515). 
 
(2) AR as a minimal axiom: Fraenkel’s second reading sketches the intended effect of the 
axiom. According to it, the axiom imposes a minimal model for the axiom system: “If the 
domain (Grundbereich) B contains a smallest submodel (Teilbereich) B0 satisfying the axioms 
(…), then B is identical with such a smallest submodel B0.” (ibid, 163) This effectively rules 
out the existence of proper submodels of B0 that satisfy ZF. In an added footnote, Fraenkel got 
more specific on the method of constructing such a minimal model: 
 
As is usual, a smallest submodel of the indicated character is to be understood as a model that is the 
intersection of all submodels of B with the property in question and that also possesses the property 
itself. (ibid, 163) 
 
This states that the minimal model B of ZF can be constructed by the intersection of all 
possible models that satisfy the theory. Moreover, if such a minimal model exists, then the 
extended theory ZF+AR will result to be categorical (see Schiemer 2010, 316). (I will return 
to the last point in Section 3.5 below.) 
 
3.4 Part 2 of Untersuchungen 
As I mentioned above, the formative influence of Fraenkel’s AR on Carnap’s own theory of 
extremal axioms is not intelligible from Carnap and Bachmann (1936) alone. Neither is it 
traceable in the first part of Untersuchungen (Carnap 2000). Here, Carnap sets his main focus 
on the three metatheoretic notions of completeness (see Introduction) without mentioning the 
“completeness of the models” and his extremal axioms. However, things look different taking 
into consideration Carnap’s unpublished material for the projected second part of his 
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 Compare also the third edition of Einleitung (Fraenkel (1928) for a similar definition. 
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manuscript on axiomatics in the Nachlass (RC 081-01-01 to -33). These documents clearly 
prove that Carnap was working on a general account of extremal axioms already in 1928. 
Moreover, they show that most of the concepts and results listed in the 1936 paper with 
Bachmann can be traced back to this earlier work. Finally and most relevant for our account, 
the importance of Fraenkel’s AR (and the way he conceives its effect on the models of ZF) 
for Carnap’s theory becomes evident from the existing documents of Part 2 of 
Untersuchungen. Generally, one can say that Carnap’s account of extremal axioms in 1928 is 
more ramified than in 1936. In a “preliminary work plan” for Part 2 he mentions different 
types of axioms that yield the completeness property described above. For the first group, the 
“minimal” and “maximal axioms”, Fraenkel’s AR is mentioned as the main example of the 
former (RC 081-01-02). Beside these, Carnap mentions a different but related group of 
axioms dubbed “accessibility axioms“ (“Erreichbarkeitsaxiome”). And here again, AR (next 
to Peano’s AI) is mentioned as a typical mathematical instance.210 The next section will be 
used to present Carnap’s different groups of extremal axioms and to show how the 
distinctions he makes between them closely reflect Fraenkel’s different versions of AR. 
 
3.4.1 Different types of minimal axioms 
Fraenkel’s influence becomes visible in the way Carnap describes the first group of minimal 
axioms in his manuscript. In (RC 081-01-04) he presents a general account of “axioms of 
restriction” (Not surprisingly, their maximal counterparts are dubbed “axioms of 
completeness.”) The following two informal definitions are given:  
 
An axiom of restriction means fixing the minimal extension: the domain of elements is to have the 
smallest possible extension compatible with the other axioms. (RC 081-01-04/1)211 
 
The axiom of restriction can be formulated in this way: „There exists no (proper) part of a system of 
elements (a model or a realization) that satisfies … the axioms. (RC 081-01-04/2)212 
                                                 
 
210
 Carnap’s “preliminary work plan” is the single document of Part 2 of Untersuchungen that is published in 
Carnap (2000). In their commentary, the editors Bonk and Mosterin hold that “Fraenkel’s suggestion [GS: of 
adding AR to ZF] (…) was probably the starting point for Part 2 of Untersuchungen” without, however, 
discussing any details of this line of influence that can be witnessed in Carnap’s documents (Bonk and Mosterin 
(2000, 48) 
211
 “Ein Beschränktheitsaxiom bedeutet Festlegung des Minimalumfangs: das Gegenstandssystem soll den 
kleinsten mit den übrigen Axiomen verträglichen Umfang haben.“ (RC 081-01-04/1) 
212
 “Das Beschränktheitsaxiom kann so formuliert werden: „Es gibt keinen (echten) Teil eines 
Gegenstandssystems (Modells oder einer Realisation), der die Axiomen … erfüllt.“ (RC 081-01-04/2) 
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The formal versions of an axiom of restriction presented here are more or less equivalent to 
(3) in Carnap and Bachmann (1936). In addition, a slightly different formalization is 
suggested. For an axiom system f with only one primitive relation P, the axiom reads:  
                                                  (P): P ⊂ R. fP. ⊃. P = R 
Carnap paraphrased this version in this way: “In words: a) every partial relation of R that 
satisfies the other axioms coincides with R.” And in a footnote he adds: “This formulation is 
only suited as a verbal description of the logistic formulas; otherwise the earlier formulations 
are more easily comprehensible.” (RC 081-01-04/2)213 
Now, Carnap’s informal definitions clearly echo Fraenkel’s characterization of his set-
theoretical AR. In fact, Carnap’s first reading of the axiom as “determining a minimal 
extension” that is consistent with the other axioms is an almost a verbatim adoption of 
Fraenkel’s talk of “the smallest extension compatible with the remaining axioms” quoted 
above (Fraenkel 1927, 234). Moreover, there is also a strong similarity in the way the models 
of an axiomatic theory are conceived in the two cases. Following Carnap’s second definition, 
an axiom of restriction imposes the minimal model as the single admissible model of an 
axiom system. In his third definition, closely following the “logistic formula”, a minimal 
model is conceived as the minimal partial relation of the model relation R. We have already 
indicated above that Carnap’s conception of formal models is clearly heterodox from a 
modern point of view since the models of a theory are conceived as (sequences of) relations. 
Submodels are thereof presented as partial relations of a given (model) relation.214 What is 
important to see here is that this conception of submodels as partial relations is already 
present in Freankel’s own treatment of AR (and of set models more generally). Note for 
example a section in Fraenkel (1928) on the general use of “models” and “pseudosystems” 
(“Pseudosysteme”) of an axiom system for indirect consistency or independence proofs. 
Models are explicitly defined here as „interpretations differing from the usual interpretation of 
the primitive concept” (“vom üblichen abweichenden Deutung gewisser Grundbegriffe”) 
(ibid, 342). The standard method of devising restricted models for consistency or 
independence proof is described in this way:    
 
                                                 
 
213
 “In Worten: a.) jedes (sic!) Teilrelation von R, die die anderen Axiome erfüllt, fällt mit R zusammen. (…) 
Diese Formulierung eignet sich nur zur Wortbeschreibung der logistischen Formeln; sonst sind die früheren 
Formulierungen leichter verständlich.” (ibid.) 
214
 For an extensive study of Carnap’s nonstandard treatment of submodels compare again Chapter 2. 
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In many cases the interpretation in question more or less restricts the extension of a primitive concept 
vis-à-vis its usual interpretation for the whole axiom system so that only a part of the objects originally 
falling under the primitive concept is accepted as existing. (ibid, 342)215     
 
Model variation is thus conceived here as the modification of the standard or intended 
interpretation of the axiomatic primitives of a theory. In the case of set theory, this means 
that, for different independence proofs, the concept of set (or, equivalently the membership 
relation) is reinterpreted in the sense that it is “understood differently, generally in a narrower 
sense than in the “proper” set theory following form our axiomatic (system).” (ibid, 344)  
Applied to Fraenkel’s version of AR for set theory, this effectively means that the intended 
model of ZF+AR is conceived as the minimal “interpretation” of the “basic relation” ∈ 
defined by ZF. Now, it is exactly this view of a minimal model as the minimal partial relation 
of the axiomatic primitives that is also expressed in Carnap’s third formal version of his 
axioms of restriction in 1928.   
 
The parallels with Fraenkel’s account do not end here. As mentioned above, Carnap presents 
a second kind of extremal axioms in his manuscript, the so-called “accessibility axioms” he 
considers as “related with (possibly a special case of) the axiom of restriction” (RC 081-01-
10). An accessibility axiom presupposes “absolute” and “relative existence axioms” which 
state that “there exist elements in the system with these and that properties (“Urelements”)” 
and that “if elements exist of this and that property then there also exist elements of that and 
those properties” respectively. Given this, an accessibility axiom is defined in this way:  
 
An accessibility axiom then states: every element of the system is either an element (according to the 
absolute existence axiom) or its existence can be deduced in finitely many steps from the elements 
with the help of the relative existence axiom. (ibid.)216 
 
The underlying idea here is that an axiom system T fixes a certain “accessibility class” 
(“Erreichbarkeitsklasse“) of elements constructible from a certain base set (imposed by the 
absolute existence axioms of T) via the iterative application of operations (expressed in the 
                                                 
 
215
 “In vielen Fällen schränkt die fragliche Deutung den Umfang eines Grundbegriffs gegenüber der üblichen 
Deutung im gesamten Axiomensystem mehr oder weniger ein, so dass nur mehr ein Teil der ursprünglich unter 
jenen Grundbegriff fallenden Objekte (…) als existierend zugelassen werden.“ (Fraenkel 1928, 342) 
216
 “Ein EA besagt dann: jeder Gegenstand des Systems ist entweder selbst eine Gegenstand (gemäß dem aExA) 
oder seine Existenz ist aus der der Gegenstände mit Hilfe des rExA in endlich vielen Schritten ableitbar.“ (ibid.) 
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relative existence axioms of T). The accessibility axiom then secures that this class is also the 
single intended model of T. It states, in Carnap terms, that “every element is accessible” (RC 
081-01-10/3). 
Here again, the set-theoretic context of his reconstruction is quite definite. Note first that 
Carnap’s discussion of absolute and relative existence axioms clearly reflects Fraenkel’s own 
presentation of the standard set theoretical axioms in Fraenkel (1928). There, ZF includes a 
number of “unconditional existence axioms” (e.g. the axiom of infinity) and “conditional 
existence axioms” (e.g. the axioms of union, power set and choice).217 Second and more 
generally, Carnap’s picture of a theory’s domain as an accessibility class closely mirrors 
Fraenkel’s newly introduced conception of the set universe as an algebraic closure of a base 
set (in his case the empty set) under the operations codified in the axioms of ZF. Note that 
Carnap explicitly speaks of a “basic class” (“Urklasse”) consisting of “Urelements” and of an 
“order of classes” (“Stufenreihe von Klassen”) as a theory’s domain. The latter begins with 
the basic class and yields higher and higher levels by the reiterated application of an “order-
relation” (“Stufenrelation”) that defines the group of operations specified in the relative 
existence axioms. The “union of these classes” is then the accessibility class; its elements are 
the “accessible” elements of a theory (RC 081-01-10/2). It is precisely this idea of a theory’s 
domain as the accessibility class that one can also find in Fraenkel’s closure conception of set 
models. Moreover, Carnap’s version of an accessibility axiom as expressing the (closure) 
condition that “every element is accessible” clearly corresponds to Fraenkel’s first version of 
devising AR. Recall from Section 3.2 that AR was devised there as a minimal condition on 
admissible sets. The intended domain of ZF+AR was conceived as the restriction to the sets 
introduced by the absolute existence axioms and by the “finite application” of the relative 
existence axioms of ZF.218  
 
Given this obvious background in axiomatic set theory, it is quite surprising that Carnap, 
instead of explicitly discussing AR, draws to “Peano arithmetic” to further illustrate his theory 
of accessibility axiom (RC 081-01-10/3).219 Recall that in the “preliminary work plan” for 
                                                 
 
217
 See Fraenkel (1928, §16) 
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 Compare Fraenkel (1928, 355). 
219
 In Carnap (1934) Fraenkel’s AR is extensively discussed as an accessibility axiom: “The axiom of restriction 
states that in the domain of sets treated in [the axiom system] S, say B, only those sets are considered whose 
existence is imposed by the other axioms.“ (Carnap 1934, 281) 
„Das Beschränktheitsaxiom besagt, dass in dem in S behandelten Mengenbereich, etwa B, nur diejenigen 
Mengen vorkommen, deren Existenz durch die anderen Axiome gefordert ist.“ (Carnap 1934, 281) 
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Part 2 of Untersuchungen “Peano’s axiom of induction“ is juxtaposed to AR as an instance of 
an accessibility axiom. What was Carnap’s motivation for treating these two axioms as 
functionally similar? In order to approach this question let us make a step back and have a 
second look at Fraenkel’s own conception of AR and his motivation for setting it up in the 
way he did. 
 
3.4.2 Fraenkel’s arithmetical background220  
It is not completely clear from Fraenkel’s remarks on AR mentioned in Section 3.3.2 how he 
conceived the intended restrictive effect of his axiom on the possible set models of ZF. 
Nevertheless, there exists an insightful passage in Fraenkel (1928) that helps to see his 
mathematical background for AR. Fraenkel mentions here the “special character” of the 
axiom compared to the “existential” and “relational axioms” of ZF and observes the fact that 
“in both versions [of AR], the inductive moment is essential.” (Fraenkel 1928, 355) What is 
his intuition about the inductive character of AR here? As we have already seen, the concept 
of intersection plays a central role for the intended effect of the axiom candidate. A minimal 
model is conceived as the intersection of all possible models satisfying ZF. From a 
methodological point of view, this is a paring down-approach of defining a specific minimal 
structure by taking the intersection of all closed subsets of a given set. 
There is a direct link between Fraenkel’s use of this method and the early understanding of 
induction principles in arithmetic. As is generally known, the paring down method was 
productively used by Dedekind to express the principle of mathematical induction as well to 
fix axiomatically the standard model of arithmetic.221 I make a case in Schiemer (2010) that 
Fraenkel’s conception of a minimal model for set theory was very likely shaped in close 
analogy to Dedekind’s strategy of defining the natural numbers as a minimal set closed under 
induction. More specifically, I show that there is a striking similarity between Fraenkel’s 
treatment of AR and Dedekind’s “theory of chains” (“Kettentheorie”) introduced in Dedekind 
(1888) (see Schiemer (2010, 316-321)). This suggests that Fraenkel actually modeled his idea 
of set-theoretic restriction based on Dedekind’s approach.222 Here, my aim is not to retrace 
this line of influence but to offer an explanation why Carnap, in formally reconstructing AR, 
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 This Section is based on Schiemer (2010). 
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 Compare Sieg and Schlimm (2005). 
222
 See Schiemer (2010) for further details of this comparison between Dedekind’s approach to arithmetic and 
Fraenkel’s conception of set theory. 
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also perceived a methodological affinity between Fraenkel’s axiom and the arithmetical 
axiom of induction. It is for this reason that a brief look at Dedekind’s approach will be 
instructive. 
 
Dedekind’s foundational treatment of the natural numbers in Dedekind (1888) is based on a 
number of methodological results concerning the central concepts that allow the reduction of 
numbers to a logical basis (ibid, 351). One of these newly introduced concepts allowing him 
to devise the sequence N of the natural numbers is that of a chain (relative to mapping 
function ϕ and a system S): in modern terminology, a subsystem B of S is called a chain if it is 
closed under a mapping ϕ (ibid, 352). A system A0 is defined as the chain of A (“Kette des 
Systems A”) if A0 is the intersection of all chains containing A (ibid, 353). What is important 
to note here is that Dedekind also conceives A0 (give this underlying intersection of closures 
approach) as the smallest chain containing A, i.e. the smallest subset of S closed under ϕ. 
Again, in modern terminology, this effectively says that A0 is the minimal closure of A under 
ϕ (compare Schiemer (2010, 317).223  
Given this concept of a minimal chain, a set of axiomatic conditions is set up by Dedekind to 
characterize “simple infinite systems,” i.e., systems isomorphic to the system of natural 
numbers (1, N, ϕ). One of the four conditions, condition β, states that the admissible system 
has to be a minimal chain containing the base 1:  N = 10 Thus, in Dedekind’s account of the 
natural numbers, 1 is the base element and the sequence N is the intersection of all sets 
containing 1 that are closed under the successor operation. Note the difference of this early 
axiomatic presentation of arithmetic to standard (second-order) Peano arithmetic: In 
Dedekind’s version, principle β is used as an alternative to an explicitly formulated induction 
axiom. Instead of introducing AI as an axiom, Dedekind proves the principle of mathematical 
induction with the help of his concept of a minimal chain.224  
It is this minimal chain condition expressed in Dedekind’s original axiomatic system of 
arithmetic (and the paring down method underlying it) that most likely motivated Fraenkel’s 
own axiom of restriction for set theory. The alleged “inductive character” of AR thus can be 
best explained with reference to Dedekind’s original indirect treatment of arithmetical 
                                                 
 
223
 As Sieg and Schlimm (2005) point out, Dedekind is not explicit about the minimality of chains of A in 
Dedekind (1888). There exists, however, have pointed out, a note in Dedekind’s earlier unpublished manuscript 
“Gedanken über Zahlen” in which this issue is explicitly mentioned: “(A) [i.e. the chain of A] is the “smallest” 
chain that contains the system A” (quoted from Sieg and Schlimm 2005, 144). Compare again Schiemer (2010) 
for a fuller discussion of this point. 
224
 Dedekind (1888, 361); compare Sieg and Schlimm (2005, 145). 
  133 
induction via minimal chains. Moreover, Fraenkel’s background in Dedekind arithmetic will 
also help us to understand Carnap’s more general remarks about the role of minimal axioms 
in arithmetic in a proper way.  
 
3.4.3 Carnap’s versions of arithmetic.  
Our initial question was: Why does Carnap repeatedly refer to arithmetic for illustration of his 
extremal axioms despite the fact that the AI obviously has a different structure than his formal 
reconstructions of minimal axioms? The point to see is that Carnap – just as Fraenkel – is in 
fact not considering Peano arithmetic (in its modern canonical form) when speaking of 
“basic” or “elementary arithmetic”. Instead he has in mind alternative axiom systems 
including such related to Dedekind’s β that are structurally comparable to his account of 
minimal axioms. Thus, even though Carnap mentions AI as an instance of accessibility 
axioms in particular and of minimal axioms more generally, it is in fact not the main focus in 
his discussion of the axiomatization of basic arithmetic. 
In the notes on Part 2 of Untersuchungen there are two versions of a “Peano axiom system“, 
both including alternatives to the axiom of induction. In Carnap’s published work up to 
Carnap and Bachmann (1936), most importantly his logic manual Abriss der Logistik (Carnap 
1929), one can identify all in all three alternative versions of arithmetic: 
 
(a) (Second-order) Peano arithmetic: An “original form” of Peano arithmetic with three 
primitives (Nu, Za, Nf) standing for ‘Zero’, ‘Natural Number’, and ‘Successor’ respectively. 
The axiom system includes a second-order version of the induction axiom (see Carnap 1929, 
74). 
 
(b) Ancestral arithmetic: The axiom system defines a single primitive relation (Vg) (for 
“antecessor” (“Vorgänger”)). An accessibility axiom (AA) imposes that “every number is 
accessible from the base element (the Zero) in a finite number of steps (…).” (ibid, 75). 
Carnap’s formal presentation of the axiom in Abriss makes central use of the concept of the 
“succession of Vg” (“Vg-Nachkommenschaft”):225  
(AA)                                             E!B’Vg. ⊃. Za = Vg*’B’Vg 
                                                 
 
225
 Compare Carnap (1929, 34-35). 
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It can be paraphrased by saying that the set of natural numbers Za is the “succession of Vg” 
from the base element B of Vg. Translated in modern terms, this simply states that the set of 
natural numbers is the transitive closure of the base element under Vg.226 Essentially the same 
version of the axiom system can also be found in (RC 081-01-10).227  
 
(c) Basic arithmetic: A version of “Peano’s AS (without the induction axiom)” where the 
accessibility axiom in version (2) is substituted by a minimal structure axiom in the sense 
specified in Section 2 above. This axiom system can be found in (RC 081-01-11). It is also 
discussed more extensively in Carnap and Bachmann (1936, 79-80).  
 
Now, Carnap holds that the three versions are equivalent axiomatic presentations of the same 
theory of the natural numbers. More importantly, for him, there are direct correlations 
between the axioms of the respective systems: the accessibility axioms in (b) “corresponds” to 
the induction axiom in (a) (Carnap 1929, 75). The axiom expressing a closure condition via 
the notion of “succession of Vg” in (c) corresponds to the union of the accessibility axiom and 
two other axioms in (b) (stating the existence of a base element of Vg and the endlessness of 
Vg respectively). Finally, from Part 2 of Untersuchungen, it is clear that Carnap takes the 
accessibility axiom in (b) to be equivalent to a minimal structure axiom used in (c) (see RC 
081-01-11). So, in Carnap’s understanding, the induction axiom, the accessibility axiom, the 
closure axiom and the minimal structure axiom have (more or less) equivalent roles in the 
axiomatization of basic arithmetic.  
Three points have to be emphasized here. First, it is clearly in connection with ancestral 
arithmetic that the status of AI as an accessibility axiom becomes intelligible. In fact, one can 
understand AA as conceptually motivating the induction axiom. The idea expressed in AA is 
that the intended model of ancestral arithmetic is gained by the transitive closure of Zero 
under successor operation. On closer inspection, this is of course also implicit in AI:  
                                (∀X)([X(0) ∧ (∀x)(X(x) → X(S(x)))] → (∀y)(X(y))) 
                                                 
 
226
 Compare Smith (2008) for a modern presentation of ancestral arithmetic. Here, the accessibility axiom is 
defined for the signature (0, S) (for ‘Zero’ and ‘Successor’) and reads: (∀x)(x = 0 ∨ S*0x) (see ibid, 4). 
227
 In Abriss, there is a forth, “most simple” version of arithmetic, also with a single primitive relation (Vg), but 
with only two axioms. The first axiom states that Vg is 1-1. The second axiom effectively states that that domain 
of Vg is the closure of the base element under Vg (see Carnap 1929, 75). 
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The last part of the formula, i.e. the consequent ∀y(X(y)), expresses that all elements of the 
intended domain hold in a set (given that it contains Zero and is closed under Succession).228 
Thus, any subset A of a model’s domain for PA that is assigned to X that satisfies these two 
conditions in the antecedent is also the intended domain of PA. 
Second, note that in the light of these equivalences of the alternative axiomatic systems the 
minimality of the intended model of Peano arithmetic becomes clear. In particular, the 
comparison with the equivalent versions of AI makes evident its intended role in the 
axiomatization: to fix the system of natural numbers as the minimal subset of all sets closed 
under induction.229 In all four of Carnap’s axiomatic systems this minimal property of the 
standard model of basic arithmetic is implied: via accessibility and an implicit minimal 
closure condition in (b), via containment in all inductive sets in (a), and finally via an explicit 
minimality condition expressed in the minimal structure axiom in (c).230  
Carnap’s discussion of the alternative axiomatic systems of arithmetic actually explains why 
he conceived AI as a minimal axiom despite the obvious differences described above. We 
indicated that Fraenkel, when mentioning the “inductive character” of AR, did not think of AI 
but rather of something like Dedekind’s axiomatic condition β: N = 10. A similar point holds 
for Carnap. His immediate conceptual background for his axiomatic presentation of arithmetic 
in (b) and the closure condition expressed therein is not Dedekind’s notion of a chain. 
Nevertheless, it is built on something essentially similar, namely Frege’s concept of an 
“ancestral” of a relation introduced in his Begriffsschrift231 and, more directly, on the notion 
of an arithmetical “progression”. Carnap mentions explicitly in Abriss that his version (b) is 
effectively based on Russell and Whitehead’s formal notion of a “progression” from Principia 
Mathematica §122 (see Carnap 1929, 75).232 Now, it is generally known that the closure 
condition expressed in Russell’s progressions as well as in Frege’s ancestral of a relation is in 
                                                 
 
228
 The same point was recently stressed by Smith when discussing the relation between PA and ancestral 
arithmetic: “Now note, however, the crucial assumption here: the successors of zero are the only natural 
numbers. This assumption evidently underlies our acceptance of induction. (…) it is an idea which has to be 
available to anyone who fully grasps PA.” (Smith 2008, 3) 
229
 Compare Hintikka (1986) on this point. 
230
 The minimal structure axiom explicitly adds to the picture the additional condition that this model minimality 
holds for the intended models of arithmetic up to isomorphism. 
231
 See Frege (1879, Prop.76) 
232
 Progressions are defined in Principia Mathematica as a specific type of series, i.e. as a class of all inductive 
cardinals whose “generating relation” satisfies the following conditions: (i) being 1-1; (ii) having a first term not 
included in range of R; (iii) being denumerably infinite; (iv) being closed under its “generating relation” R  
(Russell and Whitehead (1962, 245). The intention behind this last closure condition is to exclude those 1-1 
relations that result in independent chains of elements, i.e. infinite series with a serial number other than ω (see 
ibid, 245-248). 
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fact identical to the one expressed in Dedekind’s notion of a chain.233 There exists, however, a 
subtle difference between the three approaches to arithmetic that is relevant here. Dedekind, 
as we have seen, explicitly mentions that the chain 10 is the smallest of possible chains. This 
minimality property is not made explicit in the other two accounts that lay the ground for 
Carnap’s axiom system (b). In particular, no explicit mention was made by Frege or Russell 
of the model minimality implied in their versions of ancestral arithmetic. It was for this reason 
that Carnap - in connecting the dots - introduced the third version (c) including an explicit 
minimal axiom in order to emphasize the model minimality already implicit in his 
predecessors’ formal theories of arithmetic.     
Finally, with the Russellian (and Fregean) background of Carnap’s conception of arithmetic 
in mind, the apparent conflict between the specific “metatheoretic” character of his minimal 
axioms and his mathematical sources (specifically AI) can be dissolved. The axioms (or 
axiomatic conditions) on which Carnap’s formal reconstruction is based are unlike AI clearly 
metatheoretic from a modern point of view. They contain, as do Carnap’s minimal axioms, a 
minimal closure approach that is nowadays expressed in a theory’s metatheory and not in the 
axioms themselves.234  Thus, Carnap’s minimal axioms (as his mathematical sources) can be 
criticized for their anachronistic metatheoretic character, i.e. mainly for quantifying over 
possible models of a theory.235 They cannot, however, be criticized for not adequately 
representing their mathematical sources. A closer look at the actual influences for his formal 
reconstructions - namely Freankel’s AR and a Russellian interpretation of Peano arithmetic - 
has shown that Carnap is in fact capturing the informal conceptions of limiting conditions on 
a theory’s domain expressed there quite closely. Thus, the possible claim mentioned in the 
introduction that Carnap’s theory of extremal axioms fails to capture actual axiomatic practice 
has shown to be untenable.  
I turn now to the second interpretive issue mentioned at the outset of the chapter, the question 
on Carnap’s views on the relation between “completeness for models” and “monomorphism” 
and on how they relate to a larger then contemporary debate on the issue. 
    
                                                 
 
233
 See e.g. Demopoulos and Clark (2005, 140). 
234
 See Shapiro (1991) for further discussion of the use of minimal closures in Dedekind’s work (ibid, 98) as well 
as in Frege’s ancestral arithmetic (ibid, 129).  
235
 See Hintikka (1991, 331-332) and, for an alternative view, Shapiro (1991, 185-186). For an early critique of 
this nature see Baldus (1928). 
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3.5 Extremal axioms and categoricity 
A central motivation for Carnap’s discussion of minimal axioms (and extremal axiom in 
general) in Untersuchungen was to show that the addition of such an axiom results a 
categorical (in Carnap’s terms “monomorphic”) axiomatization.236 In the case of Peano 
arithmetic, adding an accessibility axiom or a minimal axiom to the base system enforces 
model minimality on the possible interpretations. In Carnap’s view, this kind of completeness 
of the models also implies the categoricity of the resulting system. We saw in Section 3.1 that 
a similar motivation for introducing a minimal axiom to the axiom system of set theory can 
also be traced in Fraenkel’s discussion of his AR. Recall that in Fraenkel (1924) and later on, 
the axiom candidate is introduced in order to yield an axiomatization that “captures the 
totality of admissible sets completely (…),” where completeness is understood as categoricity 
(ibid, 218).237 Fraenkel never made an attempt at a formal categoricity proof for his set-
theoretic system. Nonetheless, it is clear from his informal remarks that for him the 
minimality of the set models would imply the categoricity of ZF+AR. Here, as with Carnap’s 
example of basic arithmetic, Fraenkel viewed the categoricity of the resulting system of 
axiomatic set theory was an immediate result of adding AR to ZF. 
More generally, I think it is save to say that in the theoretical accounts of formal axiomatics 
up to the 1920s, the categoricity of a theory was conceived as a direct consequence of the 
completeness of models expressed by extremal axioms. Nevertheless, in the second half of the 
decade a more refined discussion of these two notions of completeness set in (with the 
participation of von Neumann, Zermelo, Skolem, Finsler, Bernays, Bear, Baldus, and Carnap 
among others). The main focus in this debate was dedicated to Hilbert’s AC and Fraenkel’s 
AR and their effects on the respective axiomatic theories.238 However, to a lesser extent, also 
the more general logical relation between extremal axioms (and the kind of completeness 
imposed by them) and the categoricity of the mathematical theories was discussed. In this 
respect, two contributions stand out. One is Carnap’s own attempt to characterize and classify 
extremal axioms in the Untersuchungen of 1928 that was least partly motivated by the wish to 
clarify their effect on an axiomatic system. The second explicit discussion of this point can be 
                                                 
 
236
 In (RC 081-01-04), after stating the informal versions of restriction and completeness axioms, he mentions 
that “both happens to yield monomorphism.” Compare Reck (2007, 195-196).  
237
 For Fraenkel’s treatment of three types of completeness, i.e. semantic completeness, syntactic completeness 
and categoricity, as well as their relationship and later reception, by Carnap, see Awodey & Reck (2002). 
238
 For the immediate, mostly critical reception of Fraenkel’s axiom candidate see Schiemer (2010).  
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found in an article of the mathematician Richard Baldus also dated from 1928. In the 
remaining two sections, their contributions to this metatheoretic question will be compared. 
 
3.5.1 A limitative result by Baldus  
One central limitative result on the general impact of extremal constraints on the models of a 
theory was developed in Baldus (1928). The main target of Baldus’ discussion is Hilbert’s 
geometrical AC in Grundlagen der Geometrie.239 Baldus discusses different versions of 
Hilbert’s axiom (both the original version quoted in Section 3.2 above and the axiom of line 
completeness introduced in a later edition of the book). He shows that the later axiom of line 
completeness can be substituted by an equivalent continuity (or Cantorian) axiom.240 A 
theory consisting of Hilbert’s axioms groups I to IV, the Archimedean axiom, the continuity 
axiom but not the (Euclidian) axiom of parallels is termed (following Bolyai) “absolute 
geometry”.  In his paper, Baldus presents two important metatheoretic results on the 
axiomatic theory of absolute geometry. First, it is shown that the general completeness of 
models can be proved as a meta-theorem of the axiom system. In Baldus’ own terms:    
   
Theorem of completeness. It is not possible to add in thought any kind of things (“points,” “lines,” 
“planes”) to an interpretation of the axioms of absolute geometry (…) so that the axioms again hold in 
the extended interpretation and that the axiomatic relations between the elements (points, lines, planes) 
of the original interpretation are preserved under the extension. (ibid, 324)241   
 
This completeness theorem in fact expresses the same kind of model maximality as Hilbert’s 
AC does. Baldus motivation for his reconstruction is this: By substituting Hilbert’s ‘meta-
axiom’ by a less problematic axiom of continuity, the maximality constraint on the possible 
models of the theory does not have to be expressed within the theory itself. It can instead be 
transposed to the (semantic) metatheory of the axiom system.242  
                                                 
 
239
 Beside the discussion of AR, there are also a number of critical side-remarks on Fraenkel’s AR, in 
particularly on its problematic metatheoretic character. For a fuller discussion see Schiemer (2010). Compare 
also Hintikka (1991). 
240
 See Baldus (1928, 323). 
241
 “Vollständigkeitssatz. Es ist nicht möglich, zu einer Deutung der Axiome der absoluten Geometrie (…) 
irgendwelche Dinge („Punkte“, „Geraden“, „Ebenen“) so hinzuzudenken, dass in der erweiterten Deutung 
wieder die Axiome der absoluten Geometrie gelten  und dass die axiomatischen Beziehungen der Elemente 
(Punkte, Gerade, Ebene) der ursprünglichen Deutung bei der Erweiterung erhalten bleiben.“ (ibid, 324) 
242
 Note that this idea goes further than Hilbert’s (and Bernay’s) own approach in later editions of Grundlagen to 
substitute AC by an (still ‘metatheoretic’) axiom of line completeness and present full completeness as a 
theorem. Compare Awodey and Reck (2002, 12-17) on this point. 
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It is Baldus’ second and main result concerning absolute geometry that clearly limits (or 
better, puts into proper perspective) the previously conceived relation between completeness 
of models and the categoricity of a theory. In Hilbert’s axiomatization of Euclidian geometry 
the maximality assumption expressed in AC implies the categoricity of the theory. Baldus 
shows that this consequence does not hold in the case of absolute geometry. Here model 
maximality (in Baldus’ specified sense as the non-extensibility of the domain of points) does 
no suffice to effect categoricity. Thus, Baldus (as far as I know) was the first to show in print 
that the two kinds of completeness – model maximality and categoricity - are not generally 
equivalent notions: 
 
An axiom system can be complete in the sense of the axiom of completeness without that all its 
interpretations are isomorphic, i.e. there exists a 1-1 correlation between them that preserves the 
axiomatically fixed concepts and relations. (ibid, 328)243  
 
There can be cases, he argues, in which two models of a theory are both maximal in terms of 
the set of points but where a 1-1 correlation between the respective domains does not preserve 
the structure of the models (see ibid, 327-328).  Baldus’ result is highly intuitive in the light 
of non-Euclidian geometries, in particular hyperbolic geometry. The axiom system of 
absolute geometry was in fact originally set up by Bolyai as a neutral base theory to which 
different inconsistent axioms of parallels could be added, thus yielding different non-
Euclidian theories.244 Baldus shows that the completeness property for models holds for any 
theory that includes absolute geometry, i.e. Euclidian geometry or hyperbolic geometry, but 
not elliptic geometry. In both cases the continuity axiom fixes that the possible models have 
as the domain Cartesian space over the continuous ordered field R, viz. C2(R).  
Model maximality is thus a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the categoricity of a 
theory. Only the addition of an axiom that provides a unique characterization of the space 
defined by absolute geometry would render the resulting theory categorical (see ibid, 329). 
Since the possible axioms for this role, namely the Euclidian axiom of parallels and a 
hyperbolic alternative are inconsistent with each other, i.e. impose inconsistent structures on 
                                                 
 
243
 “Ein Axiomensystem kann im Sinne des Vollständigkeitsaxioms vollständig sein, ohne dass dessen sämtlich 
Deutungen isomorph sind, d.h. unter Erhaltung der axiomatisch festgelegten Begriffe und Beziehungen 
elementweise ein-eindeutig aufeinander beziehbar.“ (ibid, 328) 
244
 Compare also Torretti (1984, 66). 
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its models, the base theory of absolute geometry underlying both theoretical extensions could 
simply not be categorical.245  
 
The general moral to be drawn from these counterexamples presented in Baldus (1928) was 
that model maximality (and minimality thereof) is not equivalent to categoricity. More 
precisely, it is the conditional from model maximality to categoricity that does not hold in 
general. Constraints in addition to the extremal constraints concerning the possible models of 
a theory have to be specified so that the introduction of an extremal axiom yields a categorical 
theory. Baldus, apart from his discussion of the two examples of a complete, non-categorical 
theory did not get more specific on how these conditions can be understood in a more general 
setting. Here, Carnap’s Untersuchungen enters into the picture. 
 
3.5.2 Carnap’s understanding in 1928 
It was already mentioned that one of Carnap’s main motivations for his formal reconstruction 
of extremal axioms was to get a clearer picture of the logical relations between the different 
notions of metatheoretic completeness, including those of “monomorphism” and 
“completeness of the models”. How, then, does his account relate to Baldus limitative result? 
According to Hintikka (1991), the relation is one of complete misunderstanding of the 
original problem on Carnap’s side: Due to a tacit “universality assumption” in Carnap’s 
thought he presupposed in his formal models an invariant and fixed domain of discourse. 
Since the domain of a model cannot be extended or restricted in this conception, Carnap 
simply missed the point of extremal conditions (expressed by Hilbert and later by Baldus in 
terms of the non-extensibility of a model’s domain) (ibid, 332). Hintikka observes further that 
since “the bone of contention was thus a profound difference in the conceptual assumption of 
the two parties, it is perhaps not surprising that is was never consciously acknowledged by the 
disputants, either by Baldus or by Carnap.” (ibid, 333) Now, whereas Hintikka’s last 
observation is correct, I take the reason for this to be that Carnap and Baldus are in fact (both 
in Carnap and Bachmann (1936) and in Carnap (2000)) addressing the same problem as 
Hilbert and Baldus. I showed in Chapter 2 that Hintikka’s reading is not a valid 
characterization of Carnap’s version of extremal conditions. Moreover, I argued there that 
                                                 
 
245
 A second example for a model maximal, non-categorical theory mentioned by Baldus is the theory of 
algebraically closed, absolute algebraic fields without a characteristic mentioned to him by Emmy Noether. See 
(ibid, 328-329). 
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once the heterodox character of Carnap’s conception of models is understood properly, also 
his formal reconstruction of extremal axioms shows to be in accord with mathematical 
practice.  
What remains to be studied here is the actual relation between Baldus’ limitative result and 
Carnap’s account. Here again, a closer look at Carnap’s unpublished work on the topic proves 
to be insightful. There is archival evidence that Carnap was, already in 1928, seriously 
engaged in assessing the more general relation between the two types of completeness. For 
instance, in a letter to Fraenkel dated March 26, 1928 he writes: 
 
I have also started to analyse the question of the relation between the axiom of restriction, the axiom 
of completeness and monomorphism. The treatment of the axiom systems as propositional functions 
greatly facilitates the investigation. (RC 081-01-26)246 
 
Unfortunately, it seems impossible to decide on the basis of Carnap’s documents in the 
Nachlass whether or not he was aware of Baldus (1928) when working on the subject in his 
manuscript for Part 2 of Untersuchungen.247 Nevertheless, a closer look at what Carnap 
thought about the relation of completeness of models and categoricity in his projected Part 2 
is quite revealing. It shows that Carnap was in fact fully aware that the addition of an extremal 
axiom to a given base system was not a sufficient means to yield categoricity. 
 
Before turning to Carnap’s own results on this point, recall again his convention for 
discussing extremal constraints on the models of an axiom system. His last remark in the 
letter to Fraenkel that the conception of axiom systems as propositional functions simplifies 
the study of extremal axioms is central here. The main concept introduced by him to study 
extremal constraints is that of a model’s structure.248 In Untersuchungen, a model’s structure 
characterizes a model in the sense that it fixes its isomorphism class (Carnap (2000, 74)). 
Accordingly, an axiom system - expressed as a propositional function f(R, S, T) with primitive 
relations R, S, T - has a “structure number” referring to the numbers of different structures it 
defines. Each of these structures fixes one isomorphism class of models. An axiom system 
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 “Ich habe auch angefangen, die Frage des Zusammenhanges zw. Berchr.Axiom, Vollst.Ax und Monomorphie 
zu untersuchen. Die Behandlung der AS als Aussagefunktionen erleichtert die U. sehr.” (RC 081-01-26) 
247
 In an attached note to the manuscript titled “For Axiomatics, to read” (RC 081-01-30) he mentions only 
Baldus (1927), a paper on the Archimedean axiom in geometry, but not Baldus (1928). Overall, I take it to be 
rather unlikely that Carnap was aware of Baldus (1928) when working on his manuscript. 
248
 Compare 1.3.2 for a more detailed account of Carnap’s ‘structuralist’ conception of axiom systems; see 2.2.1 
for his notion of a ‘model structure’. 
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with only one structure is categorical (“monomorphic”), a system with more than one 
structure non-categorical (“polymorphic”) (ibid, 128).  
We also saw in Section 2.2.2 that the “extremal conditions” imposed by minimal and maximal 
axioms were also cashed out in terms of structures and structure extensions (and restrictions 
respectively): In Part 2 (as well as in Carnap and Bachmann (1936)), a segment TSF of this 
class of structures of an axiom system can be classified by the relation of a being a “proper 
substructure”.249 “Beginning structures” of f are those belonging to the domain of TSF. “End 
structures” of f are those belonging to the range of TSF. Finally, “isolated structures” are the 
structures of f not belonging to TSF (see (Carnap and Bachmann 1981, 75-76), RC 081-01-08).  
Accordingly, the “minimal structures” of f imposed by a minimal axiom restrict the possible 
models of f to instances of the beginning- and isolated structures; “maximal structures” 
imposed by maximal axioms fix the models to be instances of either the end- or the isolated 
structures of f (see (ibid, 76); RC 081-01-08).250  
Given this structural account of axiom systems, we can now turn to Carnap’s understanding 
of the general logical relation of completeness of models and categoricity. In a document 
titled “Monomorphism by BA [axioms of restriction] or VA [axioms of completeness],” he 
discusses the general conditions which a base axiom system has to fulfill so that an extremal 
axiom implies the categoricity of the resulting system (RC 081-01-09). For the case of 
maximal axioms, the base system in question has to possess among the different possible 
structures either:  
 
(i) a single undividable isolated structure and no undividable end structure or  
(ii) a single undividable end structure and no isolated structure (RC 081-01-09).  
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 A structure S is called a “proper substructure” of an existing structure T, if S and T are not identical and there 
are at least two models M and N, where M is a “proper part” of N and M satisfies S and N satisfies T. See RC 
081-01-06 and Carnap and Bachmann (1981, 75). 
250
 Note that Carnap’s reconstruction of extremal condition is cast in terms of model’s structures and structure 
extensions and not, in terms of models and model extension. It is important to emphasize here again that this 
does not commit him to a nonstandard understanding of the informal use of models and model extensions found 
in Hilbert, Baldus, and others. As I show in Section 2.5, Carnap’s notions of structure extensions and extremal 
structures fully correspond to their informal counterparts in Hilbert and others, provided that Carnap’s heterodox 
account of models is understood properly. 
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Put in terms of models, a maximal axiom adds up to a categorical axiomatization if the base 
axiom system is satisfied by either exactly one maximal model or one structurally non-
extensible model.251, 252  
 
How does this account relate to the results in Baldus (1928)? It is clear in both cases that the 
addition of an extremal axiom was not conceived as a sufficient condition to yield the 
categoricity of a theory. For Carnap, a maximal axiom effects categoricity only if it restricts 
the set of admissible models to either an isolated or a single maximal model. This is 
essentially what Baldus expresses in his example of absolute geometry. Translated in 
Carnap’s terms, the point to see there was that the axiom system allows different and 
independent proper substructures, say a “Euclidian” and a “hyperbolic” substructure. Baldus’ 
axiom of continuity thus restricts the class of models to the respective maximal models, i.e. to 
the models of the respective maximal structure of each substructure. Since the condition (ii) 
of a single maximal structure is not met here, adding a maximal axiom to the base system 
does not imply categoricity. As we have seen, it only gets categorical if an additional axiom, 
say the axiom of parallels, is added to the theory. In this case, the resulting base axiom system 
(taken without a maximal axiom) possesses only one proper substructure, namely the 
“Euclidian” structure. Since Baldus’ axiom of continuity restricts the possible models to the 
model(s) of the maximal structure, the theory suffices to capture its interpretations up to 
isomorphism.  
Given this, Carnap’s account in 1928 can be considered as a formal equivalent to Baldus 
result. In fact, it allows getting a better grip on the difference described informally by Baldus 
between the different inconsistent structures within absolute geometry. Note that the issue of 
extremality constraints and categoricity is taken up again in Carnap and Bachmann (1936), 
however this time with explicit reference to Baldus (1928). Carnap and Bachmann, in 
discussing Baldus’ examples note here that whereas the inference from categoricity to 
completeness of models is trivial,  
                                                 
 
251
 An analogue case can be found a few pages later for the case of maximal structure axioms. Here, adding the 
an axiom yields categoricity if among the possible models there are either (i’) a single isolated structure 
(dividable or undividable) and no end structure or (ii’) a single end structure (dividable or undividable) and not 
isolated structure (RC 081-01-11). 
252
 Note that this result is closely related to Carnap’s second notion of completeness extensively discussed in Part 
1 of Untersuchungen, namely “non-forkability” (“Nichtgabelbarkeit”). It states, in modern terms, that a theory T 
is semantically complete if there is no sentence ϕ expressible in T such that both T ∪{ϕ} and T ∪{¬ϕ} are 
satisfiable (see Awodey and Reck (2002, 4)). Given this, one could say that for Carnap, a theory is categorical iff 
it is complete in the models and non-forkable.   
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The converse does not follow, however. The nonexistence of extensions for the models of an axiom 
system does not at all imply the monomorphism of an axiom system. (Carnap and Bachmann (1981, 
82)) 
 
For Carnap in 1936, the inference in this direction might fail due to the existence of 
“incomparable models, i.e., such that neither can be isomorphically mapped into the other.” 
(ibid, 82) Given the case of absolute geometry (as well as Noether’s algebraic example), the 
authors go on to specify a general condition under what circumstances the addition of a 
maximal axiom implies categoricity: 
 
An axiom system closed by a maximal axiom is monomorphic if among the models of the body 
axioms there is one into which all others (that do not belong to endlessly increasing structure 
sentences of the body axioms) can be isomorphically mapped. (ibid, 82, my emphasis)253  
 
Two remarks on this passage are in order here. First, there is a slight change in the treatment 
of model maximality compared to Carnap’s original account in Untersuchungen. Instead of 
speaking of end (and isolated) structures, the maximality of a model is expressed here in 
terms of its embedding properties.254  
Second, and more important for our discussion, note how the stronger notion of completeness 
of models for a categorical theory is stated here. Model maximality in this sense can be 
paraphrased in this way: a model M is (up to isomorphism) the unique model of T that admits 
no proper extension to a model M’ of T. Two characteristics of M are expressed here: (a) 
uniqueness and (b) non-extensibility. Now, the uniqueness condition had traditionally been 
understood as a direct consequence of the non-extensibility of a maximal model, for instance 
in Hilbert’s axiom system for Euclidian geometry. However, as we have seen, this inference 
does not hold in absolute geometry.  
A similar example can be given for the complementary case of minimal axioms. The relation 
between (a) and (b) is not completely settled in Carnap’s original example of minimal axioms, 
Fraenkel’s AR. Already in von Neumann (1925), the earliest critical discussion of Fraenkel’s 
axiom candidate, doubts were raised concerning the model minimality effected by AR. More 
                                                 
 
253
 Compare also the following related passage: “For example, in monomorphic, closed axiom systems maximal 
axioms are equivalent with the positive requirement that every model of the axiom body can be isomorphically 
mapped into M.” (Carnap and Bachmann 1981, 82) 
254
 See Ehrlich (1995) for a closer discussion of this point. 
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specifically, von Neumann argued that Fraenkel’s proposed method of devising a model via 
the intersection of all possible models need not necessarily lead to a single minimal model 
satisfying the other axioms and thus to a categorical axiomatization (ibid, 405).255  
It is in this light, I think, that Carnap’s and Baldus’ more general limitative results on 
extremal axioms have to be seen: both authors stress the fact that whereas (b) is generally 
secured by an extremal axiom, (a) is not. Condition (b) can also hold for structurally different 
models of an axiom system. Now, in Carnap and Bachmann (1936), the conceptual distinction 
between (a) and (b) is drawn explicitly.256 Nonetheless, we have seen that already in 1928 this 
distinction is clearly reflected in Carnap’s account of extremal structures. In addition to the 
Carnap’s remarks in (RC 081-01-09) discussed above, this becomes obvious from a 
distinction he draws throughout the manuscript between “deducing“ an extremal axiom from 
a given axiom system and “applying“ it to the axiom system (e.g. RC 081-01-05). Briefly, a 
maximal axiom can be deduced in the case that the system possesses one or more maximal (or 
isolated) structures. In these cases, the completeness of models is not necessarily an exclusive 
property of a single model. Thus, according to Carnap, it makes no sense to “apply” a 
maximal axiom in order to effect categoricity. In contrast, a maximal axiom should only be 
applied to a system if it helps to fix one unique maximal model as the intended model of the 
theory (as is the case in Euclidian geometry) (see ibid.). 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
As pointed out by Hintikka, there was a “subsequent deterioration of the discussion” on the 
general character of extremal axioms after Baldus (1928) and Carnap and Bachmann (1936) 
(Hintikka 1991, 334). This is an effect, however, of Carnap’s misguided semantic 
understanding of extremal condition. To the contrary, in this chapter I aimed to show that 
Carnap - in his Untersuchungen from 1928 and later on - not only presented a formal account 
of extremal axioms that closely captures the informal conceptions of model maximality and 
minimality expressed in his mathematical sources, most importantly Hilbert’s AC and 
                                                 
 
255
 According to von Neumann, this is due to the fact that the range of the generalization over all (sub-) models 
of a theory involved in the intersection approach depends on which background set theory is assumed. Different 
(or better differently interpreted) background systems might allow different ranges of submodels. Given 
Fraenkel’s paring down method of specifying a minimal model, this may lead to different results when different 
systems are assumed as the background theory (ibid, 405). 
256
 Compare again how model maximality is introduced in 1936: “The models of an axiom system that is closed 
by a maximal axiom possess a certain completeness property in that they cannot be extended without violating 
the original axiom system.” (ibid, 82, my emphasis) 
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Fraenkel’s AR. Moreover, he (together with his later collaborator Bachmann) also established 
a more refined picture of the connection between the completeness of models and categoricity 
that was in full agreement with Baldus result. Finally, whereas Carnap’s type-theoretic 
account of extremal axioms has to considered as clearly heterodox and problematic from a 
modern logical perspective, it would be a mistake to make the infer ex-post that is was not 
conceived in earlier days as a valid formal explication. Two references should suffice to make 
this point. In a later paper on Hilbert’s AC (Bernays (1955)), Bernays after mentioning the 
problematic logical character of the axiom states that: “That this complication does not, on the 
other hand, hinder the logistic formalization of the axiom of completeness was shown by R. 
Carnap and F. Bachmann (…) [in Carnap and Bachmann (1936)].” (ibid, 219)257 
Second, in a Fraenkel’s Foundations of Set Theory (Fraenkel & Bar Hillel 1958), Fraenkel 
referred to Carnap’s attempts to formalize AR as a minimal axiom in HOL, concluding that 
“True, recently (…) Carnap proposed a vindication of this axiom of restriction, and Carnap 
formulated it symbolically, as an axiom of a minimal model (…).” (ibid, 90)258 In an attached 
footnote to the passage cited above he stressed this notion of a restriction condition in 
Carnap’s formal presentation as an adequate version of his own informal treatment of AR: 
“The pith of the axiom is then the demand that no “partial relation” ε should fulfill the 
conditions expressed by the other axioms.” (Fraenkel & Bar Hillel 1958, 90)  
These two references by Bernays and Fraenkel from the 1950s clearly do show that Carnap’s 
formal account of extremal axioms was, at least before the eventual turn to contemporary 
model-theoretic semantics, generally considered as a serious contribution to the (meta-)theory 
of formal axiomatics.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
257
 “Dass andererseits diese Komplikation die logistische Formalisierung des Vollständigkeitsaxioms nicht 
hindert, wurde von R. Carnap and F. Bachmann gezeigt (…) [in Carnap and Bachmann (1936)].” (ibid, 219) 
258
 The formalization referred to here is ‘(H)[(x)(y)(Hxy ⊃ Exy). Kon(H) ⊃ (x)(y) (Hxy ↔ Exy)]’ from (Carnap 
1954). As already in Untersuchungen an Carnap and Bachmann (1936), Fraenkel’s account of a minimal 
property codified in AR is symbolized here by the use of higher-level binary relations (representing different 
possible membership relations) and the notion of a minimal partial relation here: “There exists no proper partial 
relation of E that also satisfies the properties stated in axioms A1 to A8 [GS: i.e. ZF].” (Carnap 1954, 154) 
Compare also Schiemer (forthcoming). 
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Outlook 
 
Carnap’s project of Untersuchungen was eventually abandoned as a direct reaction to Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorems and to Tarski’s metalogical work (see Awodey and Carus (2001) 
and Goldfarb (2005)). With the subsequent turn to a purely syntactical investigation of 
mathematics in Logical Syntax of Language also the explicit semantic framework of his 
“general axiomatics” was given up. This holds in particular for his notion of a formal model. 
The concept is not mentioned in Carnap (1934). More surprisingly, also his later work on 
semantics, most notably the three-volume book project Series in Semantics, remains silent on 
the notion. Instead of discussing formal models, Carnap introduces here the substitute 
concepts of “state of affairs,” and “state descriptions” (see Carnap (1942) and (1947)).  
It is only in his very late work, in his ‘Replies and Expositions’ in the Schilpp-volume 
(Schilpp (1963)) that the notion is eventually reintroduced in print. In §10 of the book - titled 
“My conception of semantics” - the following definition of ‘model’ is given:   
 
A model for a language (in the extensional sense of “model” customary in mathematics, as in the 
definitions by Tarski, Kemeny, and others) is an assignment of extensions of the following kind: To 
every type of variables a class of entities of this type is assigned as the range of values, and to every 
primitive constant of the type system an extension of the same type is assigned. (ibid, 902) 
 
The conception outlined here essentially conforms to the way formal models are understood 
today. Interestingly, following a remark on the ‘structure’ of a model, Carnap also refers to 
his early work on axiomatics here. In an attached footnote he adds: “For more exact 
definitions, especially with respect to axiom systems, see Carnap and Bachmann [1936].” 
This reference gives the impression of a certain continuity between his original theory of 
models for axiomatic theories and the late standardized account mentioned in 1963. However, 
in light of the results of the present work, this shows to be more of a retrospective idealization 
than an adequate account of the evolution of this notion in his work. One of the main 
objectives in the dissertation was to point out where exactly his early theory is heterodox 
compared to modern model theory. In particular, it was to show that the conception of models 
underlying Untersuchungen and also Carnap and Bachmann (1936) differs significantly from 
the above specification of “model(s) for a language”.  
The results gained in the present work open up possibilities for further research in Carnap 
scholarship. In particular, it would be worthwhile to retrace Carnap’s evolving views on 
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semantics in general and on models in particular in his subsequent work up to Schilpp (1963). 
As I see it, at least three pressing questions are still open for closer discussion: (1) Which 
influences led to the shift from Carnap’s substitutional conception of models to a modern 
extensional understanding in terms of an “assignment of extensions” outlined above? (2) At 
what point did he change his ‘universalist’ view of a pure type-theoretic language in favor of 
the use of schematically understood languages with non-logical terminology? (3) Finally, 
when did Carnap adopt the modern notion of domain variation for models. Addressing these 
questions would call for a closer study to the few documents (mostly in informal 
correspondence and in discussion notes from the Nachlass) where the notion of models 
resurfaces in Carnap’s later philosophy. This includes (among other things) his notes of the 
Harvard discussions with Tarski and Quine from 1940/41 as well as his correspondence with 
Kemeny and Bar-Hillel on issues in inductive logic in the early 1950s. Investigation of these 
discussions will allow a deeper understanding of the conceptual transitions in Carnap’s 
thinking about formal semantics throughout his intellectual career. This, however, is work for 
another day. 
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Abstract (German and English) 
 
In jüngerer Zeit hat sich ein verstärktes Interesse an den historischen und technischen Details 
von Carnaps Philosophie der Logik und Mathematik entwickelt. Meine Dissertation knüpft an 
diese Entwicklung an und untersucht dessen frühe und formative Beiträge aus den späten 
1920er Jahren zu einer Theorie der formalen Semantik. Carnaps zu Lebzeiten 
unveröffentlichtes Manuskript Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Axiomatik (Carnap 2000) 
beinhaltet ein Reihe von erstmals formal entwickelten Definitionen der Begriffe ‚Modell’, 
‚Modellerweiterung’, und ‚logischer Folgerung’. Die vorliegende Dissertation entwickelt eine 
logische und philosophische Analyse dieser semantischen Begriffsbildungen. Darüber hinaus 
wird Carnaps frühe Semantik in ihrem historisch-intellektuellen Entwicklungskontext 
diskutiert. Der Fokus der Arbeit liegt in der Thematisierung einiger interpretatorischer Fragen 
zu dessen implizit gehaltenen Annahmen bezüglich der Variabilität des Diskursuniversums 
von Modellen sowie zur Interpretation seiner typen-theoretischen logischen Sprache. Mit 
Bezug auf eine Reihe von historischen Dokumenten aus Carnaps Nachlass, insbesondere zu 
dem geplanten zweiten Teil der Untersuchungen wird erstens gezeigt, dass dessen 
Verständnis von Modellen in wesentlichen Punkten heterodox gegenüber dem modernen 
Begriffsverständnis ist. Zweitens, dass Carnap von einer ‚nonstandard’ Interpretation der 
logischen Hintergrundtheorie für seine Axiomatik ausgeht. Die Konsequenzen dieser 
semantischen Annahmen für dessen Konzeptualisierung von metatheoretischen Begriffen 
werden näher diskutiert. Das erste Kapitel entwickelt eine kritische Analyse von Carnaps 
Versuch, die axiomatische Definition von Klassen von mathematischen Strukturen mittels des 
Begriffs von ‚Explizitbegriffen’ formal zu rekonstruieren. Im zweiten Kapitel werden die 
Implikationen von Carnaps frühem Modellbegriff für seine Theorie von Extremalaxiomen 
näher beleuchtet. Das letzte Kapitel bildet eine Diskussion der konkreten historischen 
Einflüsse, insbesondere durch den Mengentheoretiker Abraham Fraenkel, auf Carnaps 
formale Theorie von Minimalaxiomen.     
 
In recent years one was able to witness an intensified interest in the technical and historical 
details of Carnap’s philosophy of logic and mathematics. In my thesis I will take up this line 
and focus on his early, formative contributions to a theory of semantics around 1928. 
Carnap’s unpublished manuscript Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Axiomatik (Carnap 2000) 
includes some of the first formal definitions of the genuinely semantic concepts of a model, 
model extensions, and logical consequence. In the dissertation, I provide a detailed conceptual 
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analysis of their technical details and contextualize Carnap’s results in their historic and 
intellectual environment. Certain interpretative issues related to his tacit assumptions 
concerning the domain of a model and the semantics of type theory will be addressed. By 
referring to unpublished material from Carnap’s Nachlass I will present archival evidence as 
well as more systematic arguments to the view that Carnap holds a heterodox conception of 
models and a nonstandard semantics for his type-theoretic logic.  
Given these semantic background assumptions, their impact on Carnap’s conceptualization of 
certain aspects of the metatheory of axiomatic theories will be evaluated. The first chapter 
critically discusses Carnap’s attempt to explicate one of the crucial semantic innovations of 
formal axiomatics, i.e. the definition of classes of structures, via his notion of 
“Explizitbegriff”’. The second chapter analyses the impact of Carnap’s early theory of model 
for his theory of extremal axioms. The final chapter reviews the mathematical influences, 
most importantly by the set theoretician Abraham Fraenkel on Carnap’s specific formalization 
of minimal axioms.   
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